Patreon Bonus: Battle Cruisers & Battleships are separate Categories in the Washington Naval Treaty

The opening problem: the Washington treaty divides ships into capital ships, carriers, and an "other" category, rather than treating battlecruisers as a distinct class.

The historical treaty’s 5:5:3 capital-ship ratio reflected American insistence on a battle line of fifteen ships, a constraint that shapes the alternate settlement.

Interwar carriers support the battle line not only by scouting but by correcting gunfire, which ties carrier size and speed to the number of fast capital ships at sea.

American negotiators treated Hood as equivalent value to a Colorado, while a 42,000-ton Lexington would have exceeded the treaty's ordinary 35,000-ton capital-ship ceiling.

The historical treaty capped ordinary carriers at 27,000 tons and 8-inch guns while allowing Britain, America, and Japan two larger capital-ship conversions apiece.

Britain’s worldwide commitments make a separate battlecruiser allowance the central bargaining point in this alternate Washington conference.

Not reliably; post-First World War leverage was less centralized, and a British walkout would likely take France, Japan, and Italy with it and leave Congress facing the naval spending it wanted to avoid.

Because speed caps were not part of the contemporary Washington framework, while displacement already forced designers to trade speed against armour, armament, and endurance.

France and Italy are better served by moving their theoretical battlecruiser allowance into battleship tonnage for a Mediterranean rivalry.

Washington imposed no cumulative cruiser tonnage limit, and that loophole complicates both cruiser building and the treatment of small carriers.

It could ask, but the exchange would not solve France's central problem because cruisers could not counter Italy's fast battleships and Washington imposed no aggregate cruiser tonnage limit anyway.

Italy refused to sign for less than France received, while France was economically weak and unwilling to remain outside the treaty.

Probably something like an enlarged County-style reconnaissance cruiser with 9.2-inch guns, alongside an earlier evolution toward a Leander-like light cruiser.

Hermes might sit outside the counted carrier tonnage, encouraging navies to build useful small carriers below the threshold.

A separate category lets Britain retain Hood, Renown, and Repulse while building new battleships and battlecruisers before 1930.

A few thousand additional tons could combine Nelson-class protection with an F3-style hull and machinery arrangement to create a much faster first postwar battleship.

It would become a controlled programme: each navy could build only the ships and sequence written into the agreement, preventing surprises without stopping construction.

No; the heavy-cruiser category did not yet exist in the treaty, and the proposed ships developed from the large-light-cruiser and scouting tradition.

British governments could distribute recurring warship orders to preserve strategically useful yards while supporting regions suffering economic decline.

Scaling the F3 study toward the available treaty tonnage could produce a very fast British battlecruiser, especially if a 15-inch/50 armament saved weight.

New British battlecruisers could make Renown and Repulse available to Australia and New Zealand, spreading cost while maintaining fast ships in the Pacific.

It could, because recurring fast-capital-ship designs would keep machinery efficiency and power density under active development.

Probably not; states without an existing capital-ship industry would have to order abroad, and few had a strategic need or budget strong enough to justify doing so.

It could perform reconnaissance, but that does not mean placing battlecruisers at the front of the battle line.

Not necessarily; aircraft and engine development, lift dimensions, and hangar design matter more directly than the carrier's total displacement.

No; it required disclosure of foreign orders and prevented the builder from taking those ships into its own service.

The analysis keeps decisions made before the treaty divergence fixed and changes later events only when they follow causally from the new settlement.

It might try, as it did historically, but weak infrastructure and the loss of admirals and engineers would still prevent a successful programme.

Japan can retain the four Kongōs within a separate battlecruiser allowance while using capital-ship tonnage for four new battleships.

Workers retired, died, or moved into other industries, while specialist foundries and production lines closed or went dormant and later had to be rebuilt.

Keeping orders moving preserves skills and production capacity that are expensive to recreate after a building holiday.

Repeated two-ship and one-ship orders would turn the 1920s into a design sequence, preserving gun production and feeding lessons from each class into the next.

Atago and Takao were less complete and had already progressed further toward dismantling, making Kaga the more practical replacement hull.

It could produce a different and better ship, but if the design remained reconnaissance-focused it would be a strong scout rather than an ideal cruiser fighter.

Japan might build fewer top-heavy cruisers and destroyers because the new capital ships would already provide strength that smaller types historically had to offset.

They were too new to replace legally, still fitted Japanese scouting doctrine, and gave Japan four useful ships where the same tonnage might buy only three larger ones.

France can build three new battleships, but slow 13.4-inch-gun designs would be badly outmatched by fast Italian capital ships.

Britain gave up the most momentum because it had the world's largest and perhaps most advanced submarine arm, but no signatory was close enough to the limit to be severely constrained in actual construction.

Because the United States wanted the smallest possible cruiser weapon and 9.2 inches already represented the upper end of the contemporary negotiating range.

Japan's top-heavy destroyers were the clearest example, packing excessive capability into constrained hulls.

Italy is one of the great beneficiaries: it can complete the Francesco Caracciolos and later build a second generation of fast battleships.

It could work technically, but Italy would probably still prioritize battleships because the Regia Aeronautica argued that land-based aircraft could cover the Mediterranean.

Possibly, but only if it recognized the logistical requirement and built fuel depots and strategic reserves before the war.

Italy might place less emphasis on heavy cruisers and favor very fast light cruisers because the battle line already supplies heavy striking power.

Italian protection was strong for its intended theatre, while a fast battleship could manoeuvre across the Mediterranean and still survive the close fleet action Italy expected against France.

Yes, operating conditions helped, although Italian submarines still encountered torpedo problems in the North Atlantic.

Probably no more than about 25 knots, because reaching 28 knots would require major changes to machinery space, shafts, hull proportions, and possibly armament.

No; the principal problem described here was inconsistent shell quality, which made accurately aimed rounds follow unpredictable trajectories.

Because Congress has already funded them, the United States is likely to complete a fourth Colorado and five Lexington battlecruisers rather than start fresh programmes.

Five Lexington battlecruisers give the slow American battle line a fast arm designed for reconnaissance, economic warfare, and independent support rather than equal-line combat.

Carrier value was still theoretical in 1922, whereas the Lexingtons were already funded and matched the navy's established scouting doctrine.

Fast British and Japanese capital ships would expose the 21-knot American battle line and make a historical 27-knot Yamato an inadequate answer to the new environment.

If capital-ship construction continues through the 1920s, a later treaty may regulate replacement and light carriers instead of imposing the historical naval holiday.

A stronger, faster Royal Navy makes Germany’s small surface raiders and later fast battleships far less useful as an offset strategy.

Continuing naval orders could support employment and technology through the Depression, but the political coalition that brought Hitler to power cannot be reduced to economic conditions alone.

Higher carrier limits could produce earlier, more capable fleet carriers and link them closely to fast battlecruiser scouting forces.

Extra displacement could bring Implacable- and Essex-scale capabilities forward while leaving Britain protection-heavy and America aircraft-heavy in their design choices.

A 16,000-ton London category could improve Ranger- and Wasp-like ships while changing which Japanese hull replaces Amagi after the earthquake.

Giving Japan meaningful construction rights may reduce the insecurity that made the historical treaty order increasingly unstable.

Probably not; the 1918 decision arose before the treaty divergence, and the transfer back would likely still wait for the 1937 Inskip decision.

American negotiators could rationally expect superiority to deter war while overlooking how the same imbalance might make Japan frightened and more willing to take dangerous risks.

More and larger carriers could make Taranto far more destructive, while a Japan invested in the treaty system might pursue partnership with Britain rather than the Axis.

A larger Illustrious and the possible survival of Glorious could turn Taranto from a small specialist raid into several waves of torpedo and dive bombers.

A Japan that sees the treaty order as beneficial could invoke the memory of its British alliance and enter the European war against Germany and Italy instead of joining the Axis.

Converting the unfinished Lexington-class USS United States would create an early large-carrier test bed, while otherwise the navy would have to learn through successive smaller classes.

Possibly; if Japan no longer relies on Yamato-type battleships as its main offset, it may continue seeking advantage through powerful torpedoes and fast destroyers.

Possibly until the late 1920s, because political enthusiasm concentrated on top-line battleships while the supporting fleet received less attention.

Probably yes; Washington could not comfortably allow Britain and Japan to win together and dominate the post-war order without American participation.

It might instead use an all-forward Nelson-style layout if repeated capital-ship construction made that arrangement the standard British solution.

The Sino-Japanese War was already underway, so the key uncertainty is whether Japan widens it and whether Britain continues supporting China after accepting Japanese help.

Probably at about the same time, because the decisive factor is the pace of gun technology rather than the displacement available to the ship.

Much depends on the war's outcome, but Japan could become a more acceptable non-communist partner than the Soviet Union and join Britain and America in a radically different great-power settlement.

It becomes much less likely because Germany lacks the ships, experience, and freedom to build the naval force that supported the historical operation.

British air-dropped torpedoes had the specialized shallow-water entry system proven for Taranto, whereas a deeper dive would send many weapons into the seabed before they could reach a target.

Britain would probably build or adapt the improved version, since it already possessed the underlying Harrier design tradition.