Alternate History - Royal Navy retains the Fleet 'units' of Royal Naval Air Service: Patreon 76

The scenario keeps the ship-operating units of the Royal Naval Air Service under Admiralty control after 1918, rather than simply moving the later Fleet Air Arm intact.

Only fleet-connected land-based elements are retained; the RAF still receives the broader land-based air force and Coastal Command functions.

Keeping naval aviation inside the Admiralty preserves accounting, spares, and bulk-purchasing practices that can sustain aircraft and engine production more effectively.

No. The RAF remains a major independent service with bombers, fighters, Coastal Command, and most land-based aviation, while the Navy controls only its fleet-connected aircraft.

Not necessarily. French engines and parts were easier to source in France, and the RNAS had a stronger system for sustaining them.

The RNAS had grown into one of the world's largest air services by 1918, supporting the case for retaining the Fifth Sea Lord and an aviation advocate within naval command.

Earlier naval integration of engineering officers provides one explanation for differences between RNAS practice, RFC culture, and the Air Ministry's later emphasis on bombing.

The RFC had support and accounting systems, but these worked less well for aviation than the RNAS arrangements. The comparison is deliberately simplified.

Probably, because a larger Fleet Air Arm infrastructure and production network would already exist around the world.

Yes. It would preserve the flow of naval aviation officers into senior appointments, while the Navy would still draw carrier captains from broader professional backgrounds.

The Royal Navy's willingness to fund aircraft and aviation institutions complicates the shorthand that interwar admirals were simply battleship-minded.

Before the 1918 transfer, RNAS aircraft already searched thousands of square miles for U-boats each day, giving the fleet a practical patrol capability worth retaining.

A modest improvement in aircraft-to-fleet radio communications at Jutland makes spotting and reconnaissance visibly valuable to Jellicoe's battle fleet.

Carrier and shore-based aircraft need different support arrangements, giving fleet aviation an operational reason to remain under naval control.

A destroyer could expedite spare parts between Channel depots, provided the service needing them requested the transport.

Reconnaissance creates opportunity, but ships, supplies, and mobility must turn what commanders know into an operational effect.

A fleet-controlled air arm would retain a smaller but global chain of bases and treat aviation as part of the same support system as ships, fuel, and rearmament.

The loss of HMS Glorious exposed a hazardous command decision above the ship as well as her captain's failure to fly patrols.

Yes. In-house expertise gives the Admiralty a direct route to industry instead of relying on answers filtered through the Air Ministry.

Continuous naval control avoids the dual-rank system and makes flying personnel, fitters, and carrier crews part of one command and damage-control structure.

A fleet-owned air arm could make shore-based fighters and support personnel a normal part of temporary naval bases, potentially changing the defence of Crete.

The Admiralty's wider purchases from major manufacturers could help it resist Air Ministry control over naval aircraft procurement.

Launches, aircraft, and torpedo boats create a combined engine market that can sustain suppliers and press for more power.

Separate procurement could either encourage cooperation or draw aircraft firms toward different service customers.

Yes. The services historically bought many distinct types already, with occasional adaptations providing useful commonality.

The scenario turns the treaty's carrier limits toward a distinct 12,000-ton scout-carrier category, giving reconnaissance and spotting a durable place in force structure.

Experimental status creates room to replace early carriers while respecting the scenario's total tonnage limits.

Hermes-derived scout carriers would accompany cruiser squadrons on distant stations, where their aircraft extend search and presence beyond a cruiser's visual horizon.

A steady building programme could improve machinery, speed, and arrangements within the 12,000-ton limit.

Probably. Common machinery would save money, although the carriers would probably receive no eight-inch guns.

Possibly, but fear of heavy seas entering the hangar would continue to weigh against the design.

Yes. The concern was seawater entering the hangar, illustrated by the heavy seas encountered by British carriers in the South Atlantic.

A larger scout-carrier force supports improved Ark Royal- or Illustrious-scale fleet carriers by producing more experienced officers, crews, and damage-control specialists.

Probably, although the suggestion is not developed into a detailed design.

A larger carrier programme creates more experience with launch equipment, but it does not bypass the existing progression from hydraulic accelerators toward steam catapults.

Repeated construction could encourage greater use of welding in later scout carriers and Ark Royal, although no weight saving is calculated.

Yes, but the direction cannot be forecast precisely because intelligence, treaty choices, and design responses create too many feedback loops.

A mature 12,000-ton scout-carrier hull could replace Unicorn's depot-carrier role or provide an alternative starting point for wartime light fleet carriers.

Those operating from ships would remain naval; Coastal Command's land-based aircraft would stay with the RAF.

A 30,000-ton ceiling could encourage more protected foreign carriers or still larger air groups.

Possibly, but they would count against the combined British and Dominion treaty allowance and operate within the wider imperial naval system.

The closer comparison is Implacable, with an Ark Royal-sized air group and Illustrious-style armour, while hangar dimensions remain a design choice.

A navy with deeper aviation expertise is more likely to demand genuinely high-angle dual-purpose destroyer mounts and to understand the limits of pre-war exercise assumptions.

Probably. Their integration with the wider fleet would make participation likely from the outset.

No. The treaty ceiling holds them to 12,000 tons, so later ships improve through batch-by-batch design changes within that limit.

The smaller carriers give the Royal Navy a pre-war design and trained force for anti-submarine and convoy work, rather than creating escort carriers only after the war exposes the need.

TSR aircraft would dominate most scout-carrier groups, with fighters more likely aboard ships assigned to the China Station.

Naval demand could raise standard engine power to an estimated 1,500-1,600 horsepower by 1938-1939 while preserving the practical requirements of TSR aircraft.

Accurate low-speed flight supports the torpedo-entry arrangement, leaving a role for a more powerful Swordfish-like biplane.

Higher naval engine requirements could provide more powerful engines for Air Ministry aircraft too.

Keeping naval aviation continuously in-house could make 1939 aircraft the result of several development cycles, not the first serious generation after institutional recovery.

A preliminary fighter attack could provoke visible defences and fires to guide dive bombers during a night strike.

A larger naval air establishment makes satellite production in Ceylon, Australia, or Canada more plausible, improving fighter and spare-parts supply in the eastern theatres.

Carrier aircraft could observe German movements off Norway from beyond a cruiser's visual horizon, making the historical surprise harder to reproduce.

Yes, but ships would still be needed to deliver aircraft and parts to Australia or the Mediterranean.

Larger peacetime orders would build more production capacity before wartime expansion began.

The workforce could grow through sustained employment and training during the years after 1918.

Yes, but steadier naval orders would leave them recovering from a higher industrial baseline.

Earlier engine development could advance contra-rotating propellers, with their arrival still linked to roughly 2,000 horsepower.

It helps, but historical rearmament starts from a reduced base; the scenario preserves more capacity beforehand.

It depends on preserving more capacity through earlier naval orders, reducing the amount that later rearmament must rebuild.

Naval contracts can preserve apprentice training when commercial pressure would otherwise cut the least experienced workers.

An existing scout-carrier force and early emergency escort-carrier production could provide air cover across the Atlantic sooner.

Yes. Their aircraft could find U-boats farther away, while carrier fighters could intercept Condors before they reported convoy positions.

Yes. Some aircraft could maintain contact while others returned to load torpedoes and launch a strike.

Germany would likely pursue snorkels and greater underwater endurance earlier, but those responses would take time while aircraft increased early U-boat losses.

Probably. The Deutschland class remains close to what German industry can support, although its air defence could improve.

The response is uncertain. Graf Zeppelin would probably reach a similar incomplete state, although completion is not ruled out.

More interwar carriers would not by itself create the requirement for angled flight decks.

More carrier aircraft and a deeper naval aviation establishment could turn Taranto into a far heavier blow, weakening Italian convoy protection and expanding British choices in the Mediterranean.

Not radically. Battleships remain broadly similar, though their dual-purpose and anti-aircraft batteries would probably improve.

They would probably reduce aviation facilities on cruisers and shift the saved capacity toward guns and more Type 93 torpedoes.

Japan could divide its allowance between more small carriers and fewer larger ones, with the latter considered more likely.

German failures were serious, but no comparative failure rate is given. The distinction drawn is Dönitz's willingness to believe his officers and press the technical specialists for a remedy.

If Atlantic and Mediterranean pressures ease, Britain can hold more useful carrier and capital-ship strength in the Indian Ocean, complicating Japanese planning.

A conditional earlier end to the North African campaign could change Britain's commitments when war spread to Southeast Asia.

Testing across varied waters offers one explanation for differences in British, German, and American torpedo reliability.

The decisive change comes from a much larger carrier force and the experience, options, and resilience it creates.

The main carrier powers are expected to expand most, while French and Italian choices remain uncertain.

Different treaty assumptions would raise the allowances to ten fleet carriers and twenty scout carriers.