Bruships 184: Naval History Questions Answered Live...

The proposed explanation is that Soviet numerical strength became especially dangerous when its technology approached Western capabilities. The opening answer mistakenly discusses 1969 before returning to the 1959 question.

Development was active, but fleet-wide implementation was deliberately paced to avoid expensive mass adoption of technology that was still changing rapidly.

It is extremely small, but it is still a form of inland naval power suited to river and lake operations.

Robert Gannon's Hellions of the Deep covers American torpedo development, while Colin Baxter's The Secret History of RDX examines the explosive used in Torpex.

They would probably accelerate helicopter operations and institutional naval aviation, but the Independence class would soon be inadequate for jets.

Yes, especially against submarines, but the danger of badly damaging the attacking ship made ramming an exceptional tactic.

A geographic Royal Naval Space Station designation could accompany an HMS stone-frigate name, with Discovery suggested as a suitable exploration name.

Support for nationalist parties in devolved government can coexist with a preference for the economic and institutional benefits of remaining in the United Kingdom.

His trial could have triggered an earlier debate about blind obedience and officer initiative, potentially changing Royal Navy command culture before 1914.

It would first expand industrial capacity, then build a much larger fleet whose growth would place severe additional pressure on Germany's naval strategy.

German naval competition depended on the Army's funding requirements, while American geography made a larger naval share of military expenditure easier to justify.

French election rules in early 2025 distinguish constitutional appointment powers from disputes about whether those rules are desirable.

A substantially more threatening Gloire could justify a larger, broader Warrior carrying roughly 84 to 90 guns, perhaps followed by more sister ships.

Bellerophon is suggested but challenged because Fisher disliked it. Vanguard is the other possibility developed in the exchange.

Spain needed continuous investment from the early ironclad era, producing several modern capital ships plus adequately trained crews and supporting infrastructure by 1898.

Italy lacked the money, budget capacity, and time to take up the offer.

Switzerland, with its small inland naval presence and paddle steamers on the same waters.

Both purchases are considered unlikely, though an Australian acquisition remains a disputed possibility because its geography gives it a stronger need for long-range strike.

A proposed air-launched replacement for American nuclear support faces objections over British second-strike doctrine, accident risks, and dependence on US aircraft integration.

Geography favors Australian long-range strike, but precision weapons, existing commitments, and support costs strengthen the case for submarine-launched missiles over a separate bomber fleet.

Treaty politics, Chatfield's procurement bargain, and the war's timing determined the choice; disagreement centers on whether triple 15- or 16-inch turrets would have avoided early problems with the quadruple mountings.

Yes, but it may be safer to land undamaged aircraft first so a crash does not block the deck and so the damaged aircraft can reduce its fuel load.

The US Navy would still attempt the battle with two carriers, with some benefit from concentration but substantially less capability.

A February 2025 forecast expects American support to become more conditional while leaving the consequences for established alliances uncertain.

Competing February 2025 interpretations of executive power turn on constitutional rules, Congress-created institutions, court orders, and appropriations.

Yes, but success would depend partly on luck and which side found the opposing force first.

Hoche could dominate older ships lacking quick-firing guns, but she compared poorly with Royal Navy contemporaries because her long, repeatedly revised construction left her obsolete on completion.

The Marceaus improved on Hoche but retained close-melee assumptions and faced comparison with Britain's newer Royal Sovereign class.

One proposed explanation is nominal machinery output versus estimated installed performance, but neither figure was confirmed by trials.

For shore-based long-range patrol, ASW, and logistics, though effective use would depend on stronger Navy-Coastal Command coordination.

It could carry a 4,000-pound total load, but several smaller bombs or two torpedoes would be structurally and tactically more useful than one 4,000-pound bomb.

A close detonation would cause severe blast damage; the outcome would depend partly on the ship's condition and sealing.

Possibly through earlier investment, but turbines would more likely power experimental boats first because reliable aircraft engines required more maturation.

Yes, especially against France, because Britain would blockade the French fleet and the United States would be fighting on the stronger coalition's side.

Yes if the drone has comparable missions and performance, because it will retain much of the same industrial complexity and cost as a crewed fighter.

A practical light carrier requires clear limits on its missions and air group, illustrated by Spanish, Thai, and Australian design choices.

An illustrative eighteen-aircraft group sustains four aircraft in one role by allowing for rearming and servicing, with greater numbers needed as the patrol moves farther away.

Removing a pilot does not remove the engines, wings, or mission equipment that determine how much carrier space a combat aircraft needs.

Communications failures and weapons authority drive an autonomous fighter's computing, cooling, security, and command requirements.

Expand existing frigate and auxiliary programs, fill known fleet gaps, and consider new classes after the current programs are properly supported.

Italy's approach ties additional naval commitments to the ships and capabilities needed to carry them out.

Yes; many naval evacuations occurred, including other withdrawals from France and the Royal Navy's costly evacuation operations around Crete.

Absalon and StanFlex illustrate forward naval presence and strict equipment compatibility, with payment tied to making the systems work together.

It appears to have examined whether an armored cruiser or similar ship would still be useful in the missile age, though the identification is tentative.

When additional costs fall on the government, an underestimated bid can transfer the supplier's mistake to the customer.

She actually sank on her first voyage after launch. Survival would probably have denied historians the unusually preserved wreck, while sinking farther offshore would have made recovery harder.

No; the existing barbette is too small for three 14-inch guns, and the performance advantage would not justify such a conversion.

The proposed Agincourt prompts disagreement over triple 15-inch turrets and an 18-inch design, with broadside gun numbers central to the comparison.

About five inches for general-purpose use, smaller for air defense, and roughly 9.2 inches for a dedicated land-attack weapon.

Spain would gain a powerful but expensive global-presence asset, and the program would likely stimulate Italian and eventually Turkish carrier development.

Ark Royal completed the immediate strike-carrier requirement, so the next priority was the fleet-support role, followed by replacements for Courageous and Glorious.

Only partly; removing the crew changes the ship so extensively that accommodation skills decline while automation and redundancy requirements grow.

An Aegis conversion is unlikely, though removing the after guns could make room for radar and missiles clear of the forward battery.

Yes; the quadruple turrets would have time to mature and the 16-inch Lion program could begin earlier.

German light cruisers are one suggestion; Hoche suffered repeated redesigns by successive designers as battleship requirements changed.

Poorly; the conversion would probably leave only four or five guns, turning the ships into specialized bombardment assets rather than effective battleships.

EDAR offers speed and range in suitable conditions, while conventional landing craft are cheaper and usable across a broader range of sea conditions.

The LCM Mark 1 of 1938 and earlier motor landing craft place the development of familiar landing-craft forms in the interwar period.

About 18 inches is one practical limit, while Fleet of Oceans considers 20-inch guns viable with accepted tradeoffs; 16 to 16.5 inches is preferred for value.

Probably, if the failure came early enough in design; cost, carrier numbers, and the eventual air group would remain open questions.

The Falklands strengthened the case for British carriers, while northern-flank reinforcement and disaster relief support investment in amphibious ships.

Existing Harriers could offer a short bridge, but closed production lines and ageing airframes could not sustain a forty-year carrier program.

An engine-cover example connects aviation accident investigation with multiple contributing failures and changes to equipment design.

Probably, because early carriers needed separate anti-aircraft and anti-surface weapons until a reliable dual-purpose gun could replace both batteries.

A Channel pipeline is technically possible, but a transatlantic fuel pipeline is impractical and lacks sufficient justification.

A practical estimate is roughly 24 to 36 aircraft each, depending on hangar and funnel arrangements, perhaps fewer given German inexperience.

Avoid war if possible; otherwise broaden industry and transport, build a mass pilot-training system, prepare convertible carriers, and expand long-range submarine capability.

Broad pilot competence sustains replacements and gives aces the wingman cover they need, while survivors can become instructors.

Better Japanese aircraft production and trained replacements could turn the Philippine Sea into a much more costly carrier battle for both sides.

No comparable example is recalled; Warspite's attack combined clear, shallow water with an exceptionally accurate strike.

Three visible Yamato-class launches in 1940 could encourage Montana and Lion construction while planners still wanted battleships as a proven answer to battleships.

New aircraft required enough industrial capacity to risk a production change and reliable transport to keep factories supplied.

There is a possible role for moving very large numbers of people, but normal practice separates airlifted personnel from equipment carried by sealift.

Probably the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands.

Glowworm's attack on Admiral Hipper and Spitfire's collision at Jutland are suggested comparisons; Glowworm was lost, while Spitfire returned with battleship armour on her bow.

Sheltered deep water with nearby tidal flats or low-lying land for docks and support facilities is more useful than a deep inlet bounded by cliffs.

Force Z would withdraw at high speed, perhaps exchanging fire, because it could not profitably fight two 16-inch battleships.

It could complete the Maltas and Darings, fund modern gun cruisers and larger surface combatants, and support a later transition to missile ships and successor carriers.

It could disrupt creditor income and the wider economy, so repayment would need careful timing even with the imagined windfall.

Extremely formidable as a task-group centerpiece or independent strike ship, potentially carrying several hundred Tomahawk-class weapons plus other capabilities.

Probably not; with other conversion hulls unavailable, the G3s would be Britain's natural treaty choice and were incomplete enough to become almost purpose-built carriers.

Expand the merchant fleet, because most medieval naval forces were mobilized by converting commercial vessels for war.

Both have value: the pipeline is the stronger dedicated oil route, while Seaway expansion improves wider maritime access, and neither is a quick project.

The heavy guns make sense for the setting's close-range threats, although the same arrangement is not favored for a present-day carrier.

In Britain, Portsmouth and Liverpool; for overseas coverage, Gibraltar and either Australia or Singapore are strong candidates.

It would reduce the oil embargo's leverage and ease fleet operations, while scrap-iron imports remained an important constraint.

Colossus and Victoria are the British examples, particularly Victoria's mixed main armament and the alternative of a larger hull with four 16.25-inch guns.

A further Lord Nelson-type design could have introduced 13.5-inch guns before Dreadnought and changed the new battleship's armament.

A 1.5-inch step was large enough to justify new logistics and performance while allowing the leading navy to manage escalation more gradually than a two-inch jump.

A heavier-armed Dreadnought could force rivals to meet a larger gun standard alongside turbines and an all-big-gun layout.

A common twin-engine airframe is plausible because it could cover several roles and greatly simplify Far East logistics.

Surcouf is the main choice on practical and operational grounds, with a separate objection to hydrogen-peroxide submarines.

A close contest is expected, with the preference for Farragut explicitly based on personal liking.

He is imagined as more likely to act independently, with a hypothetical rebellion supported by experience at sea and on land.

They would serve as powerful conflict-management ships between destroyer and carrier deployments, reducing pressure on both.

A proposed explanation is that the factories were elsewhere or had been moved away from the Wraith, although this remains speculation about the setting.

Alaska would probably become Canadian and diversify imperial oil supply, but useful naval effects require earlier exploration, refining, and a much larger tanker fleet.

It could make Anglo-Persian less powerful by creating another major imperial producer competing for influence and favorable agreements.

The turrets are judged mechanically impractical, while opinion differs over how many conventional missile hits the enormous hull could survive.

The Royal Navy K class, because its steam-turbine machinery and multiple retractable funnels made diving dangerously complex.

Its immediate power could be enormous, but unknown fuel and materials would obstruct operation and copying, while its weapons could encourage misleading technical lessons.

A sufficiently powerful twin-engine aircraft could cover strike, reconnaissance, and formation-breaking fighter duties.

A related general-purpose design is proposed, but its airframe and contemporary engines would give it different performance from either the Mosquito or the later Sea Hornet.

The earlier engines would lack the power needed for a comparable single-engine aircraft, making two engines attractive for payload, speed, and range.

Longer wings create handling, hangar, and structural problems; the proposed twin could place its folds near the engine structure, although the design must remain within contemporary engineering limits.

Existing naval maintenance and spare-engine exchange practices could limit downtime, but the additional engine requirement remains.

The proposed priority is disrupting incoming strikes through rapid climbing and diving attacks, while longer wings create separate structural and carrier-handling costs.

The same aircraft must also carry out strike, patrol, ASW, and reconnaissance missions, so it needs a general-purpose design.

It could, but the decision would depend on combat performance and whether the larger pool of aircraft available for patrol compensated for weaker individual fighter performance.

The proposed response is to force through the escort and break up the strike so the fleet's successive layers of anti-aircraft fire face smaller attacks.

Larger twins could use the space of an enormous carrier without increasing aircraft numbers beyond the proposed practical limit of its air-group organization.

No firm judgment is possible because the supposed I-500 is not identified confidently; a long-range submarine without the aircraft installation is only a tentative recollection.