Bruships(Christmas Eve): Naval History Questions answered till the Bru runs out!

They were better submarines, but they still did not fully achieve the fleet-submarine goal.

Victoria Taylor's recent German archival research is the strongest lead for an up-to-date answer.

Several powers explored it, but none had the technological level needed to make the concept fully workable.

Not directly; they occupied related roster positions but represented different concepts, with the U class continuing aspects of the R-class idea.

No; Formidable also fired her guns while engaging ships at Cape Matapan.

The upper-deck dual-purpose mounting was not ready and was too heavy for the design.

There is no fixed size; the choice depends mainly on the desired speed, stability, and role.

Probably not, because the required air intakes would be difficult and hazardous to route through a submarine hull.

Probably not; the Royal Navy would be strongly tempted to build the Revenge class for the same 28-knot battle line.

No; continued construction and strategic reactions would prevent the fleet from remaining fixed at that lineup.

Potentially yes, although the proposed aft-heavy arrangement would be undesirable.

It already had a long surveyed list of imperial peoples, enough to name several additional batches.

It would address their high-angle fire problem by replacing the later 4-inch modification with a dual-purpose main battery.

No; that was an abnormal readiness situation rather than the intended operational balance.

Millions; leading frigate captains could become clear modern-equivalent millionaires through prize money.

Multiple forces can cause it, but the outer bow structure is among the parts most likely to separate when the hull fails.

He recalls the main ballast tanks as divided and the larger tanks as intended to have baffles that reduced sloshing.

It was reliable, and Sea Harriers often fired from very close behind hot targets after using terrain for concealment.

They adjusted the trim tanks continuously so the changing liquid load did not make the submarine rise unexpectedly.

Their construction and deployment would depend on strategic demand and supportable stations; the nominal class totals alone do not establish a workable fleet.

Designers tried to keep those fluid systems isolated so their contents would not mix.

A Battle-class destroyer, especially an early ship with 4.5-inch guns and a very heavy 40 mm battery.

The engines were difficult to remove without cutting open and resealing the hull, making replacement slower and riskier than building anew.

No; it would probably build much smaller batches, perhaps around six boats per evolving design.

Yes in industrial terms; financing would be difficult but not impossible.

About twelve while maintaining broadly similar speed and other characteristics.

Probably the 1821 Britannia, a 120-gun Caledonia-class first rate.

It would probably perform the Vulcan strike role, though with a demanding tanker plan.

They were used extensively for testing and for comparing German hydrodynamic design with British submarine development.

It ended the program by confirming that continued HTP torpedo use was not sensible or safe.

No; the American rebellion came earlier, and it was the French monarchy that supported the colonists.

It is an internally operated seacock used to admit seawater for tank cleaning and system maintenance while sea pressure normally holds it shut.

Not clearly; both were in poor condition, and Ark Royal was easier to sustain even if Eagle might have offered a longer ultimate life.

Short production runs concentrate development costs on fewer hulls and forfeit the large savings and readiness benefits of later ships.

It helped underwater smoothness somewhat, but its main benefit was a stronger, more seamless hull and greater diving depth.

Early U-boat losses would rise sharply and weaken the experienced nucleus needed to expand the German submarine arm.

It proved of little practical use, and removing it saved effort and released space for other needs.

Blücher probably wins if she maintains long range; Minotaur becomes dangerous if she closes to effective 7.5-inch range.

Probably not without first modernizing an existing yard or building a new one.

Only a little; it helped, but the effect was small.

A traditional armored belt offers little value, while selective armor around vital spaces can still improve survivability.

Yes in function, but it was handled by Royal Navy and reserve gun parties rather than a separate Armed Guard branch.

Bombing, materials, housing, and the decision to prioritize Vickers for other specialized work all contributed.

Yes; it should let Blücher keep a long-range chase and bring more forward-firing guns to bear.

Special Christmas meals are as old as the Royal Navy's life at sea, though extra alcohol is less common across modern fleets.

Probably; it could become an imposing prestige unit, but construction would worsen the economic burden without proving the wider programme viable.

No; rapid support and repair can save the ship, as HMS Belfast demonstrated.

Hull-transmitted shock reached their mountings, so designers needed to isolate or raft sensitive equipment from the pressure hull.

Only if it is fast enough; a conventional slow battleship is often better completed for gunfire and surface duties.

Its heavy frigates overmatched standard British frigates but could not fight fourth rates, razees, or ships of the line on equal terms.

Continuous funding and production ended, causing Britain to lose the industrial capability that could have built very large guns.

Britain likely did get there first, but Valiant mainly gave Rickover evidence he could use to secure funding.

They can work, but a containerized 40 mm cannon would offer a more economical and repeatable defense.

The decisive change would be a second carrier and airborne patrols, which could detect the Germans early and allow escape.

Not always completely; some desirable changes were omitted because they were too costly or difficult during conversion.

After an early Soviet naval defeat, the war would turn toward difficult Arctic approaches or US amphibious operations near Archangel or Vladivostok.

Yes for the United States and Japan, while British carrier development would probably continue on a different path.

About 12,000 tons in a post-First World War setting and roughly 15,000 tons during the Second World War.

It could be longer and add a proper hangar, aviation stores, more endurance, and possibly stronger weapons for the presence role.

Less than is often assumed; much of the change is repackaging, rebranding, and refinement rather than new core gun design.

It was deep enough for her to enter, but still restrictive enough to require care and limit how far she went.

Development waits on extraction economics: depth, access, and high enough energy prices to justify rigs and tankers.

No; that dispute was aboard Glorious, while Courageous was lost on anti-submarine patrol with a combat air patrol operating.

Warspite for a pre-1945 choice, because she represents both world wars; a Malta-class carrier is the attractive postwar option.

The mixed force likely included destroyer crew without swords and cruiser-derived reserve personnel who did carry them.

A great deal; they would enable multi-carrier operations and add partners to historically overworked fleet carriers.

The Type 31's improved Iver Huitfeldt foundation gives other navies a durable and adaptable frigate option.

Yes, probably as uncrewed gun boats used to protect transits through straits and similar constrained waters.

Choose a true carrier or a cruiser, then design consistently around that mission instead of combining both around the Yak-38.

Vian, Somerville, Cunningham, Harwood, Fraser, and Jellicoe are strong candidates; Lord Cork and Orrery is not.

The label helps address the legal restrictions on taking a true aircraft carrier through the Bosporus.

No; the Navy chiefly needs enough Constellations, because the frigate can cover cutter missions better than a Legend can cover frigate missions.

A coordinated three-carrier strike, which could inflict enough damage to undermine the Italian fleet for the rest of the war.

Provide all three navies with capable long-range conventional submarines alongside their nuclear boats.

It would likely start from Eagle's pattern but could use 5.5-inch guns, possibly in a turreted arrangement.

Yes; Britain was indebted and cautious, but not financially incapable of such a program.

Likely 16-inch guns, over 30 knots, and a displacement somewhat greater than Vanguard.

No; Mountbatten had real flotilla-command and political strengths, though these did not guarantee strategic competence.

It could provide a financial buffer for industrial reconstruction without turning Britain into a resource-dependent economy.

A much harder target, though poorly concentrated or ranged defenses could still be overwhelmed through gaps in their coverage.

The Alaska class, because of superior 12-inch guns, radar fire control, and overall combat efficiency.

No; it fits a genuine pattern of contradictory German decisions that alienated the United States.

No; Germany failed to gain sea control, break the blockade, or overturn Royal Navy superiority.

War would probably still follow within months through Allied cooperation and a likely German-American naval incident.

Probably not; the Army wanted involvement, but the wider government lacked the same commitment without Belgium's invasion.

A former inland sea and island settlement in North Africa are offered as a tentative Atlantis location, with the claim kept distinct from established fact.

Midway was a larger post-treaty design closer to Malta, balancing a bigger air group against Britain's stronger emphasis on distant-station survivability.

Possibly not; the class might instead be called a new Dreadnought and reset the public label for the next generation.

Only fleets with a reachable neutral coast could do it; Germany had limited options, while Italian and Austrian ships were effectively trapped by geography and enemy control.

Ordinary persuasion was unlikely to work because the Kaiser's commitment to the rivalry was too deeply entrenched.

Dudley Pound, because he was hardworking and treated his staff far more calmly.

The 1950s Daring class, because its weapons, radar, machinery, and electrical systems were advanced yet buildable with 1930s industry.

The naval balance shifts sharply because American forces build combat experience sooner and reinforce Allied operations from the outset.

Potentially, but the successor design would depend heavily on how other navies continued their own construction programs.

It largely ignored the label change and replaced older ships only when newer vessels could assume their roles and value.

It would improve resilience, but political and media pressure against apparently idle ships makes it unlikely.

They became more common in ships designed around the 1970s.

Andrew Cunningham, because he was senior enough and one of the few admirals able to manage Churchill.

A Malta-class carrier design and gas-turbine motor-torpedo-boat work would add useful aviation and propulsion technology.

There is no context-free choice; Beatty is one plausible answer because his support for naval treaties carried far-reaching consequences.

Probably not; Britain would likely build more than one, with four or possibly eight being more plausible.

Destroyers and cruisers would be the most effective platforms.

Spain and Turkey would need to join the Axis cause, and even then Gibraltar would remain a very difficult siege objective.

Essentially every ship position that historically carried a quad Vickers machine gun.

It would involve many more predreadnoughts, likely stronger British numerical superiority, and no comparable independent battlecruiser command.

He could become First Sea Lord and use his political skill to preserve carriers and shape the postwar fleet.

Both choices made sense for their circumstances: Bofors favored Pacific range, while the pom-pom suited Mediterranean volume of fire.

The label made British category strength look better, even though the ships were more accurately fast battleships.

Yes; it sought to replace a quadruple pom-pom position with six longer-ranged, more accurate Bofors barrels.

Pom-pom and tank comparisons show why military equipment should be judged in the force ratios and missions in which it actually fought.

They might begin with 10-inch cruisers, then shift toward 9.2 inches after seeing the British rate-of-fire advantage.

Plating, frames, and structural shapes are plausible, especially for standardised ships.

It preserves a rapid cruiser rate of fire while adding penetration, whereas larger intermediate guns become too slow for their limited gain.

They would drive much larger treaty allowances for Britain and the United States, while Japan might lack the capacity to use its expanded share alongside the Yamato program.

Roughly 6 inches for manual loading and 9.2 inches for rapid mechanical loading, with still larger guns trading progressively more firing speed for power.

An internal struggle for the First Sea Lord's office diverted Battenberg's attention at a moment when the Admiralty faced an operational crisis overseas.

Luck played a part, but the deeper issue was that 11-inch armor-piercing shells were badly matched to lightly armored cruisers.

Probably not; Fisher peaked around 1905-06 and was much less reliable later in life.

There was little surface-gun competition, and 5-inch weapons were better suited to the anti-aircraft mission navies prioritized.

Probably Texas, with Washington also plausible, because both combine coastline with the money and political influence needed to sustain orders.

Henderson's technical command of procurement made it difficult for contractors to obscure problems or manage the Admiralty's attention.

They become numerous when submarine misidentification and friendly air attacks are included, while ship-on-ship cases are rarer.

It would still build lighter cruisers, but probably as a continuum beneath the heavy force rather than through the same historical categories and classes.

The next senior prince would normally act as regent, with a suitable senior lord or royal uncle considered for an infant regency.

Either cruiser lost at Cape Bon, where the leading Tribal-class destroyers overwhelmed them almost at once.

Very strongly; they reflected the Royal Navy's demanding prewar construction standards.