Bruships 142: Naval History Questions & Some Books

The poles are suggested as cooler landing areas where encounters with large animals might be easier to avoid.

Naval artillery could serve ashore, while tanks mainly borrowed quick-firing mechanisms and gun ideas adapted to much smaller vehicle constraints.

July 1916 is well supported, and 1 July is plausible, but the surviving references conflict over the exact day.

Methods varied between managed state forests, private markets, and bargains with landowners, with inconsistent supply quality and continuity.

Her size was workable, but the layout is judged too conservative to make the most of her experimental role.

The 1960s or 1970s were presented as plausible under intense competition, although the orbital premise was acknowledged as unstable.

Their guns were mainly a deterrent to raiders, not protection sufficient to fight a regular warship.

No. Austria-Hungary is characterized as wanting a relatively small navy built to a good standard.

Yes; both German and British intelligence generated nonexistent or duplicated enemy ships from uncertain reporting.

A slower, much more heavily armored regional ship resembling contemporary Swedish coastal-defense battleships.

A brief historiographical aside uses Churchill to show why leadership should be judged against the demands of a particular crisis.

The British likely hold the advantage because their whole fleet, including older battleships and cruisers, would reinforce the modern ships.

Three triple turrets, giving nine 15-inch guns, unless the entire design changed substantially.

Yes. Rank mattered, while urgent engineering work could affect the choice among officers of similar rank. A higher-ranking chief engineer might still have to take command.

They would probably serve with ships such as Revenge in the First Battle Squadron, with their protection making them candidates for the head of the line.

England would learn enormously from her architecture and try to arm her, potentially gaining an unmatched flagship and design model.

Britain would have gained twelve exceptionally powerful escorts with much deeper missile capacity, more aviation, and better electrical margins.

It was not disastrous, but it was sufficiently below contemporary expectations that his political defense could not save him.

The Tribal class could gain four twin dual-purpose 4.7-inch mountings and possibly a larger torpedo battery.

They would not solve the construction problem and could reduce the reform pressure created by defeat in the Russo-Japanese War.

It adds substantial defensive depth, nearby air bases, and a stronger northern flank while further constraining Russian Baltic options.

It was discussed, but the Admiralty preferred a carrier-supported force resembling an expanded Force H.

Ark Royal's loss prompts a qualified judgment that timely use of her damage-control procedures could have saved her.

Around 90,000 shaft horsepower was plausible, potentially producing roughly 24 to 26 knots with appropriate turbines and hull work.

No particular need for a fifty-foot bow extension is identified; a hull closer to Queen Elizabeth's length is proposed with small-tube boilers.

Some yard work probably began, but its extent remains disputed before the yards shifted toward submarine production.

Breaking up a concentrated Austrian formation would let the British exploit speed and manoeuvrability.

Few straightforward ones within the requirement to build them in Russia, because domestic industrial capacity was the decisive constraint.

Probably, although the larger problem was the long interruption in battleship construction before the new programme.

The names are unknown, and a state-based naming pattern need not have continued.

They were probably counted in cruiser tonnage, although that recollection remains qualified.

Much structural and modular work could be automated; the extent to which wiring, electrics, and plumbing could follow is uncertain.

Yes, but the missing construction history could not be recreated simply by building every intermediate design first.

The names are unknown; duke or county names are suggested as possibilities.

Availability and ease of construction favor a simpler design in the proposed Soviet treaty programme.

It could resemble a larger County-class cruiser carrying perhaps nine to twelve 9.2-inch guns.

Gangut is the choice, with the class's long retention in service given as the reason.

Often the overall gun mix changed, using a combination of retained and replacement cannon rather than a simple one-for-one upgrade.

Roughly fifty percent heavier than a representative 8-inch shell, about 380 pounds versus 256 pounds.

Blohm & Voss, Deutsche Werke at Kiel, and the naval yard at Wilhelmshaven were the immediately prepared facilities.

The alleged Churchill order is doubted; the alternative account describes a repair visit during a strike, with no guns aimed at the town.

Keeping a full boiler installation might add three or four knots, but designers could instead trade the efficiency gain for armor, space, or weight savings.

Three triple turrets could give an Admiral-class battlecruiser nine guns while saving space and some crew.

Yes, although yards already building larger ships would need less additional preparation.

Perhaps a month to prepare for the crossing and about six months for full American repairs and refit work.

Start with steel and metallurgy, then build the energy, infrastructure, education, research, and skilled labor systems that naval construction depends on.

Not initially; Britain could exploit the allowance sooner, while US construction remained constrained by appropriations until the approach of war.

It could expand forces dramatically, potentially beyond a simple doubling, because many fixed support and procurement costs are already being paid.

Yes, because Britain had already been building larger destroyers.

Yes. The two historical ships were themselves completed only after Dreadnought had entered service.

York is considered very likely; Exeter is less certain because Devonshire already supplies the county association.

Japan would likely rearm or redesign toward 9.2-inch weapons, because other navies would not accept the British broadside advantage.

Less than expected, because each navy's mission philosophy would still govern the design more strongly than caliber alone.

Probably, because larger ships generally gain survivability, but the particular design still matters.

Only if designers used the extra displacement effectively.

For the broad mission set the US Navy expects, large carriers remain the more efficient answer; small carriers become attractive only with tightly limited roles.

Strike weapons, command facilities, and airborne early warning make a limited sea-control carrier harder to keep small.

The weight and support needs of an F-35B make a small Second World War escort carrier a poor direct comparison for a modern ship.

Broadly yes, although they did not fully reach the intended endpoint.

More ships, larger guns, and earlier oil firing are suggested. The later deterrence scenario imagines Fisher advising during the crisis despite the question's earlier death date.

Sending a carrier group is a late, explicit deterrent step after smaller presence missions have already delivered quieter signals.

Britain would likely build successive improved Hermes-type carriers, prompting similar programs abroad and allowing a more stable Ryujo.

An American requirement for supersonic aircraft aboard a Sea Control Ship could provide a route to reviving P.1154.

The ships were too small to exploit the new treaty ceiling, so Japan finished those underway and redirected yards to larger cruisers.

No; they were late and lightly armed, but Japan needed them to expand a training system that had fallen behind shipbuilding.

It is judged poorly suited to the way the Japanese navy wanted to fight.

The March 2024 expectation is gradual development of enhanced drone-launching equipment, with funding and timing uncertain.

A faster König-type battleship with more boilers, four shafts, Parsons turbines, existing armament, and a target speed of at least 26 knots.

Yes; Britain, Italy, and Japan have built or adapted ships for it, while Australia has considered but not adopted the concept.

The treaty navies could build much larger modern fleets, while Germany would remain limited by Versailles and later by inadequate shipbuilding capacity.

A hypothetical 800,000-ton British allowance could support ten new fast battleships while retaining older capital ships.

A larger carrier fleet could provide separate anti-submarine ships, more aviation experience, and groups of two carriers with two fast capital ships.

A larger County could carry twelve or fifteen 8-inch guns, or spend the extra displacement on protection, speed, or endurance.

Yes, but related supersonic Harrier studies continued under other project names.

They could make the voyage, but effective Pacific service required far more forward repair and supply support than was available.

Later ships would also tend to grow, although many were designed as destroyer leaders and only later called cruisers.

Yes, because the Japanese were already prepared for the Russian fleet.

Early 12-inch British dreadnoughts are the nearest match, with Dante Alighieri another useful comparison, not the later 13.5- or 15-inch ships.

Queen Elizabeth or Revenge should win comfortably, while Iron Duke is the closer British matchup and is still favored.

The comparison offered is the Invincible and Indefatigable generation.

It gained access to German naval activity and shipyards, turning the agreement into an intelligence-gathering opportunity as well as an arms-control measure.

Anthony Watts's book is the preferred starting point, with Fred T. Jane's work also recommended.

Probably, because larger British and French carrier programs would make an Italian fleet carrier politically and strategically difficult to avoid.

It would make V/STOL carrier aviation substantially more capable, likely enlarging British carriers and changing foreign carrier and aircraft programs.

Likely around 11,000 to 12,000 tons, still much smaller than Long Beach because they remained destroyer-leader designs.

The missile strike caused the damage. The argument here is that prompt salvage and a protected tow could have prevented the later loss.

Only if they could crew, fund, train, and operate the additional ships instead of leaving them inactive.

Neither option is clearly better overall, because each has advantages.

Probably enclosed turrets, though the design changed between options before ending with eight single mounts.

One changed treaty limit can support a first-order design estimate, but repeated downstream changes soon outrun historical evidence.

Continued German V-weapon launches and an attributed claim about Kosovo illustrate the distinction between degrading capacity and forcing an immediate halt.

Very unlikely; the story was more plausibly budget-season signaling, a trial balloon, press speculation, or a distraction.

The engine would likely be the most valuable part, offering a reliable 275-horsepower basis for improving British armored vehicles.

No such programme is identified, and the existing frigate and destroyer plans leave little room for one.

Probably, with sufficiently detailed plans and workarounds for the electronics and timing systems.

A future third River batch could draw on the 57 mm or 40 mm guns entering service with Type 31.

An earlier conflict or crisis would have to generate the operational and construction experience historically gained from the Flower class.

It kept building successive sloop designs, using them both as operational escorts and as a continuing test program.

They would improve long-term food stockpiling and wartime supply planning, with particular value for import-dependent Britain.

Yes; Type 31 and the Constellation-class frigate both use foreign design foundations.

No; it was the planned convoy-defense method, and driving submarines away was a valid victory even without a kill.

No; increasing gun size alone is insufficient, while fitting missiles as well can change the classification.

Probably not; that fleet role is more likely to be folded into the Type 32 frigate program.

A dedicated fleet is judged unnecessary for the smaller requirement; occasional transport use of training aircraft is recalled secondhand.

The Drinkwater series.

A doubtful Napoleonic-era story concerns part of a cooking ladle fired from a cannon.

Because larger destroyers and smaller escorts were entering service in enough numbers to make the intermediate design unnecessary.

Modern warship silhouettes can follow requirements to reduce radar returns at particular frequencies.

Britain would treat it as a major warning, build and operate more carriers together, and prepare differently for Norway and German naval aviation.

Mikasa is the tentative answer, with ships preserved in China set aside.

Possibly a batch similar to the Type III group, contingent on deliveries of Rivers and war-emergency destroyers.

Yes, especially as evidence of contemporary Royal Navy War College debate beyond the familiar names of Mahan and Corbett.

The Allies gain the larger systemic advantage through shared research, production, advanced ASW, aviation, and potentially nuclear weapons.

A recalled conversation questions whether ending cooperation accelerated independent British nuclear development, with a personnel estimate left unsubstantiated.

It is worth reading, with the qualification that it was already 42 years old when this question was answered.

No; the ships could be classified as overage without the treaty automatically requiring their disposal.

Yes, the comparison concerns numbers of ships.

No. At the stated 11,000 tons, she would not be the largest.

They were a rapid escort-strength bridge until enough Hunt-class and Flower-class vessels entered service.

The six-years-newer-technology scenario assumes operational research accompanies the equipment or is developed through exercises.

It would be worthwhile but is uncertain; an LCS might offer an even sharper public lesson about failed defense procurement.

The effect is too design-dependent to predict, and the concept remains an inefficient compromise that navies could already have pursued but generally did not.

Britain built destroyers in very large numbers across several classes, providing the flotilla strength that kept the battle fleet operating.

No firm choice is offered before a cruiser programme exists; the related railgun recollection remains unconfirmed.

Both would grow, with sloops perhaps around 1,600-1,800 tons and Hunts following the larger sloop-derived hull.

Fuel quality and Britain's timing of oil adoption might change, but Germany's geography would still impose the larger strategic limits.

Probably the Kuznetsov-type carriers, although none of the hypothetical fleet is expected to be in especially good condition.

The scenario changes the entire diplomatic and treaty framework; Britain would keep developing ships and infrastructure, then rearm again if Germany renewed its naval challenge.

Affordability is questioned; the account instead emphasizes an arriving Northern Fleet officer's role in securing the carrier.

It is unlikely to be efficient because land-gun packaging gives up the deeper mount, longer system, and automated support a ship can accommodate.

Yes, it should have been approaching replacement.

Possibly, if they remained useful long enough; service in the Falklands War could have renewed demand for their guns.

Much larger bases and a population supporting greater self-government are suggested, but the reply switches to Ascension, leaving the island comparison confused.

They would form its basis, but older ships would probably remain part of the force.

A four-triple-turret version might reach about 24,000 tons and should be treated as a distinct heavy cruiser.