Patreon 47: Putting the USA's 2nd fleet to work - US Coast Guard's presence missions & deployment

Yes. It would be extremely useful and likely become the model for later British carriers, although existing treaty limits would create an immediate international problem.

They were called battleships, with distinctions such as first-rate, second-rate, or coastal battleship rather than the later label pre-dreadnought.

The Coast Guard's origins show how tariff enforcement, rather than combat alone, gave the early United States a useful maritime force.

Tariff enforcement aligned the cutters with federal revenue and Treasury interests while avoiding many state-rights disputes.

Occasionally, but the original ten cutters were new vessels and the Coast Guard usually obtained ships designed for its own missions.

The Revenue Cutter Service moved readily from customs enforcement into combat against French ships, privateers, and British raiders.

Cutter Mercury illustrates why shallow-draft local vessels could matter more than larger warships in coastal waters.

A Revenue Cutter transferred to the Navy became part of the opening naval drama around Fort Sumter.

Britain has one navy rather than a separate armed maritime service, so the Royal Navy absorbs many Coast Guard-like functions.

No. They were heavily overengineered eight-inch heavy cruisers.

World War II shows the Coast Guard moving from coastal security into submarine warfare, amphibious command, and rescue work.

The Lake-class cutters reveal how long range and escort endurance made Coast Guard designs closely resemble Royal Navy sloops.

Very few. Nurnberg survived to serve the Soviet Union as Admiral Makarov, while most other major ships were sunk, salvaged for scrap, or otherwise did not endure as preserved warships.

Ships carried large quantities of raw materials and personnel, often after assembling at Sierra Leone from routes around the Cape and across the Indian Ocean.

A presence visit persuades through the crew's professional confidence as well as through the ship's flag, hull, and armament.

Yes, a few, including S-boats, although no complete list is given.

A 1968 interception operation shows how Coast Guard experience in coastal enforcement translated into wartime blockade work.

Hamilton-class cutters combined long endurance with enough armament, aviation capacity, and boarding capability for global maritime-security work.

The Legend class carries Coast Guard endurance and presence into a larger cutter able to deploy with credible sensors, aviation, and armament.

Not realistically. Governments were acquiring the ships, while their large crews made them less suitable for NGOs than lower-manning offshore patrol vessels.

A cutter can signal attention and enforce maritime rules without presenting the same escalatory image as a grey warship.

Yes. Anti-smuggling, boarding, and prolonged presence are built into Coast Guard ship design and operating practice.

The Treasury class shows how a hull derived from a Navy gunboat could be reshaped around Coast Guard endurance and patrol needs.

Probably less than before, but not necessarily zero: haze grey may still make visual detection harder, especially through a submarine periscope.

Yes. Campbell lost power and was badly damaged, while film and television versions have sometimes presented the action as a US Navy episode.

The Coast Guard's presence mission spans the Americas, Arctic, Southeast Asia, and Europe through relationship-building and maritime security.

The Type 31 already fills much of that role: it is a globally deployable presence ship whose function resembles a modern sloop.

Aging Polar-class icebreakers expose the gap between the United States' polar ambitions and the cutters available to support them.

The practical response to a dangerous iceberg is surveillance and rerouting, not treating it as a target for naval gunfire.

The Offshore Patrol Cutter program raises a force-structure question: can fewer replacement cutters sustain the same presence?

Probably not as a normal fit. They would more likely be fitted for but not with missiles, following the approach already used on the Legend class.

Coast Guard presence gains credibility because cutters are visibly performing practical missions rather than merely displaying a flag.

A large amphibious task group approximates heavy-cruiser presence, while a carrier battle group supplies the stronger battleship-level signal.

It should examine why its neighbors want the alliance. Russian coercion and nuclear threats were making NATO protection more attractive to Sweden and Finland in February 2022.

Not at the time of the stream. Parliamentary comments existed, but a Ministry of Defence announcement, a budget, and installed equipment were still needed before treating the upgrade as real.

The lower position allowed the three turrets to be packed more closely, keeping the ship shorter and lighter than a raised third turret would permit.

New Jersey is favored despite Yamato's 18-inch guns because the American ship would probably hit first and more often, degrading Yamato's ability to reply effectively.

They could beat that isolated force, but the Royal Navy would not knowingly accept such an encounter; it would combine larger hunting groups and divert convoys rather than meet a concentrated enemy piecemeal.

Japan would probably prefer ballistic-missile defense, Sweden could combine stronger defenses with NATO membership, and South Korea might reconsider a nuclear program despite the high acquisition cost.

The mountings would make the ship very broad and place severe stress on the design, while a triple 18-inch turret could use roughly comparable space.

Remove the casemate battery for turreted dual-purpose guns and place corresponding main turrets at matching heights where clearances allow.

Reginald Henderson would likely gain aircraft procurement authority as Third Sea Lord, giving the Navy about five effective years to develop stronger engines and different carrier aircraft before the war.

They could have complicated Russian operations and perhaps achieved a prominent sinking, but their ability to survive and remain operational is unknowable.

It would welcome them, then ask what much larger Royal Navy it was expected to support.

Probably not. Britain benefited from denying hostile use of the coast, but owning it would require an enlarged army and an enduring continental defense commitment.

Yes. It was a large and capable fleet, concentrated in the Mediterranean and located where it could repeatedly interfere with British operations and communications.

It would be a powerful group, but Type 83 had not yet been designed and the proposal required too many Astute-class submarines.

No. It was described as money for projects left unfunded over roughly two decades, alongside a plan to reach NATO's two-percent benchmark over five years.

Many governments might reduce it once the immediate danger faded because they often expect domestic alternatives to win more votes than defense spending.

It depends on the design. Plants optimized for rapid acceleration and high speed could consume heavily, while long-range installations could use the same general boiler type efficiently.

Reliable triple-turret technology made three-gun mountings more space-efficient for large weapons, while twin mounts generally remained preferable for smaller guns.

German designers preferred specialized weapons. The 3.5-inch gun fit neither role perfectly, although it could have been developed into a useful dual-purpose weapon.

A contemporaneous reading attributes Russia's early difficulties to optimistic political assumptions, vulnerable logistics, and preparation for less resistance than it encountered.

Fighters would be difficult aid because Ukraine lacked protected operational depth and would have to support them under Russian reach. Additional drones might have been more immediately useful.

The different weapons could engage different targets and ranges, with their coverage intended to reinforce one another.

It would probably be more difficult for the Germans because British radar was likely superior and could help the British close the range.

Probably. Both held large stockpiles and understood that first use would invite retaliation.

Keep the armored concept, enlarge the ships toward Implacable or Indefatigable dimensions, and maintain continuous construction. American expectations of severe carrier losses helped motivate the larger Midway class.

The additions were small, removed equipment offset much of their weight, and the ship had little spare space for a larger increase.

No major surface warship sinking is identified. Royal Indian Navy vessels attacked submarines and smaller or landing craft, but the exact record needs dedicated archival research.

The primary purpose was to close the range.

Yes, but the reserves would have to cross airspace dominated, though not fully controlled, by Russia and would be vulnerable while moving.

Britain and the United States could afford to use it, while Japan might also participate; the result would be larger and different ships rather than strict adherence to the historical caps.

Its effect depended on the outcome. Failure could weaken Putin and sanctions could add pressure, although a cornered regime might become more dangerous.

A direct attack on Poland was unlikely, but Polish intervention inside Ukraine would risk a wider Russia-NATO conflict.

Russia retained a fairly substantial operational submarine force, supported by budget priority and continuing construction and upgrades.

Not inevitably. The outcome depends on several choices, especially whether Russia invests in a more integrated infrastructure network.

Not for Sea Tempest as currently conceived. Its airframe is not designed for arrested recovery, and an F-35C replacement would inherit many issues of the existing F-35 family.

The navies would probably stay larger, but the Falklands outcome depended more on British signaling, including conflicting Foreign Office policy and withdrawal of the Antarctic patrol ship.

The reserve measures were larger in the short term, while SWIFT restrictions could have an enduring, cumulative effect on interbank activity.

The policy is interpreted as a pursuit of a stronger Russia and a personal legacy, with legacy-seeking by autocrats presented as a source of dangerous action.

Drones mattered, but many losses were attributed to small infantry teams attacking exposed road traffic. Stronger convoy protection would reduce vulnerability at the cost of speed and resources.