Patreon 102: Zeroes over the Med! Japan joins the Britain & Free powers on 25th of June 1940...

Yes, depending on when the Japanese ships sail and whether the new fighters are available to accompany them.

The scenario begins by removing the Second Sino-Japanese War, weakening the chain of embargoes and confrontation that historically pushed Japan toward war with the United States.

Carrier refits, training commitments, and unfinished capital ships sharply limit what Japan could send to Europe in June 1940.

Removing Japanese attacks in the Indian Ocean would preserve merchant capacity and ease the wartime movement of food and supplies.

Yes, although Allied technical upgrades would probably be needed before they could make their fullest contribution.

In this alternate timeline, an Allied naval war could give Yonai military success without a war against the United States.

Possibly; Yonai could present the post as a vital command for an experienced general while gaining distance from a political rival.

Britain's first problem would be using Japanese help without overcrowding the Mediterranean or neglecting the Atlantic, Commonwealth politics, and American relations.

Japanese factories supplied with imperial raw materials would give Britain another source of equipment and complicate American pressure on the alliance.

The historical arrangements already moved in that direction: British and Canadian forces preceded an American takeover in 1941, before US entry into the war.

Joint cruiser patrols could make a historically fatal lone-ship encounter much harder for an Axis raider.

British research gave American radar development a substantial boost, but the United States already had its own research and useful ideas. Wartime cooperation combined the two programmes.

Japanese entry on Britain's side would improve Pacific security, create food-export opportunities, and give Australian and New Zealand industries more time to develop.

An Anglo-Japanese alliance could unsettle Canada because worsening American relations threatened devastation even without an American conquest.

American leaders would have to weigh isolationism against the danger of Britain and Japan winning the war, sharing technology, and writing the peace without the United States.

Not uniformly: prejudice existed, but long naval and diplomatic contact gave many British officials a more nuanced perspective.

An expanded coalition could attract Chile and other neutral states.

Germany loses Japanese trade while Italy anticipates reinforcement of the Mediterranean Fleet, but an immediate Axis seizure of French ships could drive Vichy forces back into the war.

Yonai could present support for Britain as loyalty to a fellow monarch, making resistance to the alliance harder for Japanese nationalists.

No. The First World War alliance worked without special royal postings, and royal connections would remain a matter of strategy and political justification.

Sending trained Japanese aircrew to fly British aircraft would deliver combat power faster than transporting complete Japanese air units to Europe.

Japan could distribute its ready carrier and fast capital ships between the Mediterranean, Force H, and Scapa Flow while preparing later reinforcements.

The Tōne-class cruisers' aircraft would be more useful searching ocean routes for raiders than operating under Mediterranean land-based air attack.

No. Japan was already putting the available resources into these ships and building them as quickly as it could.

Britain would have little reason to add Japanese forces to an occupation shared with the Soviet Union.

North Africa could provide a combat testing ground for Japanese tanks that would otherwise remain at home.

Most would probably sail around Africa to Britain. A small party could travel through Canada for the political value of the visit.

No. Yamato commissioned too late and her roughly 27-knot speed fell below the 28-knot cutoff used here for the fast-battleship group.

If Japan's older capital ships completed their preparations by March 1941, they could join the British battleships that historically fought the Italian fleet at Cape Matapan.

A renewed Anglo-Japanese alliance would leave Stalin watching deployments while weighing whether neutrality, the Axis, or the Allies best protects the Soviet Union.

They would face the problem of explaining why they refused to work with a state that had joined their war and sent representatives.

Not directly. Japanese units would enter an established British command system, while the doctrine's attritional elements fit European operations better than its final battle near Japan.

Probably not for Portugal or Finland, whose immediate Spanish and Soviet security problems would still dominate their policies.

Mediterranean experience could change Japanese thinking about anti-aircraft guns, though no particular replacement is specified.

Weeks of movement and months of joint preparation would separate Japan's declaration from its effective participation in Allied operations.

The invasion would remain plausible because Hitler could see territorial expansion as a way to strengthen Germany against the enlarged coalition.

A North African deployment is more plausible initially, since newly arrived Japanese troops would need time to train and integrate.

It would depend on each colony's leaders, information, and timing; Asian colonies might lean Free French to avoid Japanese intervention.

Troops from mountainous regions of northern India could be suitable, but organising their deployment in time would be difficult.

Sōryū could give the Mediterranean Fleet a third carrier for training, air defence, and maintenance flexibility before major raids.

Large Mediterranean operations could combine reinforcement with transfers to Force H and the Home Fleet.

Relatively few British ships would be released at this date, while the reduction in Australian and New Zealand concerns would be more significant.

No rapid transformation is likely; Japan was not at the same stage as Britain's evolving empire and Commonwealth.

The fleet mostly had Claudes, but Japan could concentrate enough early Zeroes on the two carriers sent west.

The proposed strike force depends on the aircraft that each navy could supply at the scenario's date.

Probably not at sea; his seniority and British connections make a strategic liaison role in Britain more plausible.

The alternate timeline pairs the historical Swordfish night attack with a possible Japanese or American dawn strike on the damaged Italian fleet.

He would be too junior in 1940 for the proposed post.

The shared Helldiver name can obscure which American dive bomber belongs in the proposed 1940 air group.

If Taranto destroys Italy's ability to supply North Africa, defeats ashore could remove Mussolini and release Allied naval strength for the Atlantic months earlier.

Zeroes and possible Wildcats could relieve the Fulmars while Allied crews learned British fighter control.

No. The proposed Japanese declaration comes after the Norwegian campaign's conclusion, and deployment would take additional time.

Japanese reinforcements could give Force H and the Home Fleet more fast ships and carriers for containing German surface raiders.

Even a much larger Allied carrier force would not make a Taranto-style strike on Germany's fleet an equally practical operation.

Only marginally, if at all; their historical post-launch completion was already very fast for battleships.

German planners would have to choose between risking Scharnhorst and Gneisenau early and waiting until Italy's defeat released more Allied ships.

Germany might push the project harder, but it still lacks the resources and imported materials to make the carrier operational in time.

If Italy joined the Allies, its occupied French territory could provide a landing area for an advance before the Atlantic Wall existed.

Possibly. More fast capital ships could cover Hood's absence, although Britain could also postpone refits until the German surface threat had been defeated.

Released Mediterranean forces and Japanese reinforcements could make a German surface sortie unattractive.

British cooperation could improve Japanese radar production and night operations, while Japanese ships might receive ASDIC.

An Italian collapse, concentrated Allied power, and possible American and Soviet entry could leave Germany surrounded and make a military removal of Hitler plausible in 1941.

Yamato, Musashi, and possibly a battleship Shinano would give other navies a reason to build new capital ships after an early peace.

Mediterranean damage experience could push Japan and the United States toward British-style armoured flight decks.

An early peace would preserve more British resources while leaving difficult decisions about Germany and Soviet-held Poland.

Chiang Kai-shek could face the Chinese Communists with stronger forces and possible Japanese, British, and American support.

It probably would moderate practice, especially where prisoners were held jointly, though it would not automatically erase underlying attitudes.

A victorious coalition could bring Yonai together with Roosevelt and Churchill, with monarchs involved to demonstrate Japan's standing.

No credible naval invasion was available, and only part of Japan's fleet would have left home waters.

Japan could act with the United States while Britain and European allies threatened the Soviet Union from the west. That danger might compel Stalin to relinquish eastern Poland.

No. A 15-inch Vanguard class is rejected if the N3 and G3 designs have been built, regardless of its displacement.

Probably Scapa Flow.

Yes. A shorter war without a Japanese threat would leave more shipping available to move food around India.

India would remain part of the British Empire, with the Indian Army probably heavily involved across the coalition's campaigns.

No; cruiser numbers and logistical support impose a practical ceiling that battleship gun growth does not remove.

Jets and angled-deck carriers would still develop, but new fast battleships could remain central to task groups into the 1960s and perhaps serve into the 1970s or 1980s.

Rocket and missile adoption would probably slow because dive bombers remained useful and no long war forced immature technologies rapidly into service.

Reserve aircraft and the Spitfire's handling could help trained Japanese pilots contribute to the Battle of Britain.