Bruships 55: New Books

Les Brown and Malcolm Wright provide suggested references for the details of a Tribal-class destroyer model.

The engineering example shows a flotilla's senior specialist gaining a deputy as operational work increased, first in reserve formations and then in regular flotillas.

Work below decks, gun-team experience, and the degree of control over events shaped different forms of combat stress.

Michael Alpert's account shows how dependence on seaborne trade turned neutral merchant ships into a central legal and operational problem in the Spanish Civil War.

A British protest over bombing in the Spanish Civil War shows why allegations of deliberate attack required stronger evidence than accusations of recklessness.

They were principally command and administrative ships, though purpose-built leaders were often larger and carried additional armament.

Support depends on the person. The example concerns someone helped by family, medical care, and regular companionship.

Yes. A sense of control could reduce one pressure, while the loss of friends in an exposed gun crew created another.

Submariners could suffer severe trauma, sometimes described by crews using different terms.

The corrected figures given are about 3,500 merchant ships and 175 warships, with 783 German submarines and 17 Italian submarines lost in the Atlantic campaign.

Yes. In some damaged ships, the overhead shell rails offered a stable way to move casualties through tight internal spaces.

Yes, through secure passenger movement and economic benefits. Missile transport and launching are considered unsuitable roles.

A northern delegation sought peace after Severus assembled an overwhelming force, but compromise no longer served the emperor's political and personal aims.

Septimius Severus's campaigns in Scotland depended on a maritime conveyor that joined coastal bases, river craft, and the advancing Roman army.

The Roman plan combined a mass advance up Dere Street, a later division of the army, and naval closure of the eastern coast to isolate the communities in its path.

Coin imagery and the line of Roman camps support a debated reconstruction of a vast bridge of boats across the Forth near South Queensferry.

The size and alignment of Caracalla's camps connect the divided Roman army with the later system of glen-blocking forts.

A Canadian study was intended once archive visits became possible, with Australian archival research also planned for the Australian ships.

The publisher left the contents to the author, who chose what he thought readers needed to understand about the Tribal, Battle, and Daring classes.

The contest is placed between the Canadian and Royal navies, both of which specialized in anti-submarine warfare.

African personnel served in naval forces and especially merchant shipping, while local army units could supply detachments for boarding parties.

A Crusader fitted with a 5.5-inch gun prompts a conditional question about its anti-tank potential.

Sometimes, although technical-language training also limited recruitment, as the Royal Indian Navy example illustrates.

The TOG program reunited First World War tank designers around a huge trench-crossing vehicle whose assumptions and transmissions were overtaken by mobile war.

TOG's transmission choice emerged from a committee of veteran designers, with possible personal influences alongside the engineering requirement.

TOG 1 could cross trenches, but its narrow hull, electric motors, and later hydraulic conversion created steering and reliability problems.

TOG 2 gained turret space through a revised track layout while retaining the earlier project's difficult proportions and electric drive.

TOG 2's mockups reveal debate over duplicated anti-tank weapons and the difference between proposed fittings and a completed vehicle.

Fletcher's book treats major tank families in depth while grouping several less familiar designs into a shorter final chapter.

Warner's study restores Edward I's daughters to the political story and uses births, deaths, marriages, and descendants to map a European dynastic strategy.

Conflicting dates for Catherine and Joan show how historians test medieval family chronology while leaving uncertainty visible.

The next pregnancy and the customary period of rest after childbirth favour an earlier date, but do not establish when she was born.

Kaiser Wilhelm II is identified, with the First World War and the subsequent collapse of monarchies treated as consequences of the failure.

His blank cheque to Austria-Hungary encouraged escalation; withholding it might have left more room for a conference and negotiation.

Prince Robert's anti-aircraft escort conversion differed from the infantry landing-ship roles given to Prince Henry and Prince David.

Robert K. Liu's scratch-built HMCS Prince Robert shows how model making can expose gaps in plans, photographs, and published warship reconstructions.

Possibly for some roles, but space for modern computers and communications equipment would limit the conversion.

Sharing combat systems could lower convoy-escort costs, but concentrating control ashore would make the screen vulnerable to a single failure.

The expense would be enormous, and some original battleships still survive.

The original Beaufighter would need more electrical power as well as space, and fitting extra generators would add to the space requirement.

Maps from Gareth C. Sampson's account show Rome pressing into a region divided among Pontus, Armenia, Parthia, Ptolemaic Egypt, and smaller kingdoms.

Veteran units, uncertain deployments, and conflicting sources shape the reconstruction of Lucullus's five-legion army.

Lucullus entered a rebellious province with a mixed army and chose to strike at Mithridates himself rather than solve every secondary problem first.

Roman commanders converted successful campaigns into triumphs, public games, wealth, prestige, and momentum for the next election.

The late Republic and early Empire are judged the peak of Roman military efficiency and organization.

They could compare well with older 15-inch weapons on some measures, but a contemporary new 15-inch design would have been more capable.

Competition itself was not new; Rome's advantage was that several commanders could win honors within one system while citizen-soldiers retained a stake in that system.

Broadly yes, with significant financial backers helping him sustain that cycle.

Hiroshima and Nagasaki prompt a qualified comparison of the human costs, uncertain alternatives, and competing explanations for Japan's surrender.

A recalled film proposal about Victorious under the Robin codename gave the carrier an entirely American crew, and the historians withdrew.

The option was considered, but its use is judged doubtful because of the legacy of First World War gas warfare.

An existing submarine blockade complicates an explanation of surrender based solely on losing Manchurian supplies.

HMS Victorious operated alongside USS Saratoga in the Pacific, using British fighter direction while the two carriers divided fighter and strike work.

British fighter-direction experience and American strike methods circulated between the two carriers, with consequences for later British carrier thinking.

Not on the required scale. They had some coastal-landing experience, but would have needed British and American lift, crews, and naval coordination for an assault on Japan.

No. Biological weapons were not used; the details of any proposed plan remain unresolved.

No. Postwar mergers absorbed Blackburn into larger groups, and its industrial lineage continued within Britain's consolidated aerospace sector.

Prior Soviet coastal operations are distinguished from the lift and coordination needed for the hypothetical invasion of Japan.

HMS Charybdis carried Bermuda's food, produce, and passengers after its regular steamer was requisitioned, despite a cramped and costly conversion.

Charybdis's machinery, armament, and protected-cruiser layout establish the starting point for her difficult civilian conversion.

A former Admiralty whaler passed through commercial whaling before returning to Bermuda as the passenger tender Bermudian.

The claimed X-37 capability is questioned, while carriers still provide mobile bases for sustaining and rearming aircraft beyond land-based support.

First World War experience and detailed knowledge of familiar ground are central to the case for the Home Guard's defensive value.

No. Other countries had veterans too; Britain's island position gave its defenders more time to organize and prepare.

Practical commercial conversion is ruled out because of the armour and cost, while preserving a battleship as a museum required much less alteration.

Exercise examples suggest that Home Guard units gained much of their effectiveness from detailed knowledge of their own districts.

Its useful role would have been costly delaying actions and local ambushes while regular forces moved up, rather than a prolonged battle on equal terms.

The Home Guard could draw on regular forces, while shortages and a later clarification distinguish British support from the German landing force's limitations.

A recalled Martin-Baker proposal placed emergency production speed and simple manufacturing ahead of exceptional performance.

Stay-behind units and concealed supplies formed another part of Britain's preparations for an invasion.

It had lost substantial equipment, but recovered supplies, stocks already in Britain, and factory production meant that it was not entirely unequipped.

No single unit stands out from an invasion battle, though some regional formations were well equipped and performed local security and exercise duties.

No. The strategic campaigns failed, but British units still won local actions, fought rear guards, and conducted difficult withdrawals within flawed Allied plans.

HMS Scotsman foldouts and comparisons with the Cammell Laird archive help trace the long development of British submarine designs.

Britain's many commitments affected which formations were available for the early campaigns in Asia.

Readiness was changing, and usable brigades did not necessarily appear as complete divisions, making that fixed count misleading.

Soviet missile defences around Moscow created a penetration problem for Britain's limited Polaris force and drove the case for Chevaline.

Antelope exchanged a Polaris warhead for decoys and changed its trajectory; Britain's more elaborate development became Chevaline.

Hardening and decoys made interception harder while adding weight and reducing the range available to a Polaris submarine.

British estimates compared the interceptors needed against Chevaline with both the deployed Soviet force and the treaty limit.

Missile replacement and a fifth submarine offered different ways to strengthen the deterrent, with conversion costs complicating the comparison.

Alternative basing studies and Anglo-French cooperation were constrained by development schedules and restrictions on sharing American information.

A successful invasion is judged necessary, and Germany lacked a workable way to reach Britain. When German oil would have run out remains unresolved.

It could have complicated Roosevelt's position, but the assessment is that Anglo-American cooperation against Japan would probably have drawn the United States into the European war anyway.

Possibly, with better Army-Navy cooperation. The concrete suggestion is a damaging raid followed by withdrawal, and it is still judged a poor idea.

Weak American preparation and response helped German U-boats inflict heavy losses off the coast.

British motorization included terrain-specific exceptions and did not settle how armour and infantry should be organized and fought together.

The port would be defended, shipping would take time to assemble, and fog could hinder German aircraft while favouring British naval opposition.

The argument for concentrating German offensives turns on limited supply capacity and the potential value of a Baltic port.

Command turnover and dispersed formations in Crete are compared with the time available to organize southern England's defence.

No. It would have needed captured vessels, and the combined force would still face losses while clearing routes under British fire.

Possibly. Better warning, firmer Norwegian command, and a rapid Allied concentration at Narvik could have denied Germany the foothold it needed.

Yes, supplies were still reaching the troops. Withdrawal is explained here by the decision to concentrate on the campaign in France.

It could have denied Germany key resources and bases while strengthening Allied control of the northern Atlantic and Arctic routes.

A secure Narvik is proposed as a way to concentrate Allied arrivals and join the northern Norwegian army despite German air supply.

Royal Marines normally formed part of the crew and commonly manned a turret. Warspite's detachment had been removed, so its normal complement was not an available force at Narvik.

If they operated together, the slower Deutschland-class ships would make the group easier to catch, while Britain could concentrate more capital ships and carriers against it.

No. Destroyers brought the initial troops; merchant ships were intended to carry supplies.

Considerable initial firepower, but their fuel and support requirements would soon limit them; an early ironclad is suggested as a more sustainable addition.

Norway. At Singapore, firmer defence of essential ground might have exploited Japanese supply shortages, but command decisions prevented that test.

No. British heavy forces would hunt the raiders while convoy escorts continued anti-submarine work, and only a fraction of the U-boat fleet could be on station at once.

Singapore needed supreme leadership able to coordinate reinforcements and the fleet, according to this critique of its command arrangements.

Only in limited numbers: many boats from the Indian Ocean and China Station had already been reassigned to the Mediterranean.

Germany would need enough submarine-building facilities and infrastructure, while Britain could respond to the visible change by building more sloops.

German submarines were one planning problem among several; Japanese and Italian threats also shaped the British fleet.

The 1939 Tsingtao confrontation opens a conditional scenario in which an early Anglo-Japanese war reshapes Pacific coalitions and forces Germany to recalculate.

They had some problems, but the British and Italian difficulties were less severe than the major American and German torpedo failures.

Potentially. His planning skills may have fit a chief-of-staff role better than supreme command.

Birmingham placed an armed guard on the detained St Vincent de Paul and escorted her out under the guns of Japanese cruisers without either side opening fire.

A rough price comparison is tested against steel supply and the industrial capacity needed to turn funding into completed submarines.

The merchant master's log and testimony became harder to obtain when a quarantine flag prevented his planned visit to Birmingham.

The boarding party's instructions combined armed control of access with referral to Birmingham and a means of requesting assistance.

The battleship docks already existed, while new submarine facilities would need to be built and would reveal the change in priorities.

He had those language skills, but so did other officers aboard. His demonstrated ability also helps explain why he was trusted with the assignment.

Faster construction is not established: submarines remain complicated to build even though they are much smaller than battleships.

German naval planning assumed that a war with France would also bring in Britain because the allies divided military effort between French land power and British maritime strength.

Japan and Italy would preserve Britain's need for battleships, while a different threat balance could change speed, armour, and anti-aircraft priorities.

Brind knew more about the whole operation and his reasons for issuing orders; Ashmore saw his own assignment. Consular records were still needed to check Brind's account.

Paper parity under the naval treaties still left Britain with the larger fleet when Congress funded fewer ships than the United States was allowed to build.

British night fighting supported dispersed forces awaiting reinforcement; Japanese night attacks aimed to weaken the approaching American battle fleet.

No specific end date is given. Such plans could remain valuable exercises even as Anglo-American naval cooperation deepened.

Churchill's funding and a longer tradition of irregular warfare supported the wartime acceptance of unconventional methods.