Patreon 48: Anglo-Japanese War in Feb 39 - if Tsingtao Incident goes "hot", what's IJN doctrine?

The opening premise is that Japanese naval doctrine changed markedly between 1939 and the Pacific War of 1941-45.

Any extra battleship would be useful, either in front-line service or by freeing a British ship, especially if Italy supplied the crew and support.

Probably: motor torpedo boats would likely reinforce Singapore and forward bases, while the scale of motor gun boat use is less certain.

He might try, but the number and political connections of the implicated officers would make a face-saving prosecution extremely difficult.

It would probably produce an eastern war first and delay any European war, while the absence of the Tripartite Pact leaves Germany and Italy outside Japan's camp.

Yes as command and fire-support ships, but reactivating them would probably have taken too long for the actual campaign.

Possibly: their command role might have encouraged a large command-oriented successor alongside, or instead of, some frigate replacements.

Prince Fushimi Hiroyasu was not quite as bad, but his status, politics, and protected position made him a useful comparison.

Older cruisers on secondary stations could free modern ships for the main coalition fleet in the Far East.

The navy of early 1939 was shaped by a struggle between status-conscious expansionists and pragmatic modernizers.

Yes: Mitsumasa Yonai is presented as at least Fisher's equal as a reformer, though Japan gave him less freedom to shape events.

They were primarily products of strong Japanese naval academies, with some officers also studying or observing overseas.

Probably, but only by reducing construction of cruisers and destroyers rather than competing for overall naval supremacy.

Yonai's strategic objection to war centered on Japan's fuel, shipyard, dry-dock, and internal-transport weaknesses.

Fuel technology offered a concrete measure of whether alliance with Germany would improve Japan's ability to sustain a war.

Shipyards, dry docks, fuel facilities, and internal freight links capable of replacing vulnerable coastal shipping.

No detailed English-language work is identified; a Japanese family compilation may exist, while much of Yonai's surviving material remains difficult to access.

It depends on when they learned the ships' real characteristics; early warning permits crash construction, while later discovery shapes the next generation instead.

A January 1939 war begins while aviation doctrine is still evolving and reform-minded officers retain influence over mobilization.

About two years for initial plants and operating experience, making a 1936-37 start potentially useful before the later oil embargo.

The decisive-battle doctrine assumed an exhausted enemy approach that Britain and the United States could avoid through forward basing.

Equal treaty allowances did not mean Britain and the United States could place equal numbers of ships in service in early 1939.

Japanese faith in large, heavily armed ships made numerical and tonnage restrictions feel like permanent strategic inferiority.

Possibly: attainable limits would reduce incentives to cheat and the cycle of suspicion that made later agreement harder.

The more applicable late-1930s concept used submarines, aircraft, and night attacks to wear down an approaching fleet.

With the Royal Navy leading the war, carrier fighters and tactical shipboard radar would compete successfully for national resources.

Because reaching those trade routes required getting past the enemy fleets and their bases, so Japanese doctrine placed fleet defeat first.

A 1939 Anglo-Japanese war could pit two highly developed but different night-fighting systems against one another.

Yes: fast battlecruisers and a multi-carrier strike force would likely deploy, with Renown, naval fighters, and tactical radar accelerated as resources allowed.

A shell might pass through fabric before detonating, but a hit on the airframe or machinery would still be extremely dangerous.

It would mobilize everything serviceable, with modern ships likely moving east while older units covered the Atlantic and Mediterranean.

Probably: strategic influence, naval balance, public opinion, and the desire for a voice in the peace settlement all favor American entry alongside Britain.

Senior officers could expect defeat yet still choose war, creating tension between existential rhetoric and conservative fleet handling.

The historical incident put HMS Birmingham and Japanese cruisers in an unusually dangerous armed standoff.

British officials without radio contact still coordinated more effectively than Japanese customs and naval authorities who could communicate.

At ranges down to roughly 400 yards, even a doomed British force could inflict severe mission damage before being overwhelmed.

Because war in Europe took priority before Britain's planned 1942 rearmament was complete; a Far Eastern war beginning first would reverse that allocation.

The proposed British approach builds at Singapore, protects the South China Sea, and progressively cuts Japan off from trade and fuel.

Fighting Japan first would reverse Britain's historical decision to prioritize escorts for the European submarine threat.

The likely opening reinforcement combines an experienced fleet commander, carriers, modernized battleships, and later Anglo-American concentration.

The British concept uses selected coastal positions and naval isolation rather than attempting to conquer all of Taiwan.

Protecting Atlantic and Indian Ocean commerce lets Britain mobilize for war without suffering the trade shock imposed by Germany and Italy.

A 1939 maritime war would begin while Japan was still heavily committed in China and potentially fighting the Soviet Union.

Without French Indochina or a Pearl Harbor target, Japanese planners would have to weigh an early move against the Philippines.

Probably: the existing plan to use spare 15-inch turrets still makes Vanguard a distinct and useful design.

Japan could call on several carriers in 1939, but not the concentrated, mature striking force associated with Pearl Harbor.

Yes: a joint carrier force would provide early operational lessons and could drive much larger follow-on carriers by 1942.

A deliberate Allied advance could deny Japan the fuel needed to contest a final fleet action on favorable terms.

Early carriers and especially cruisers would be at greatest risk from submarines and air attack, while Britain would try to avoid a costly decisive fleet battle.

Britain and the United States could redirect or expand shipbuilding, while Japan's concentrated infrastructure sharply limited wartime acceleration.

Not quickly: limited shipyard capacity and the Yamato program left too little industrial flexibility for a major wartime expansion.

No: it would finish the Illustrious class, then build larger fleet carriers and more Unicorn-like support ships as experience accumulated.

Probably: existing British large-gun experience and a scaled Lion design offered a plausible accelerated route.

An early war reaches Japan before years of attrition produce the personnel crisis and suicide tactics of 1944-45.

Restraint at Tsingtao and during the Asama Maru dispute reflected recognition that the international balance was still unfavorable.

The Pacific conflict likely ends before an atomic weapon is ready, leaving its first possible use to a later confrontation in Europe.

They would matter late because existing aircraft lacked the range, but Pacific requirements could yield much longer-ranged bombers for the next war.

It would receive major Allied support and tie down large Japanese land forces while the maritime coalition applied pressure at sea.

Probably: the lessons could accelerate a Daring-like development, although the exact design and date remain uncertain.

It might reach a Type XXI-like design through continued iteration, but Allied anti-submarine warfare would also be substantially better by then.

Not without difficulty: heat and humidity caused problems for its wooden construction and might have changed the aircraft's development.

Probably not before the decisive phase; Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were far more plausible German participants.

Probably not long, because coastal concentration and limited room for dispersal left Japanese infrastructure highly exposed.

Yes, but Britain would also advance its jet program and might enter the war with comparable or second-generation fighters.

Fighting one major war at a time could encourage deeper Commonwealth trade and naval integration.

Possibly: the more pragmatic faction in power in 1939 might accept an honourable peace that preserved Japan while ending its empire.

Possibly, especially for the Dutch, but industrial lead times mean the ships would probably arrive only after the war that created the demand.

He would push for formal equality, but Britain's status as the attacked and larger operational partner would still give it the lead.

Pairs of British, French, and German fast capital ships could turn commerce defense into a costly Japanese strategic dilemma.

Probably: Britain would join as the secondary partner so that it retained influence over the war and the peace settlement.

No easy opportunity appears: France, invasion logistics, a mobilized coalition, and a large British home garrison still stand in the way.

Britain and the United States could reach roughly comparable, much larger fleets, while most other powers remained limited by existing yard capacity.

Phantoms and airborne early warning could defend the fleet while Buccaneers struck Argentine forces on the islands.