Bruships 120: One Book & One Book only... Battleships & Battle Cruisers 1905-70 by Seigfried Breyer

A book on battleships and battlecruisers becomes a lesson in checking attractive claims against its sources.

It would effectively cease to exist as a surface force.

It was common as entertainment and could help crews coordinate work.

Not much sideways; manual handling and the ship's motion made it more practical to keep firing and adjust elevation when possible.

It could sweep the exposed deck with anti-personnel fire or keep firing into the hull, with the ships' roll continually changing the angle.

The carrier would help hold her in place, while Cumberland and the other cruisers would provide enough force to finish the action.

They could support two fast battle groups, but cost, manpower, and the desire to build a British battleship make the purchase unlikely.

Their existence could push the negotiated limits toward 18-inch guns and roughly 40,000 tons.

They can use heavy bunker-like fuel; the term describes the diesel cycle rather than a particular road fuel.

Both are dangerous in different ways, and their shadowing and reporting may matter more than the immediate gun duel against a heavy raider.

Age, size, and ability mattered; as a boy grew and proved capable, he could move into ordinary sailor duties.

The total carrier allowance would need to rise enough to preserve at least six ships, not merely permit a larger individual carrier.

Earlier victories in Europe could permit a carrier-backed Force Z to join American naval forces before Japan concentrates against it.

It would probably disperse the ships around Europe and use them as a fleet in being.

Britain and America would enlarge their leading destroyer types, while Japan and Italy could approach light-cruiser size under the destroyer label.

HMS Dreadnought, because she is comparatively small and offers little room for such a conversion.

The captain would deal with him, and the situation would be worse if the ship's master and commander were the same officer.

The Americans could emphasize daytime strikes while the British contribute fighter coordination and night operations, provided both commands cooperate.

Only with such extensive changes to shells, hoists, and machinery that new turrets would be the realistic solution.

Probably not the Sea Vampire; the Sea Fury might remain, while the Attacker is uncertain.

Possibly, but replacement would occur gradually and the final number would depend on the roles the fleet still had to cover.

Escalator clauses existed for that situation, though governments still had to choose to use them.

It could be temperamental, and the observer's position was extremely cramped for taller crew.

There is no reliable way to know, because the same-looking design calculation may not produce the same real-world problem.

Canada would probably operate Harriers, and Australia might copy the carrier choice, creating much greater Commonwealth naval-air capacity.

It is highly unlikely because Fraser was too junior and had not yet held the fleet command normally expected for the post.

Close-in weapons are a final safeguard after aircraft, outer air defence, and missiles have already failed.

Their support infrastructure and the legacy of the Hindenburg disaster were major drawbacks.

They would strengthen early British carrier and capital-ship capacity, but their survival depends on a continuing Soviet battleship threat and the money to replace them later.

Probably not, because America-class production was already replacing capacity and allied carriers could help cover deployments in the meantime.

Yes; both figures were approaching the upper limits for those aircraft roles.

A non-wood surface such as a bitumen-like coating might be considered for fire and water resistance, despite extra weight.

A rapid post-Jutland completion of the Admiral class would have changed the force the Royal Navy brought into treaty negotiations.

It depends on range, but it might survive the first broadside and would be unlikely to survive the second.

Build the heavy cruisers before the 1930 treaty, then use the established tonnage to argue for a matching light-cruiser allowance.

Four completed Admirals and possible G3s would leave Britain negotiating from a much larger and more modern capital-ship position.

Yes, if it built toward that fixed target; a continuing uncontrolled race would be the larger financial problem.

Government revenue and naval estimates show that interwar shipbuilding limits were political choices as well as questions of raw affordability.

The book's saint-name claims are tested against Royal Navy naming practice, contemporary politics, and later naming choices.

The book's impressive bibliography does not show direct use of the British archival records needed to settle some Royal Navy claims.

A passage about Austro-Hungarian battleship construction demonstrates how factual detail can be wrapped in a national interpretation.

Shell weight and loading machinery can reduce rate of fire enough to undermine the ranging advantage of very large guns.

It provides a gentler launch by flooding around the hull, avoiding some of the stresses imposed by a slipway launch.

They could be about 38,500 tons and use the extra displacement for much greater speed or a heavier 16-inch battery.

It is unlikely without serious trade-offs, because hull efficiency and cruising performance matter as much as top speed.

Possibly through coordination rather than direct ownership, with Norwegian, Canadian, and Soviet vessels providing the relevant capability.

Possibly, but only through costly infrastructure investment and trade-offs with other spending, while addressing earthquake risk.

It might not stop the entire plant, but the lost speed and manoeuvrability could leave her a sitting target.

Replace her machinery and guns, improve crew spaces, and use her as a long-range patrol and presence ship.

Diesels could improve range, but steam was still needed to reach the desired high speed.

Metallurgy and the practical power available from marine diesels were major limits, with the biggest widespread advances coming later.

Yes, especially for island resupply, dispersed operations, and selected anti-submarine missions.

Japan is economically stronger but lacks forward bases, making the Philippines and southern advance slower and logistically more exposed.

Battle noise and human limits made controlled salvo firing short-lived in age-of-sail combat.

Earlier interest was limited; the Lexingtons were battlecruisers intended for cruiser hunting, escort, and commerce operations rather than the battle line.

An additional ship changes deployments and crew quality as well as the arithmetic of a single battle.

Possibly at first, but a strong Spanish return with warships, firearms, and naval fire support could reverse the result.

Night battles would be much more dangerous for American forces and the war could last longer.

Vanguard, if restored as new, because her size, stability, guns, and upgrade margin offer more useful options than smaller ships.

British crews were generally faster because their training and sea time supported more regular gun drill and firing.

The very long Great Lakes bulk-carrier form worries him because its huge open cargo length permits substantial hull flexing.

It is possible but so difficult and expensive that building a new carrier is probably the better answer.

Metallurgy sets the theoretical limit, while shell handling and rate of fire set the practical one.

Generally no; there was little useful cover, and leaving their stations meant surrendering the ship's ability to fight back.

A model and drawings make the enormous Duke of Kent proposal credible as a design, but they do not settle who originated every idea within it.

Lengthening a hull, replacing machinery, and installing a new combat system can cost more and deliver less than new construction.

Yes, particularly in parts of the battlecruiser force and some cruiser squadrons before Jutland.

Some exceptionally long Royal Navy careers conceal repeated great refits that replaced much of the physical ship.

Destroyers are the strongest candidate because they carried guns, torpedoes, and depth charges without the structural weight required for submerged operation.

By relying heavily on supply ships and frequent replenishment.

There is no single answer: fighting strength favours a large fast capital ship, while global coverage requires numerous smaller ships and therefore a mixed fleet.

They would form its core, although they were wartime designs and would not necessarily define the entire peacetime force.

Armour thickness alone says little without understanding the area protected and the machinery and magazine layout beneath it.

They were a compromise for intermediate yards and were neither as useful as larger destroyers nor as efficient as simpler small ships.

They must position hull sonars and handle towed arrays effectively, which often requires turning the entire ship.

A battlecruiser can match a battleship's maximum belt thickness while protecting far less of the hull.

Britain's determination to stay safely below 35,000 tons left roughly 1,500 tons that might have improved speed or protection.

No; the internal layout could support a short shaft on a nearly direct line.

Yes; Eskimo, Nubian, and several other ships survived extremely severe damage.