Italy retained a small naval presence at Tientsin, but its auxiliary minelayer and gunboat could not support a combat submarine force deep in East Asian waters.
In this critique, limits on cruisers, destroyers, and submarines removed capabilities navies needed more urgently than the capital ships constrained at Washington.
Pedestal showed the payoff of aggressive attacks, but nearly half of Italian submarine losses came from 1942 onward as the fleet took greater risks it could not replace.
Missiles attacking a warship generally converge on the defended force, while land-based air defenses must protect an area against threats crossing many different paths.
Reported Houthi hits face a credibility problem: damage and possible casualties would be difficult to conceal across a warship's crew and their wider contacts.
A 30-mile torpedo attack must contend with submarines, airborne ASW, remote sonar arrays, detection networks, and decoys before it reaches the battleship.
Hypersonic weapons enter an established defensive contest involving combat air patrols, area and point defense, electronic warfare, decoys, guns, and directed energy.
Expensive hypersonic weapons are most likely to be reserved for valuable targets that operate inside larger formations rather than in isolated ship-versus-missile contests.
Conventional anti-ship ballistic missiles carry an escalation problem because an opponent may initially interpret their launch as strategic or nuclear.
China's repeated lack of interest in marketed Russian Leader designs may reflect a doctrinal mismatch rather than a simple judgment about the ships themselves.
Remote monitoring and spare systems support an estimated crew of about 300 by allowing maintenance teams to switch equipment over and work normal shifts.
Carrier crews sustain embarked aircraft and troops as well as the hull, so large escorts offer a better manning comparison for this battleship concept.
A heavily armed surface combatant may appeal to a regional navy that cannot fund carrier aviation but still needs deterrence, presence, and diplomatic utility.
Modern carriers are much larger largely because their aircraft and aviation spaces grew, not because shipboard electrical requirements increased in direct proportion.
The postwar move from cruisers to frigates and destroyers for presence missions often reduced fleet numbers without producing much smaller individual ships.
Solid projectiles dominated test programs, but electromagnetic launch does not inherently exclude more complex or guided payloads if their electronics are protected.
Water, coal, and redundant machinery provide examples of useful mass within protective layers, so an incoming weapon faces more than empty compartments.
A viewer's mash-up of Vittorio Veneto's aft aviation facilities with boats, drones, helicopters, and numerous 76 mm guns broadly resembles the concept, except for its much heavier primary guns.
The battleship's exact embarked complement would be a design choice, though it would likely include marines or equivalent personnel for boarding and landing tasks.
Combustible light-gas propulsion promises high performance but creates hazardous storage and power-generation problems aboard a ship already exposed to battle damage.
A procurement critique favors capacity for later weapon installation and argues that the Zumwalt experience damaged railguns' reputation despite continuing technical progress.
A long-range torpedo must cross a distributed sonar screen and reach a maneuvering target; neither quiet running nor under-keel detonation guarantees a hit.
Claims that Russian and Chinese defenses work while Western systems are helpless require the same scrutiny as optimistic claims from the opposite side.