Scuttlebutt 21st Century Battleship: Chat & Comment Response...

An incoming hypersonic weapon presents a different interception problem from a target crossing an air-defense system's field of fire.

Slowing for precise terminal maneuvers can improve a missile's chance of hitting while reducing the defensive difficulty created by its speed.

The proposed 21st-century battleship is a crewed command and support hub surrounded by uncrewed sensors and anti-submarine escorts.

A bow impact could break up against heavy structure, while a stern impact could wreck the superstructure without sinking the ship. Flooding and uncontrollable fire matter more than penetration alone.

Missiles attacking a warship generally converge on the defended force, while land-based air defenses must protect an area against threats crossing many different paths.

The cited reports are unconvincing because a real hit would be exceptionally hard to conceal across the crew and their wider social networks, although such weapons could still score a hit.

Torpedoes can sink battleships, but vulnerability alone does not determine a warship's usefulness or the value of its missions.

It could be lethal, but it would first have to penetrate a layered ASW screen and survive detection and countermeasures; a reliable attack would likely require a spread rather than one effortless shot.

Hypersonic weapons enter an established defensive contest involving combat air patrols, area and point defense, electronic warfare, decoys, guns, and directed energy.

Expensive hypersonic weapons are most likely to be reserved for valuable targets that operate inside larger formations rather than in isolated ship-versus-missile contests.

Conventional anti-ship ballistic missiles carry an escalation problem because an opponent may initially interpret their launch as strategic or nuclear.

The growth of microwave weapons against drone swarms raises the possibility that a warship's powerful search radar may have effects beyond detection.

The proposed battleship would aim to remain operational after hits and give the crew a safe way out if the ship could no longer be saved.

No. Layered armor and subdivision can limit how far a penetrating attack reaches, preserving systems and crew even when the outer protection is breached.

Propeller geometry deserves its own analysis, but the concept was intended to use podded or impeller-based propulsion instead of traditional shafts and screws.

The battleship concept adapts the arsenal ship's concentrated firepower into a vessel intended for peacetime duties as well as war.

Sacrificial compartments and duplicated systems allow a smaller crew to concentrate on keeping the core ship afloat and operational.

A future force could pair the reusable battleship hub and its uncrewed screen with disposable missile trucks if missile prices fall far enough.

It would be plausible contingency work, comparable to maintaining war plans, but no direct knowledge of such designs is claimed.

The tentative explanation is that the design fits Russian operational concepts but not China's naval doctrine, despite China's willingness to borrow other foreign ideas.

Maintenance still requires enough people, but switching between redundant systems would allow work in normal shifts. An ideal of 100 sailors becomes an expected complement of about 300.

It should require fewer people because it lacks a large carrier air group and its support burden. Large escorts provide a better starting point for estimating the crew.

Possibly, especially where a navy cannot afford carrier aviation but needs a powerful ship that can still perform deterrence, presence, and diplomatic missions.

Because much of modern carrier growth accommodates larger aircraft and aviation spaces; operating power has not risen in proportion to hull and aircraft size.

Adding more jobs to destroyers helps explain why modern examples have grown so large.

Mostly they changed type labels and reduced fleet numbers; many frigates and destroyers used for presence were similar in size to the sloops and light cruisers they replaced.

No. Solid shot was convenient for testing, while more complex rounds require electromagnetic shielding for their onboard systems.

No. Saltwater corrosion and large numbers of exposed explosive modules are a poor combination aboard a warship.

Water, coal, and redundant machinery provide examples of useful mass within protective layers, so an incoming weapon faces more than empty compartments.

Probably not for the main ship, though a small reactor might be useful in a secure separable pod designed to carry the crew away from a lost vessel.

Broadly yes. The concept resembles that arrangement but envisages much larger primary guns.

Lasers offer an advantage aboard the proposed ship and were already part of the concept.

Such a gun could overturn a modern submarine, although that concern would need calculation. Modern boats have a different surface-stability profile from older submersibles.

The number depends on the final design, but the ship would probably embark a boarding or landing force as many modern warships do.

They would retract, emerging for low-speed maneuvering or as emergency get-home propulsion if primary pods were lost.

Probably not; storing or generating the gas creates serious combat-safety and power problems, making railguns comparatively easier to implement.

A procurement critique favors capacity for later weapon installation and argues that the Zumwalt experience damaged railguns' reputation despite continuing technical progress.

No. The depth claim is implausible, torpedoes are not silent, and a long-range attack must defeat a wide ASW sensor screen, target maneuver, decoys, and active countermeasures.

Industrial capability would have to be rebuilt. The half-trillion-dollar figure is doubted, with a qualification that the eventual cost depends on future inflation.

Sixteen inches offers room for shells and possible missile payloads. Guns of 24 or 36 inches would be extremely heavy and difficult to maneuver aboard ship.

Magazine hits are a risk shared by ships with guns and vertical-launch cells. The proposal places magazines below armor to reduce their exposure.

There is no basis here for that one-sided conclusion. Geometry, long-running Western defense work, and propaganda from every side must all be considered.

It would not operate as a lone pure battleship; it is the centerpiece of an uncrewed task group whose distributed assets provide layered submarine defense.

Weapons salesmanship and national secrecy make public claims about military capability difficult to assess, whatever their source.