Why prewar reserve destroyers depended on British crews
British reserve-crewing plans reflected limited expectations of naval support from Canada and India, with Australia viewed more favourably.
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British reserve-crewing plans reflected limited expectations of naval support from Canada and India, with Australia viewed more favourably.
The August 1939 review provided a diplomatic reason to mobilize reserve ships and keep them ready for war.
The September 1939 collision killed fourteen men and left Walker helping rescue survivors and tow the more badly damaged Vanquisher.
Walker combined convoy duty, troop transfers, and air defence before leaving Narvik on 8 June 1940.
Walker's encounter with U-47 after the loss of Arandora Star led to repairs lasting until September 1940.
Donald Macintyre's Fleet Air Arm background, ASW specialization, and aggressive command style set up Walker's decisive convoy battle.
Macintyre's books range from U-Boat Killer to wider naval history, with much of his own career described by him.
Walker and Vanoc fought the half-hour HX 112 action that ended U-99 and U-100.
Possible causes of U-47's loss remain unresolved, despite its proximity in time to the loss of two other leading U-boats.
Walker's 1942 escorts show older destroyers guarding troop convoys and screening major warships on routes toward Gibraltar and the Mediterranean.
Extra launchers, rails, and ammunition illustrate escort improvisation, with uncertainty about which arrangements Walker herself used.
The 1943 refit traded speed and torpedoes for endurance, anti-aircraft weapons, radar, Huff-Duff, and a stronger escort fit.
Walker's new commander wanted escorts fully equipped, in contrast to Canadian deployments constrained by shortages.
Walker guarded a rescue ship at the exposed rear of convoy OG 91 and then brought two slow detached vessels safely to Gibraltar.
Roll brought earlier destroyer and anti-submarine experience to Walker's Arctic and Normandy escorts.
Walker reinforced Tribal-class escort groups and repeatedly joined exercises testing submarine-hunting methods.
Walker's Arctic escort service placed her alongside Starling when the sloop sank U-961.
Walker escorted Normandy troop transports, then returned to Arctic and coastal convoy protection before entering reserve.
Yes. Navies have placed new ships directly into reserve, preserving them as replacements or surge capacity while later members of the class remain active.
Potentially, by recruiting mariners, heavy-machinery operators, and technical personnel and then using duplicate simulators to sustain their naval-system training.
A viewer identifies the 1937 Coronation Review. The initial recollection of 1935 is revised tentatively, rather than settled through a source check during the exchange.
Losing one could be the less damaging choice if a loss were unavoidable, but the preference was still to preserve every ship.
Probably until at least 1942, with some retained to 1944 if their condition allowed.
About 2,500 tons for an interwar setting, while roughly 5,000 tons may be the modern equivalent once missiles, sensors, computers, and their support spaces are included.
The available account points to close formation work at night in poor weather, but it does not establish a more precise cause.
A reliable answer requires an infrastructure study, because a tactically attractive site is useful only if roads, railways, and dependable supply routes can sustain it.
Thornycroft and White are the two personal favourites named.
Yes. Simulators are used extensively across the armed forces, including the training context raised by the question.
A light frigate such as FDI or Type 31 is suggested as the closer functional equivalent.
Both were a little over 1,000 tons, with little difference in size.
They had a real effect but took time to mature and were easier to decoy or confuse than popular portrayals suggest.
The records establish that Walker carried more than her official allowance, but they do not support a firm total or prove that charges were stored in crew spaces.
Experiments showed that they could, but aircraft, equipment, and specialist personnel consumed enough space that a cruiser-sized platform was generally more practical.
Yes in principle, although it remains uncertain which components are already made in Britain and where BAE Systems distributes current production.
Gearing's late-war gun and torpedo armament left little room for the helicopters and missiles needed in Cold War escort work.
From How the USN learnt the lessons to conceive the Arleigh Burke class... From the Gearings to the Kidds ·
Offboard mine-clearing equipment needs ships or nearby shore facilities before it can operate in a distant area such as the Strait of Hormuz.
From How the USN learnt the lessons to conceive the Arleigh Burke class... From the Gearings to the Kidds ·
DASH shows how an uncrewed helicopter could give small wartime destroyers a longer anti-submarine reach decades before renewed interest in drones for the same mission.
From How the USN learnt the lessons to conceive the Arleigh Burke class... From the Gearings to the Kidds ·
The transfer of maritime presence duties from Britain to the United States helps explain the emphasis on the appearance and perceived status of postwar destroyers.
From How the USN learnt the lessons to conceive the Arleigh Burke class... From the Gearings to the Kidds ·
Norfolk is interpreted as an experimental ASW hunter-killer closer to a French-style contre-torpilleur than to either a conventional US destroyer or a true cruiser.
From How the USN learnt the lessons to conceive the Arleigh Burke class... From the Gearings to the Kidds ·
Norfolk and Mitscher illustrate the argument that a destroyer's anti-aircraft firepower and its diplomatic impact could favor different gun fits.
From How the USN learnt the lessons to conceive the Arleigh Burke class... From the Gearings to the Kidds ·
Forrest Sherman construction replaced worn wartime hulls and supported Tartar, ASROC, and gun experiments before providing the basis for Charles F. Adams.
From How the USN learnt the lessons to conceive the Arleigh Burke class... From the Gearings to the Kidds ·
USS Hull's Mark 71 trial prompts a counterfactual about making 8-inch guns standard on modern escorts and using their larger shells for guidance and other functions.
From How the USN learnt the lessons to conceive the Arleigh Burke class... From the Gearings to the Kidds ·
Farragut combines Terrier missiles, ASROC, and lightweight torpedoes in a larger, upgradeable destroyer designed to defend carrier battle groups.
From How the USN learnt the lessons to conceive the Arleigh Burke class... From the Gearings to the Kidds ·
The move to lightweight ASW torpedoes raises a counterfactual about retaining 21-inch systems for larger uncrewed underwater vehicles.
From How the USN learnt the lessons to conceive the Arleigh Burke class... From the Gearings to the Kidds ·
Forrest Sherman ancestry reduced design risk as Charles F. Adams combined missile launchers, guns, and ASW weapons for carrier defense.
From How the USN learnt the lessons to conceive the Arleigh Burke class... From the Gearings to the Kidds ·
FRAM conversions could extend the usefulness of older destroyers, while hull condition and equipment limits still created a need for replacements.
From How the USN learnt the lessons to conceive the Arleigh Burke class... From the Gearings to the Kidds ·
Charles F. Adams production and wartime-hull upgrades gave the US Navy enough coverage to pause destroyer construction and rethink the next ship as a complete system.
From How the USN learnt the lessons to conceive the Arleigh Burke class... From the Gearings to the Kidds ·
Spruance's larger hull accommodates helicopters and digital combat systems as cruiser retirements increase the destroyer's presence duties.
From How the USN learnt the lessons to conceive the Arleigh Burke class... From the Gearings to the Kidds ·