Complete directory
Explore every watch point in reverse video-date order, then in timestamp order within each video.
The destroyers could observe shell tracks or patterns on radar and use that warning for general evasive action, though they could not simply dodge fast projectiles.
From A bit more on RN Destroyers - The Hunt for the Bismarck ·
Type 286M is the radar most clearly associated with this operation, but rapid trials and secret variants make exact ship-by-ship fits difficult to state.
From A bit more on RN Destroyers - The Hunt for the Bismarck ·
Half an hour of fire at Piorun and a damaging near miss on Cossack show that Bismarck treated the destroyers as a serious threat.
From A bit more on RN Destroyers - The Hunt for the Bismarck ·
In this 2020 assessment, historic destroyer names were welcome, but Battle-class names for the Type 31 frigates seemed more plausible than a new Tribal class.
From A bit more on RN Destroyers - The Hunt for the Bismarck ·
The destroyer elite persisted into the 1960s, then its improvisational can-do identity became part of the smaller Royal Navy's wider culture.
From A bit more on RN Destroyers - The Hunt for the Bismarck ·
Piorun continued through an active war that included major operations and the postwar sinking of surrendered Type XXI submarines.
From A bit more on RN Destroyers - The Hunt for the Bismarck ·
Canadian Tribals helped shape the Royal Canadian Navy, while preserved HMCS Haida provides a surviving example and an archival trail back to her Newcastle construction.
From A bit more on RN Destroyers - The Hunt for the Bismarck ·
Twenty-seven Tribals were built across navies, about twenty-three in time for wartime service, and only four of the Royal Navy's sixteen survived the war.
From A bit more on RN Destroyers - The Hunt for the Bismarck ·
Wartime-built Tribals remained close to the prewar design, with the main differences concentrated in armament and anti-aircraft specialisation.
From A bit more on RN Destroyers - The Hunt for the Bismarck ·
HMS Eskimo survived a catastrophic bow loss and later replacement damage, while HMS Javelin provides an even broader comparison for destroyer survivability.
From A bit more on RN Destroyers - The Hunt for the Bismarck ·
A contemporary recollection connects Vian's night attack with the morning arrival of the battleships and credits the Tribals with ensuring Bismarck remained trapped.
From A bit more on RN Destroyers - The Hunt for the Bismarck ·
Although built under a destroyer-leader designation, Tribals were grouped into class-based flotillas under the Royal Navy's preference for homogeneous units.
From A bit more on RN Destroyers - The Hunt for the Bismarck ·
Frequent high-speed operation produced recurring turbine trouble, informally described as turbine-itis, and demanded repeated machinery attention.
From A bit more on RN Destroyers - The Hunt for the Bismarck ·
The often-overlooked Central Norway campaign may have offered a way to cut off a large part of the German advance if the Allies supplied the force at Namsos properly.
A book excerpt explains how Tribal-class destroyers surveyed landing sites, helped establish the base, escorted troopships, and ferried troops ashore at Namsos.
Carton de Wiart used HMS Afridi and HMS Somali as headquarters, exploiting the ships' working space and ability to operate farther up the fjords than cruisers.
Carton de Wiart recalled the Royal Navy's seemingly impossible promise to evacuate his whole force. The extraction foreshadowed Dunkirk, and HMS Afridi was lost during the campaign.
Royal Navy destroyers supplied fire support and air defence to British and French troops that lacked sufficient artillery and air support.
Destroyer fire support remained practical because the navy could replenish ammunition through its support and depot ships, while army artillery supply lagged behind.
Carton de Wiart kept his headquarters aboard destroyers partly to use naval radio-direction-finding reports to estimate German positions.
The force at Namsos aimed to take Trondheim and exploit central Norway's geography, but supplies sent elsewhere left the advance without the support it needed.
Concentrating support at Namsos might have let the Allies block off part of Norway and build up reinforcements despite competing demands on their resources.
The overlooked central campaign may have offered the Norwegian intervention's best chance of success, though this judgment comes from a destroyer-focused line of research.
Work on a Narvik book was already underway, while a fuller presentation of the Norwegian and British actions would wait until the battles and ships could be illustrated properly.
Interwar neglect left the German destroyer arm with uneven officer experience, and an ambush that had worked against H-class destroyers was poorly suited to the later Tribal-class attack.
Four heavily armed Tribal-class destroyers were far harder to overwhelm than the H-class ships that the Germans had defeated earlier.
HMS Warspite's float-equipped Swordfish scouted ahead of the British force and exposed German positions before the ships rounded the fjord's bends.
Combat against the H-class force consumed much of the German destroyers' ammunition, and limited resupply left them badly depleted when the Tribals and HMS Warspite arrived.
Narvik mattered beyond the fjords because the Kriegsmarine's destroyer arm no longer operated with the same strength or confidence after the battle.
Counting the Norwegian action first, the three-battle sequence moves through a German victory over British H-class destroyers to the German force's destruction.
After losing her bow and A turret, HMS Eskimo kept B turret firing, launched torpedoes, and advanced stern-first with X and Y turrets covering the following destroyers.
HMS Cossack drove into a harbour to suppress German shore fire and kept engaging targets even after becoming grounded against another vessel.
After torpedo and gun hits knocked her out early, HMS Punjabi restored enough capability to re-enter the battle despite casualties and a perforated superstructure.
The third Battle of Narvik resembled a nonstop, close-range pub brawl more than an orderly naval engagement.
Altmark supplied Admiral Graf Spee and held captured merchant sailors, making the logistics ship a potential propaganda prize.
A cruiser, four Tribal-class destroyers, and two minelayers reveal how seriously Britain treated Altmark and her prisoners.
Philip Vian commanded from Cossack temporarily, bringing tactical aggression and demanding personal standards to an already capable destroyer flotilla.
An Admiralty errand gave a petty officer a way to reach his wife, illustrating the personal consideration behind Vian's demanding command style.
HMS Cossack's gun-heavy design shows why the Tribal class sat between ordinary destroyers and cruiser-like flotilla leaders.
Optimistic prewar estimates of engagement time against dive-bombers gave way to a high-angle gun mounting and more close-range anti-aircraft weapons.
Norway's neutrality reflected the danger posed by German military proximity and British control of sea routes.
Norwegian merchant ships became an Allied strategic asset, carrying supplies across the Atlantic and later toward the Soviet Union.
Altmark's merchant crew evaded an increasingly informed British search during the tanker's difficult return voyage.
Weak inspections and active obstruction allowed Altmark to pass until a suspicious merchant captain reported the lightly loaded tanker.
British and German pressure on Norway, repeated radio messages, and aerial sightings bring Altmark within reach of the intercepting force.
Maps, narrow channels, uncertain depth, and Norwegian torpedo boats explain why the first British interception drove Altmark deeper into the fjord instead of ending the chase.
Altmark continued transmitting despite British claims of effective jamming, with the surrounding mountains a possible explanation.
Germany's inability to spare a rescue force offers a modern force-structure lesson about maintaining ships for contingencies.