Patreon 62: What If The French Navy in 1940 Fought On?

The scenario ends in 1941 and treats the result as a constrained historical argument rather than an unlimited prediction.

Yes, if French crews evacuated with their ships; Allied and Commonwealth resources could sustain a force valuable enough to justify the cost.

A stronger force could have made any battle more decisive, and Warspite might have caught Strasbourg before she reached full speed, but Britain arrived intending negotiation rather than a fleet action.

A world survey shows French naval forces spread across the Mediterranean, Atlantic ports, Africa, the Caribbean, Britain, and Canada.

Standard light weapons could be adopted, existing American orders could cover some calibres, and dedicated production could sustain the less frequently fired battleship guns.

Probably not, because the Dunkerques could be completed sooner; designing them for a later upgrade to Richelieu-type guns would offer a better compromise.

A Napoleonic-era aside notes the irony that British banks helped finance the American purchase whose proceeds Napoleon hoped to use against Britain.

Béarn is recast as a convoy-support carrier rather than judged against faster fleet carriers.

The scenario assumes most of the navy makes a collective choice, sharply reducing the chance of French ships fighting one another.

Nearly thirty Atlantic submarines would add patrol density around German, Norwegian, and occupied European ports.

Probably; it would likely merge with the Dynamo evacuation and carry more fighting personnel out of France.

The Mediterranean inventory explains why losing France forced Britain to create Force H and stretch its capital ships.

Yes as part of a concentrated squadron; Allied commanders would avoid a one-on-one duel and use numbers to make the Italian ship withdraw or suffer heavy damage.

The Denmark Strait comparison illustrates why wartime battleship matchups should be judged as formations rather than isolated hulls.

The total available fleet is translated into practical jobs across convoy escort, the Mediterranean, and anti-submarine warfare.

It increases the chance of a machinery and limited armour refit because Britain no longer has to sustain Force H, though the complete reconstruction is still uncertain.

Probably not at fleet level; the navy was professional, though some younger destroyer commanders might show extra aggression.

Incomplete French capital ships might escape for American completion, but they would not become usable additions to the 1940 or 1941 fleet.

The first branch has the navy leave metropolitan France while French colonial bases and forces remain in the Allied war.

Furious is the most plausible carrier to support the French, leaving Ark Royal and Eagle with higher-priority British formations.

French submarines, sloops, Caribbean bases, and Béarn collectively make the early Atlantic campaign more difficult for Germany.

Evacuated French sailors could guide Special Operations Executive supply runs into small harbors and coves absent from British charts.

Lower capital-ship pressure could alter the last King George V ships, cancel Vanguard, and release yards for carriers.

The real Italian attack in the Alps provides context for why continued French resistance would leave Italy facing a difficult western front.

Allied French North Africa places Libya between hostile territories and provides a short supply route to Malta.

Not earlier jets, but existing Short Sunderland flying boats could run a frequent Tunisia-Malta supply service.

An early end to the North African campaign releases British and French forces for Greece and makes Crete harder to isolate.

Ark Royal and Eagle could turn Taranto into a larger strike that disables more of the Italian battle fleet for longer.

British capital ships and carriers freed from the Mediterranean become a planning problem for Japan before December 1941.

Not at that scale, but French submarines and retained British T-class boats could cause serious operational problems in the Far East.

The second branch keeps metropolitan France fighting after the German advance reaches the limit of its supply system.

A Breton redoubt was unrealistic, but continued resistance across the remaining French territory could have lasted because France still had reserves, supplies, and British reinforcement.

Not decisively; Malta's cliffs, defended terrain, and the Axis shortage of heavy bombers still make invasion exceptionally difficult.

Possibly, but not simply because the ships were available; once the priority objective was destroyed, the risk could outweigh the value.

Operating only from Germany or Norway shortens U-boat reach and concentrates Allied patrols across a northern bottleneck.

They would have to return toward Germany or Norway through the northern passages, where a concentrated Home Fleet could wait for them.

France retaining Toulon and its industrial base strengthens Mediterranean operations beyond the advantages of an exile fleet.

Even under heavier German pressure, Canaris's influence and Spanish reluctance would probably preserve nonbelligerence.

Probably not; cooperation is possible, but the altered European war would likely end before an atomic weapon could be developed.

Open Allied ports turn Operation Torch's troops into direct reinforcement for France instead of requiring a new amphibious lodgment.

It might try, but the concentrated northern patrol barrier would make detection and destruction by cruiser-destroyer hunter groups much more likely.

Probably not; German confidence in its own submarine knowledge and racial prejudice made serious reliance on Japanese naval expertise unlikely.

Losing Libya, Albania, and Greece could remove Mussolini and push Italy toward neutrality or the Allied side.

A continuing western war removes the Arctic convoy effort and concentrates matériel in France while denying Germany captured French trucks.

If Germany is defeated or contained by late 1941, a large Anglo-French fleet can assemble in the Indian Ocean before Japan moves south.

A stronger Britain has less reason to close the Burma Road, keeping Nationalist China supplied and the Japanese Army committed there.

Without secure bases in French Indochina, Japan cannot mount the historical drive through Malaya under the same conditions.

Possibly, but Soviet moves in Poland could also provoke Britain and France; Moscow might disguise its position through a nominally independent Polish state, and any advance would still face major logistical limits.

Not uniformly; many naval leaders understood Japanese competence, but Britain lacked enough modern ships and aircraft to act on that knowledge.

The counterfactual Eastern Fleet could include the Queen Elizabeths, Nelson and Rodney, Renown, a refitted Hood, and several carriers.

Royal Oak probably remains lost, while many later Mediterranean and Atlantic losses disappear in their historical form, though other ships could still be lost in different ways.

Reaching the oil becomes much harder without the Indochina-Malaya springboard; an advance through the Philippines would face stronger Allied support from Indochina and the Dutch East Indies.

A shorter Mediterranean struggle releases experienced commanders as well as ships for an Indian Ocean fleet.

Even without a Pearl Harbor-first sequence, American interests make neutrality during a Japanese attack on Allied Asia unlikely.

French carrier construction and a twin-engine naval aircraft could influence Allied carrier design and procurement.

The conclusion explains why the simultaneous loss of Norway, France, and the French fleet shattered British prewar assumptions.

The claim that Churchill promised Britain would never fight Japan is corrected by placing prewar concern about Japan alongside Germany and Italy.

Tentatively, their main decks were broken or split-level, with the terminology explicitly flagged as uncertain.

Lower Atlantic losses and a safer Indian Ocean could preserve coastal food transport, though the deeper infrastructure failure remains colonial.

Not long if she faced a concentrated Royal Navy, and sustained fighting in France might prevent Tirpitz or even Bismarck from being completed on schedule.

The closing thought replaces the familiar Cold War with a stronger Anglo-French bloc and a Soviet Union outside Eastern Europe.