Favourite Dreadnoughts – Battleships & Battle Cruisers…

Probably Alaska, although Dreadnought's period battleship armour and unusual combat record make her more than a token opponent.

The list separates effective battleships, battlecruisers and fast battleships from ships valued for their character and service stories.

The Bellerophons matter less as famous individual ships than as the Royal Navy's first repeatable dreadnought battle-fleet core.

The Tegetthoffs are presented as an impressive home-grown first dreadnought design for a navy operating with constrained resources.

Austria-Hungary planned to follow its 12-inch-gun dreadnoughts with a roughly 25,000-ton design carrying ten 14-inch guns.

Not immediately; the designs may be recoverable, but the specialised plants, machinery and tacit production knowledge would have to be rebuilt.

USS Texas earns a place for the stubbornness and operational durability that define her long service story.

Possibly Nelson, Rodney or some Iowa-class ships, but survival would depend greatly on where the weapon struck.

Early designers valued the redundancy and agility of several twin turrets, but longer-range fighting later made triple turrets more advantageous.

Separate Commonwealth fleets could complicate treaty limits and force opponents to allocate more heavy ships to counter them.

Not formally, but many Texans volunteered and sought assignment to their namesake ship.

Possibly, if mature railguns or Gauss guns make high-velocity saturation fire substantially cheaper than missiles.

Japan would need heavier forces to counter it, raising losses or delaying operations even if the Allies still did not win outright.

The Queen Elizabeths combine speed, heavy guns and long modernisation potential, making them the leading conventional battleship choice.

Battlecruiser is understandable modern shorthand, but armoured cruiser better expresses the intermediate design space also occupied by Alaska and Deutschland.

Lion, Princess Royal, Queen Mary and Tiger.

Its designers prioritised speed so heavily that the sacrifices elsewhere left a less successful overall ship.

A proposed 28-knot HMS Agincourt might have carried six or nine 18-inch guns and served as Jellicoe's flagship at Jutland.

Earlier small-tube boilers could have raised the Queen Elizabeths toward 28 knots and the Revenge class toward 25 knots, changing two-war fleet employment.

Jellicoe accepted shipyard warnings that the unfamiliar technology would cause major delivery delays.

It would strengthen the line and outperform some early German dreadnoughts, but probably would not change the result.

HMS New Zealand is chosen for the improbable good fortune that carried her through battles that destroyed comparable ships.

Probably not; it would more likely force Japan to rethink the whole programme once 18-inch guns no longer supplied a unique advantage.

Probably not, because the shell, mounting, barrel and ammunition penalties make 20 inches far less practical than 18 inches.

Probably not; Yamato was intended to overmatch multiple older standards, not two later Iowa-class fast battleships.

Yamato's secrecy could preserve surprise, but an unknown capability could not shape an opponent's peacetime choices through deterrence.

Renown is preferred to Hood because her refitted, long World War II service demonstrated what a capable battlecruiser could still do.

Yes. Imperial Russia began the Borodino class, and the Soviet Union later considered battlecruisers again.

North Carolina and Washington are praised for their range, 16-inch guns, protection and constant presence in major Pacific operations.

Perhaps about 50 percent more on the project, with the compensating benefit of larger facilities for later ships.

Renown's long-range hits and determined approach encouraged the German ships to disengage rather than risk a closer fight.

A long battleship-building hiatus had eroded practical experience, and wartime production left little time to pause, learn and redesign between classes.

Battle fleets win command in the decisive area, while faster forces turn that victory into usable control across wider waters.

Japan expected a European war to absorb British strength in the Atlantic and Mediterranean, reducing the force available for the Far East.

Yamato illustrates how building an exceptional capital ship can constrain the wider infrastructure needed for a balanced wartime fleet.

More reliable Italian ammunition could have made the Mediterranean campaign harder and accelerated British battleship and carrier programmes.

The Iowa class represents the mature fast battleship: heavy 16-inch firepower, very high speed and formidable protection.

More anti-submarine and escort resources would help German shipping, but they could not replace the fleet and infrastructure needed to control the sea.

The cancelled Lexington battlecruisers appeal because their light protection makes their cruiser ancestry unusually visible.

The Bureau of Ships still expected commanders to fight from them, while British captains prioritised visibility in mobile engagements.

Permanent mooring does not remove underwater maintenance: even a museum ship in fresh water eventually needs inspection and work in a suitable dock.

Arms limitation was useful, but delaying the treaty until about 1925 might have produced a more favourable later diplomatic sequence.

Sweden, and probably Canada, had the technical base but would first have needed capital-ship-sized yard infrastructure.

Probably not: it curbed a possible building race, but neither country had the political will, funding or strategic reason for war.

Not entirely; Ferrol had the yards, but Spain still had to import armour and related industrial inputs from Britain.

Dunkerque probably has the overall edge as a fast battleship, though Renown's speed and Alaska's fire control make the matchup highly situational.

Cuniberti published the all-big-gun concept and Dante Alighieri became Italy's first example, yet HMS Dreadnought supplied the name adopted worldwide.

The Regia Marina, because it could assemble a far larger and more coherent surface fleet against the Royal Navy.

No. A substantially heavier main battery, preferably six 16-inch guns, would be needed to move it toward contemporary capital-ship status.

The Tillman is more dangerous in range, but Yamato is fast enough to disengage, so a decisive fight probably never occurs.

The Andrea Doria class combines attractive Italian lines and credible capability, but stronger contemporaries keep it from leading its field.

Probably limited physical damage, but it could have displaced the German fleet and powerfully influenced British carrier and aviation policy.

Russia acquired the Italian design and used it as an influence while developing the Gangut-class battleships.

No. They could damage upperworks, but aircraft and bomb technology had not yet produced a reliable ship-killing weapon.

No. Tiger was the benchmark and inspiration, but Kongo was redesigned around Japanese requirements rather than copied.

Standard load omits fuel, water and some stores, while full load includes the consumables carried for operations.

The famous bombing demonstration created headlines but used stationary targets and disrupted the controlled damage study naval planners needed.

The unbuilt Francesco Caracciolos show how four 28-knot, 15-inch-gun battleships could have transformed Italy's World War II battle line.

No. Export variants could omit selected refinements, including protection details retained for Royal Navy ships.

Nelson and Rodney combine major historical importance with a disliked all-forward layout and a speed upgrade that could have been planned in.

They were generally capable, but competing designs were better, while Scharnhorst was under-gunned and Bismarck was overly complex and inefficient.

A few extra knots could turn Rodney's historical sighting of Gneisenau from a missed interception into a 16-inch-gun engagement.

The Tennessee class earns affection through the amount of fighting it undertook and its image as a dependable crew's ship.

Probably, to retain nine 16-inch guns and heavy armour under treaty limits, though a more conventional layout had operational advantages.

Britain's late-1930s limits reflected political timing and debt caution more than an absolute inability to fund defence.

Possibly, because steadier fire from Prince of Wales might have distracted Bismarck, but Hood was still lost to an unusually fortunate hit.

British modernisation aimed toward 1942 while Germany's Plan Z assumed no major war until 1948, leaving both programmes incomplete in 1939.

Germany was permitted a stated percentage of Royal Navy submarine strength, not an automatically equal submarine force.

Her size, speed and reputation made her an effective deterrent and monitor against possible German or Italian cruiser involvement.

HMS Warspite wins the overall choice for distinguished service in two world wars, survival under damage and a record that made her a naval legend.

Iron Duke receives an honourable mention as Jellicoe's flagship and a crucial First World War battleship, but Warspite's two-war career wins the comparison.

British accommodation of German naval building is interpreted partly as an attempt to divert German resources and buy time for French and British rearmament.

Different repainting cycles and waterline requirements can justify a separate coating and colour below a warship's waterline.

Probably about 18 to 20 knots, judging from the bow wave and hull attitude.

The Second Sea Lord still led personnel matters, while the Third Sea Lord's materiel role became the lower-ranked Controller of the Navy.