Bruships: A Special - Questions/What If's till the Bru runs out? (5)

They came from across Britain and sometimes the Commonwealth, with a strong western-British presence among Royal Navy admirals in this informal assessment.

Anthony Eden was a likely Conservative choice, with Lord Halifax another possibility, though the preferred candidate was the Labour leader who later succeeded Churchill.

Why British naval planning could not concentrate on Germany alone before the Second World War.

The larger delay came from deliberately slowed construction; the catapult debate occurred before it materially constrained the yards and had more effect on Prince of Wales.

Only a major battle force would transform the balance by itself, but sustained Commonwealth sloop construction could have freed destroyers and strengthened escort and anti-submarine operations.

Probably; it was one of several railway improvements that could have strengthened the logistics supporting Malaya and Singapore.

Possibly from a mixture of feared reprisals, guilt, and reluctance to play a further part in a war whose direction he could already see.

No. Other ships were scuttled when crews wrongly believed capture was imminent, although no examples are named from memory here.

A theatre-by-theatre comparison of the logistical and convoy problems posed by Britain's three expected naval opponents.

Most would be light cruisers: they exceed traditional destroyer displacement but remain below 10,000 tons and lack eight-inch armament.

Any two of the three could still win, though the route would be bloodier and the duration could change.

Yes. Royal Marines, naval landing parties, and airborne forces all planned for missions in which they could be isolated from the main force.

The older planning basis was about nine Type 45s and sixteen to eighteen frigates for three carriers, and today the practical requirement may be higher.

No. Afghanistan was a response compelled by attack because bombing alone would not remove a dispersed hostile network.

Navies would probably emphasize ramming and boarding, backed by steam-powered crossbows, mechanical rapid-fire projectile weapons, and other ways to pierce hulls without guns.

Officers and chiefs would usually know more through professional connections, while junior and newly joined sailors might receive much less detail.

Armoured cruisers are the likelier candidates; most pre-dreadnought conversions would demand such extensive reconstruction that they would effectively be new ships.

It could either mature into chemistry or, if transmutation were real, make metal-rich states suddenly wealthy and better able to wage war.

A few would matter little, but a sizeable group positioned with ABDA or the carrier force could materially strengthen night fighting and carrier protection.

No; Prussia had little navy, and British sea power could have broken the Union blockade and supplied the Confederacy while ships such as HMS Warrior outmatched American monitors at sea.

No. Each catapult should be an independent system so one failure does not stop all launches.

There was no close equivalent for full-size warships, but large landing ships carried smaller landing craft and performed a related transport function.

Only with more forces and a unified Allied command; a carrier-backed Force Z and a senior theatre commander could have improved coordination and deterrence.

It could buy time, perhaps a few months, but not stop the United States' larger mobilisation and advance.

How the seizure of Confederate diplomats from a British mail steamer became a naval and diplomatic crisis.

Mainly in the 1920s as a strategic matter, though American ship design had already been an important technological benchmark during the dreadnought race.

How Tribal-class gunfire could expose an enemy ship at night and create a torpedo-firing opportunity.

Not on a politically acceptable timetable; blockade and bombing could continue, but a land invasion would likely still be required.

Keep the SSBNs and add four related SSGNs with vertical-launch inserts, creating an eight-submarine strategic pool with both deterrent and conventional strike roles.

Use a straight flight deck and cant several sail masts outward at roughly 45 degrees on each side, keeping the centreline clear for aircraft.

Higher-density engines and small-tube boilers: they would make 1910-era warships far faster and reshape later fleet development.

No simple hierarchy fits: British and American navies both had strong practices, and their carriers' protection schemes produced different damage and repair patterns.

Nimitz would probably remain in command, but Guadalcanal would likely be lost and the US Navy would need several more months to rebuild.

By sustaining escort construction; better submarines still had to transit, find convoys, and defeat the existing escort screen.

Possibly, but triple 15-inch turrets fit existing practice too easily; a twin 18-inch concept better explains the design's exceptional character and delay.

Wales or Cornwall are the nearer options and the Falklands the remote one, but every relocation would be extremely expensive and slow.

Japan is the likeliest user because of its island campaigns, probably with a compact one-man Japanese tank turret.

Possibly; his appetite for glory could prompt early action, and success against Goeben would make later command at the Dardanelles more likely.

The United States and Japan could complete advanced existing designs, Britain would tailor Nelsons or G3-type ships in response, and Italy might finish two Francesco Caracciolo-class battleships.

Large American crews reflect nuclear watchkeeping and a manpower-heavy approach to damage control, while European navies lean more heavily on automated systems.

For strike work it should carry a useful load at high speed, reduce detectability, and ideally be optionally crewed.

A second engine adds redundancy, but it would make the F-35B much heavier and split the naval versions further from the single-engined land-based design.

The navy carried the army past Quebec's blocking position, enabling troops to climb behind the city and form for the decisive battle on the heights.

Maintain visible, crewed presence in the area; reacting later is ineffective, while a ship and helicopter already on station can deter or intervene.

Ordinary mistakes do not disqualify a museum, but deliberate distortion for profit or politics turns it into a history-themed attraction rather than a responsible museum.

Nuclear Midways are the likelier outcome; a new carrier design is easier to adapt, and an American lead could press Britain toward nuclear Malta-class carriers.

How turret spacing, firing arcs, armour concentration, and speed competed within the Italian capital-ship design.

Examples include Glorious's weak escort, missed Japanese follow-on attacks at Pearl Harbor, and command and coordination failures at Trafalgar and in the Armada campaign.

Pair larger frigates for allied operations with submarines, Visby-like vessels, and attack aircraft for home defence and sea denial.

The same trends would continue more slowly; jet aviation and modernization were already coming, but the war accelerated them and demanded ships ready for immediate service.

A codified British constitution would entrench rights, set spending floors for defence and education, and define the devolved institutions more clearly.

They add redundancy, cover the rear quarters, and allow the ship to keep firing while it withdraws.

Why first sea lords and service chiefs must combine technical understanding, command judgement, and the ability to explain naval needs politically.

The engagement was tactically unfavourable, but Cradock had little room to escape; Canopus might have altered the German response and the force balance.

Why game mechanics can open a path into naval history but should not be read as a literal model of fleet combat.

He inherited a difficult situation, but replacing the established local commander disrupted the defence; retaining that command and improving island transport would have helped.

A practical route would reuse the Zumwalt hull and power supply with a new superstructure, updated systems, and a larger missile fit.

It depends on the drone mission: short-range single-purpose systems can be small, but long-range multi-role aircraft require a full-size carrier.

Usually yes: wartime brings more high-speed running, direct routing, and operations in rougher seas that would often be avoided in peace.

No. What matters is whether the person is fit, reliable, willing to fight, and able to support colleagues under pressure.

Their value depended on the opponent: the United States could not outbuild Britain, and Spain also fielded a larger sailing battle fleet.

No, although the carrier might have made a major difference in the Falklands War.

As aggressive as other Arctic states allow; credible Scandinavian and Canadian presence, especially enough icebreakers to operate, would limit the room for pressure.

A case for studying navies through diplomacy, policing, economics, society, culture, and war rather than combat alone.

Germany would probably have changed its Enigma settings and code books quickly, jeopardizing the intelligence gained from the submarine.

Close escorts defend a convoy against submarines and air attack; distant carriers and heavy ships cover wider routes and deal with surface raiders.

Initially Bay-class ships are likely, but a longer-term solution could be two or three ski-ramp LHDs that support both amphibious and aviation roles.

The Revolt of the Admirals, the removal of the Earl of Sandwich from naval office, and the Imperial Japanese Navy's political course during the 1930s.

Yes in a same-generation comparison: Montana emphasizes armour and firepower, while Iowa emphasizes speed and firepower; without Montana, Iowa becomes the battleship standard.

Not really; the pace of technological change was already accelerating so rapidly that long-term relevance was much less certain.

British staffs kept contingency plans at least into the mid-twentieth century, but those plans were worst-case preparation rather than evidence that war was expected.

A deliberately non-specific account of how carrier-based Merlin helicopters detected and intercepted a submarine outside weapon range.

Use ship-specific evidence, because wartime fits changed informally and could include locally acquired or captured weapons not reflected in the original class specification.

A fleet carrier, probably USS Enterprise; the Royal Navy urgently needed carrier availability and could have used it to strengthen Force Z.

Yes; British studies often keep an SSK option in view, and a Sterling-powered XLUUV could provide part of that capability without replacing the SSN fleet.

Why Jutland can be read as the last major fleet battle still directly connected to the Age of Sail line-of-battle tradition.

A Courageous-and-Glorious for Lexington-and-Saratoga exchange could teach the United States earlier lessons about small carriers while giving Britain more formidable fleet carriers.

Why claims about equipment already in service and technology still under development may be shaped in opposite directions for strategic effect.

Probably: a carrier would bring a fuller task force and better air coordination, complicating Japanese movement and potentially delaying operations.

From the Second World War onward, especially in carrier battles where aircraft fought while the opposing ships remained beyond visual range.

Yes, because of their power density, but reliable use would require earlier advances in metallurgy and jet-engine development.

They would be harder to damage from above, but production would be slower and torpedo hits would still be dangerous; the trade-off is protection against numbers.

A substantial known force at Ceylon would be more useful for deterrence, with some uncertainty about its exact strength and a position flexible enough to reinforce Singapore.

Probably Egypt, with South Africa's earlier strength and the smaller but capable Algerian and Nigerian fleets also noted.

A doctrine-led explanation for armoured British carriers and larger-air-group American carriers under treaty limits.

The British twins concentrate and control fire more easily, while the American singles disperse the battery and may survive damage better.

Hellcats saw useful European service, especially in the Mediterranean, but Britain used Hellcats and Corsairs more heavily in the Far East while Wildcats and Seafires were common in Atlantic and Mediterranean work.

Replace the machinery with small-tube boilers and standardize the secondary armament around dual-purpose guns rather than a mixed battery.

Yes. Hellcats appeared in Operation Tungsten, while Corsairs were used in later operations including Goodwood; earlier attacks also used Albacores.

Why the best carrier design depends on a navy's manpower, force structure, and strategic problem rather than a universal hierarchy.