Bruships 76: Five New Books & a Lot of New Questions

He favors above-water triple launchers because they avoid vulnerable deep-hull spaces and preserve more continuous structural and flood protection.

He finds The Sullivans more preventable, while explaining why low-flying threats could exploit limitations in Moskva's older air-defence fit.

A serious redesign could have traded speed for protection and subdivision, making Hood closer to a fast battleship.

Yes, with the right fuzing or command-detonation mode, but spending such a costly missile on a cheap drone is an unfavorable exchange.

Hedgehog could damage a target but normally required contact, whereas Squid used a heavier charge with a useful lethal area.

It remained adequate for a battlecruiser role, but not for a treaty-era capital ship competing with battleships for limited tonnage.

USS Ranger's Norwegian deployment illustrates how a carrier too vulnerable for Pacific carrier battles could still conduct useful hit-and-run operations.

They would evolve toward fast battleships and gain greater value in carrier-backed task groups once a battle fleet had secured command of the sea.

It is a plausible mixed-calibre arrangement for the class.

Hood would likely have become a celebrated and upgraded ship whose prestige made postwar preservation much more plausible.

Limbo extends range and engagement geometry and benefits from later ammunition refinements while remaining an evolution of Squid.

It altered the aircraft mix, while the smaller active carrier force retained its own designs and concentrated on British-equipped air groups.

Yes, but the Navy would first have needed political funding for a warning measure it had already considered.

It is a strategically important asset whose deployment requires political-level coordination, relative to the navy that owns it.

The tubes persisted largely because institutional enthusiasm for battle torpedoes changed more slowly than their tactical usefulness.

Yes; mixed fleets existed, including the Spanish Armada, but keeping unlike sailing and oared vessels organized was difficult.

Not realistically; the ship is preserved for dockside survival, and building a replica would probably cost less than reversing that work.

The round must be handled from the top as a canistered unit, and the canister design can create system-specific problems.

It should emphasize conventional submarines and fast attack craft for sea denial rather than trying to match Russia with large surface combatants.

Taiwan should prioritize the amphibious ships carrying troops, because destroying the lift can stop an invasion even if distant combatants survive.

They mostly drew from prestigious traditional names used by earlier high-rated ships, with admiral names representing a less typical departure.

It reinforces the Finnish model of dispersed local units that can deny an invader quick control even after crossing the border.

It could have been useful with the Malta class, but its large wing made operation from Audacious doubtful.

There are signs of conceptual work, but no proof of gun trials or a committed comparable ship.

They would need a multilateral agreement covering allied and proxy fleets, not merely limits on the two principal navies.

A prolonged war exposed logistics and sustainment weaknesses that raw equipment totals and a short campaign would have concealed.

Very frequently, with navies continually refining submarine and destroyer torpedoes in a competitive development cycle.

Yes. They performed well, and Sea Furies shot down jet fighters.

He would secure powerful aircraft engines, accelerate a fighter, reshape treaty carrier categories and mass-produce improved carriers.

Only in a limited flagship role; submarines and small attack craft fit Ukraine's sea-denial mission and resource constraints much better.

Only a stronger opposing capital-ship threat would justify them, while aviation-capable LHDs offer more practical Arctic and expeditionary utility.

A review of Sam Bregman's Why the Titanic Was Doomed uses many small counterfactuals to show how operational, design and communication failures combined.

A discussion of democratic defence spending explains the price premium created by hostile operating environments, small production runs and electoral tradeoffs.

Soldier, Rebel, Traitor uses John Lord Wenlock to illuminate the marriage, wardship and patronage conflicts behind Edward IV's break with Warwick.

At roughly 28 knots they would become useful fast battleships, but Britain first needed an industrial base able to build reliable boilers at that scale.

Leo Marriott's Naval Battles of the Second World War is recommended as an illustrated introduction that places major Atlantic and Mediterranean actions in context.

A biography of Edmund of Cornwall opens a window onto medieval marriage disputes, church jurisdiction, parliamentary privilege and the influence of lesser-known magnates.

Kerry Jang's Ship Models from the Age of Sail is reviewed as a practical, illustrated guide to enhancing kits and building convincing details.

A more aggressive commander and a better-conditioned fleet could win locally, preserve British maritime mobility and perhaps sustain a North American foothold.

Their magazines matter, but survival depends on the whole task group's layered defence and on preventing the attacker from launching a concentrated salvo.

Canals would expand and alternative rail systems would persist, although delaying steam would also slow some of the industrial improvements that made canals efficient.

After decades incomplete, the cruiser would require a prohibitively large restoration and redesign effort for either navy.

They would strengthen defensive air cover and convoy security, allowing fleet carriers to be used more aggressively.

The treaty system likely collapses in the early 1930s, allowing Britain to restart major construction years earlier than its rivals can match.

Moskva's loss is used to examine all-round radar coverage, damage control, uncertain public evidence and the danger of exposed weapons.

More design generations would probably produce better-balanced ships, though rival navies would gain their own additional iterations.

A modest defence-spending increase and slower debt repayment could fund orders that also reactivated domestic shipbuilding and employment.

A large British Pacific Fleet, especially armoured-deck carriers, plus a substantial British and Commonwealth land contingent.

They would transform warning and coordination and sharply shorten the war if held by one side, while exposing major Allied preparations if both sides had them.

Britain would probably join the conflict, while the attacked United States led the coalition for political reasons.

The public evidence was indirect, but the training burden and Russia's wider readiness failures gave strong reason for concern.

It can remain lightly used by removable facilities, such as the Type 45 gym in space reserved for additional VLS cells.

The Black Sea Fleet's ability to sustain its early-war operating tempo is questioned through stocks, maintenance depth and the wider Russian logistics problem.

It could buy British destroyers and submarines and reinforce them by granting the Royal Navy Indian Ocean basing rights.

Rebuilding would be necessary but difficult, while fragmentation would raise the far more dangerous question of who controlled regional nuclear weapons.

They would be better protected and closer to fast battleships, but their cruiser-style subdivision would still keep them on the battlecruiser side.

China may emphasize speed, while Taiwan can strengthen deterrence through distributed resistance and a durable separate political identity.

Loss of government design and construction capacity weakens the buyer's ability to challenge low initial bids and later cost growth.

An explicitly speculative discussion asks whether uncertainty about a latent Taiwanese nuclear capability could complicate invasion planning.

The risk is real, but persistent proximity to China gives Taiwan powerful incentives to build unusually capable and loyal counterintelligence services.

About six months if begun immediately, because the change requires an entire supply and maintenance system rather than training alone.