Bruships 193: Naval History Questions Answered Live...

Their fictional exploits might merit a Medal of Honor or national equivalent, but classified service could conceal awards and some depicted conduct would raise laws-of-war questions.

It largely reaffirmed the earlier arrangements without substantially renegotiating them, because reopening them would have made agreement harder.

Not entirely; Nelson was also an excellent tactician and strategist, though political judgment and assumptions about opponents' speed were genuine weaknesses.

German Army budget pressure and Britain's continuing battleship programme undermine the claim that Germany could have bankrupted Britain through naval competition.

That is uncertain for the 1840s; taking the vaccine to the 1770s, when powers were fighting over the Caribbean, prompts a much stronger expectation of exceptional rewards.

Because the armament can create a false impression of full ASW capability and encourage substitution for properly equipped frigates.

Software complexity makes the story intuitive, but installation checks and multinational production complicate a literal kill switch. Mission data and spares create practical dependencies that operators can partly offset through fallback arrangements and stockpiles.

That is especially a British formulation shaped by an anti-ship missile gap and Falklands experience; carrier aircraft remain major anti-ship platforms elsewhere.

Removing Germany's surface threat could release British carriers and battleships for a larger Mediterranean campaign, while convoy escort still limits destroyer availability.

More First World War ships, including Iron Duke and Tiger, and more Tribal-class destroyers; Dreadnought also prompts a proposed bonus for other battleships.

An SSGN concentrates cruise-missile firepower, but loading that role onto enlarged attack boats can change their employment and increase pressure on attack-submarine construction.

A missile submarine's ability to wait covertly distinguishes it from a bomber deployment that visibly signals an approaching crisis.

The objection to repeated Virginia extensions centers on fitting a large missile battery into a narrow hull, compared with the two-row arrangement available in a ballistic-missile submarine.

A submarine waiting to launch land-attack missiles has a different mission from one hunting a fleet, which shapes the argument for converting older boats.

A hypothetical tasking mistake shows how keeping the Virginia class name could obscure the different employment of a submarine carrying a much larger strike payload.

Its wider hull suggests that an inserted section could fit relatively cleanly, while the joking proposal for angled tubes beneath a long fairing is judged unattractive.

Britain could redirect most capital ships and carriers from containing Germany to defeating Italy and deterring or fighting Japan.

In the all-submarine Germany scenario, retained British patrols and a fleet based farther west complicate Japan's ability to launch a surprise attack.

A prewar British submarine reportedly followed the newly commissioned carrier Hiryū through a Japanese exercise, illustrating the intelligence value of forward submarine patrols.

Britain procured a tightly costed air-defense ship, whereas Argentina deliberately added Exocet to create a multipurpose destroyer.

Shipborne societies have limited space, resources, and replacement populations; trade and immigration can help, but an irreplaceable habitat's destruction permanently reduces the fleet and society supporting it.

Warhammer 40,000's Iyanden illustrates how a fleet can lose its supporting population even when substantial naval assets survive.

Britain would be happier, but would watch for diverted cruiser construction and would still reassess Germany after Russia's fleet losses.

Borodino and Andrei Pervozvanny separate improving Russian design ideas from the construction practices and repeated alterations that limited their results.

The strategy never disappeared, but Russia's ability to enforce a protected bastion has eroded and depends on rebuilding the surrounding force.

A contributor uses Vietnam to argue that extensive military effort and battlefield success can coexist with political defeat.

A contributor's contemporaneous assessment weighs possible territorial outcomes against the wider costs of the war to both belligerents.

Contemporaries lack the hindsight later historians enjoy, while secrecy and propaganda can make even authoritative wartime accounts deliberately incomplete.

A Type XXI-like arrangement was technically conceivable, but earlier batteries would give poorer performance, large boats would be fewer in number, and Britain and France could adapt.

Most likely more and larger cruisers, with armored-cruiser development potentially leading indirectly to battlecruisers or fast battleships.

The specific career allegation remains unverified because the cited article has not been read. The general concern is that badly timed advocacy could let cheaper ships displace frigates and destroyers.

The Falklands and Libya expose limits to claims of universal land-based air coverage and support the argument for retaining an expeditionary carrier capability.

A hypothetical rival's ability to offset sanctions leads to an argument for combining diplomacy with visible naval capability.

Surfacing can demonstrate reach, but it also reveals location and reduces uncertainty about a small submarine force.

Cooperation, trade, and aid often remain quiet, while coercive measures become public news and distort perceptions of how states exercise power.

It could preserve some paper design, but would still lose generations of practical designers and shipyard expertise.

Not as coherent minefields, but lost individual mines still turn up and can remain hazardous.

Mostly minor adaptations for British carriers, probably including clipped wings, although the differences are recalled incompletely.

A larger design could support a new post-Falklands carrier program and influence later escorts and the F-35, while Tempest would probably retain its Tornado and Typhoon lineage.

Often enough to frustrate destroyer crews, in the joking answer. Their training encouraged aggressive pursuit, while exiled Allied crews and elite flotillas had additional reasons to press an attack.

They could request trusted personnel when reputation, vacancies, and operational need aligned, but they did not have an unrestricted right to displace an established ship's company.

Probably more Crown Colonies or their successors, although Belfast and Edinburgh are suggested as the closer match in status and role. New construction increasingly expanded the fleet while older cruisers remained in use.

An old D-class cruiser received U.S. 5-inch/38 guns and Mark 37 fire control, giving the Royal Navy a powerful anti-aircraft conversion and a live trial of American equipment.

No official names had been assigned before cancellation; likely candidates can only be inferred from contemporary naming practice and notes.

Functionally very little; the wording emphasizes strike or sea control, while the modern change often lies in the smaller number of escorts.

Exceptionally important: it improved sustained speed, reduced maintenance interruptions, and increased the effective force generated from the same fleet.

France was spared a confrontation by delayed delivery, while Japan regarded them as credible threats despite doubts about Chinese handling.

A Chinese show-of-force visit intended to display modern naval power instead ended in a street brawl that helped Japanese politicians mobilize hostility.

An account of a costly marble warship contrasts its intended display of prestige with the additional ironclads and supporting vessels that the money could have purchased.

China possessed multiple fleets, but divided authority and personal hostility prevented them from combining into a coherent national naval force.

Choose a vessel of similar size with heavy machine guns and provision for a 20 mm mount or equivalent weapon.

Interesting and informative, with disagreement over parts of its interpretation.

They would pressure Soviet bastions, help keep Soviet forces out of the North Atlantic, and open NATO's northern flank.

The London Gateway service area, described as twelve miles outside London.

Common submarine and escort families are favored, but carrier numbers remain disputed. Supporting three available carrier groups drives the larger proposal toward seven to nine carriers, with amphibious ships handled separately.

Probably not: uncrewed craft can add sensors and weapons, but dependable communications and the different demands of air defence and ASW still constrain the fleet.

Predictions that Argentina should have won the Falklands air war are challenged through Michael Clapp's reported response and a recollection about how naval defence was represented in simulations.

A Chinese document title or translated copy is offered, but neither is provided in the exchange; independently verifying the translation would require further work.

A very large amount accumulated through sustained interwar purchasing; no tonnage or reaction from another country is specified.

Local processing could reduce an uncrewed sonar craft's communications demands while it remains close to the crewed ship.

Aircraft are faster and mobile, but ships supply persistence and area defense; combining their sensors and weapons produces the strongest ASW system.

A simple torpedo-delivery drone could provide stand-off attack with a recall option and without occupying a VLS cell.

Yes; conventional anti-aircraft guns could exploit the missing scale on his underside, although hitting that weak point would be difficult.

Britain would make it a priority target, while Germany would struggle to support and use a ship that consumed such a large share of national resources.

Yes; one aircraft could refuel the strike before turning away, but the capability has not received the required investment and external equipment would probably affect stealth and aerodynamics.

The ship would probably be discovered, prompting sanctions or treaty escalation that allowed Britain and the United States to build powerful counterparts.

The choice is attributed to an attempt to lead treaty restraint, despite other powers already selecting larger guns.

No; 16 inches is the largest calibre allowed under the treaty rules being applied.

The design began with twelve guns; weight and reliability problems led to replacing one quadruple turret with a twin.

Britain maintained parallel 14-, 15-, and 16-inch gun programmes, although the reply does not identify Monarch as an exact historical design.

Yes; a dedicated drone-control officer would require a redesigned two-seat variant.

A single aircraft would fare badly, while a squadron-strength strike is judged much more promising.

The ships would probably be intercepted and destroyed before reaching Japan, with British forces able to attack along the long route.

Not really; a typhoon is usually a battle-ending event that forces every ship to concentrate on survival.

The later 15-inch 45-calibre proposal combined lower gun weight with better range, while moderate barrel lengths reduced replacement demands far from British bases.

Attacks can be timed together, with escorts or pickets moving forward when useful and the group spread over a wide area.

A direct hit could rupture a pressure hull, but getting a conventional APFSDS projectile to travel accurately through water makes it an impractical anti-submarine weapon.

The Type 45s would launch Naval Strike Missiles as quickly as possible, while the returned historical ships would become immediate preservation priorities.

A hypothetical naming clash between the battleship and carrier leads to a proposed solution using another title of the same royal namesake.

Limited budgets encourage buying the high end first and hoping that conflict brings funding for lower-end equipment.

Yamato is considered the strongest preservation prospect. Views differ over the other ships, with keeping all three defended on grounds of tourism and national pride.

Japanese control is considered most likely; Britain would take an accessible ship, while a Tosa retained in Japan would join its effective battleship strength.

The premise is challenged because the ships were nearly new. The stronger criticism is that Australia should have accepted Adelaide's limited value and acquired more modern cruisers.

The treaty gun limit would probably rise to 18 inches, and Britain would likely answer with 18-inch fast battleships derived from its Admiral-class studies.

There is no agreed cutoff: proposals range from older steam-and-sail ships to coal-fired dreadnoughts and ships burning low-grade oil, depending on what operating requires.

The squadron-sized strike assumes no defending fighters and focuses on penetrating Tirpitz's shipboard anti-aircraft fire.

There is disagreement; the affirmative case depends on sample shells, existing basic technologies, and officers able to explain their construction.

Badly; New Ironsides was a slow coastal-oriented broadside ironclad, while Warrior was a much faster, larger, and more powerful ocean-going warship.

Monitor construction and prolonged reliance on Civil War ships left a gap between New Ironsides and the later American ocean-going fleet.