Why the F-35 kill-switch story persists

Why has the alleged F-35 kill switch become such a successful story despite reasons to doubt it exists?

Software complexity makes the story intuitive, but installation checks and multinational production complicate a literal kill switch. Mission data and spares create practical dependencies that operators can partly offset through fallback arrangements and stockpiles.

The F-35's software updates make the idea of a remote kill switch easy to imagine. A deliberately disabling update is considered technically conceivable, but updates are installed before flight, giving operators an opportunity to discover a disabled aircraft before trying to use it. Britain checks updates before installation, and similar national safeguards are presumed for other participants. Multinational component production also gives other countries a means of responding if the United States tried to disable their aircraft. Centralized mission data and shared spare-parts systems create more credible dependencies, although fallback arrangements and stockpiled spares can reduce them. The comparison with British nuclear missiles also fails to account for their celestial navigation and limited communications after launch.