Bruships 164: Is this Book life? Is this just a library?Caught in a landslide, no Kallax for safety!

Several did, especially the First World War warehouse problem and questions that exposed hidden assumptions in battleship and carrier personnel figures.

The gun was only modestly heavier, but turret conversion would be substantial; an early rolling replacement program could nevertheless give much of the battle fleet a major upgrade.

Yes if it introduces a new generation of smaller conventional carriers; otherwise the name may fit a surveillance vessel better.

The exact ships cannot be forecast, but naval designs generally evolve from proven hulls, with new systems introduced incrementally rather than through clean-sheet leaps.

Approximately fifteen miles in a straight line, or about twenty-five miles along the route a ship could actually follow.

The panel cannot give a defensible total live; the number may run to several dozen, but it requires a carefully defined navy-by-navy count.

The 'Wikipedia rule' sets a public-information boundary for discussing current systems while the underlying research may go much deeper.

At least about 6,000 pounds, and more once larger launchers, controls, and supporting systems are included.

Because it was the available British-built launcher, and its simple elevated arrangement worked.

Devastating on a direct hit, but generally an inefficient use of explosive because small tactical positions were too difficult to identify and hit accurately.

They were late for the war as fought, but would have been valuable off Japan, and their guns could still threaten early jets forced to approach within range.

Usually no; their quarters and messes were comparable, though they had dedicated ready or alert rooms near the flight deck.

It was a contemporary alternative to the 14-inch gun; Henderson believed nine 15-inch/45s could be ready without delay and could support wider fleet standardization.

Quite effective: she was exceptionally well protected and heavily armed, though her largest guns fired slowly and her low bow was likely wet.

Converted merchant ships did transport them; today the more valuable concept is an amphibious mothership carrying dedicated combat boats to escort its landing craft.

No; Lion was paused for strategic and design reasons, while British guns remained available if the need for new battleships became urgent.

Clemenceau offered the strongest full carrier capability, but each design could be good value because it was tailored to a different navy's doctrine and constraints.

No; it was intended to complement nuclear carriers with cheaper conventional hulls that could enter reserve and return during a surge.

No; AUKUS already separates interim US-built Virginias from a joint future design likely to rely heavily on British technology and Australian construction.

It was burdened by needing facilities for many missions despite being able to perform only one at a time, though narrower versions could suit smaller navies.

Broadly yes, but Taiwan's less-worn ships and smaller fleet made a deep rebuild more worthwhile than it was for the United States.

Some batteries remained, mainly with 6-inch and 4-inch guns, but they were too weak to defeat a major German raid until wartime reinforcement.

The economics favored conventional escorts, but nuclear cruisers offered exceptional rapid-deployment, upgrade, and diplomatic-signaling advantages that the fleet subsequently lost.

It would be useful and welcome, but it would expand an existing capability rather than transform Marine aviation.

The first might gain surprise, but later attempts would probably fail as coastal patrols and a locally raised home-defense force expanded.

Yes, including some South American examples, but they were uncommon until European warship exports expanded sharply in the ironclad era.

Repeated structural, engine, and avionics changes make the modern B-52 a useful example of how an old platform can retain its identity while becoming materially different.

Possibly for the later ships, but only if the individual carrier's hull, machinery, and other components still justify the work.

They would gain a much better broadside and likely become longer, with possible secondary gains in speed and armor.

Yes; shared large carriers would not remove the need for smaller members and secondary missions to use fast aircraft with short- or vertical-launch flexibility.

Canada would field a modern, coherent force whose Pacific ships could radically complicate von Spee's choices and the campaign around Coronel.

The protection might work, but six main guns would leave the ship underarmed for its displacement.

Missile firing created flight-deck hazards, while SCANFAR pursued valuable ideas before the supporting technology was fully ready.

It was made safe and watertight, but it was not restored as a working main-battery turret.

He might command First Scouting Group, particularly if a successful dash home earned rapid promotion, creating a more unpredictable German battlecruiser force.

The Washington Naval Treaty as signed in 1922 probably would not happen, and capital-ship construction could continue until a later settlement.

No; the terrain and firing geometry made the attack impractical and exposed the attacking battleship to unacceptable danger.

It would transform propulsion, logistics, and global strategy, with scarce supplies concentrated in high-value fast ships and submarines rather than abolishing ordinary design limits.

The Yamatos could inflict much greater losses, but close-range American gunfire would probably maul or mission-kill them as well.

They would not solve Denmark's land-border problem, but Norwegian ships could greatly increase the cost and complexity of the German invasion.

It could be a formidable one-off commerce raider, but a single ship would not alter the war and would eventually face superior British numbers.

The seniority problem is substantial, but Hood is a plausible replacement whose gunnery standards could make Jutland an overwhelming British success.

The panel suggests Iowa against Lion, King George V against North Carolina, and Bismarck against another treaty-era capital ship.

They would field much larger air groups and earlier airborne warning, greatly strengthening the Falklands task force and threatening Argentina's carrier.

That aircraft would effectively be the P.1154 rather than another ordinary Harrier mark, with a stronger fighter emphasis and major consequences for British carrier aviation.

It advanced mainly through mechanization that moved crews into supervisory and control roles; complete automation remained an aspiration.

Not with 18-inch guns or both programs at once; a large fast 16-inch battleship was more plausible, but yard and weapon-development limits still applied.

About 6 inches is plausible, as Zumwalt already demonstrates, but routine adoption of larger naval guns is unlikely.

Destroyers would become proto-Darings, and pressure to separate ship categories would raise cruiser, carrier, and battleship limits as well.

Either Trieste or the Juan Carlos I and Canberra family; the latter is the more economical choice, while Trieste is the more ambitious recent design.

Japan would probably take the Pacific possessions, but Spain might emerge better able to defend Cuba after shedding an expensive imperial commitment.

There is no fixed interval; the frequency and form depend on the geopolitical message a navy needs to send.

As capable destroyers with an enlarged aft aviation complex that helped Japan rebuild shipborne aviation experience.

Not sensibly through direct drive; a diesel-electric system would be needed to distribute engines while delivering battleship-scale shaft power.

Not in their current form; without a full support air group they cannot provide the capability needed to relieve or complement CVNs effectively.

Start with the Zumwalt hull and its integrated electric system, then investigate replacing the generating plant with a Ford-derived reactor.

Mostly in NATO standing groups, patrols, and anti-submarine forces supporting the defense of Dutch and allied ports.

No; they eat the same food, though meal timing can be adjusted around long missions.

He would probably drive rapid voidship and landing-system innovation, while the setting's politics would make his survival depend on powerful support.

Not by piercing and flooding the hull with an ordinary arrow; any plausible version needs fire, loss of steering, wrecking, or another indirect cause.

Probably with little change to its existing program; war and revolution are more likely to keep the ships in British and Italian service than deliver them to Russia.

The panel limits the answer to the broad public figure of roughly one to ten kilometers and declines more specific performance detail.

They were genuine attempts to obtain a useful capability, but usually not one important enough to survive competing budget priorities.

They would put more 15-inch shells into each salvo and raise the risk of mission-ending damage, making an already unattractive engagement even less worthwhile.

Here it represents a lower-intensity law-enforcement and maritime-safety presence, backed by an institutional history under Treasury, Transportation, and now Homeland Security.

It could make each merchant loss more damaging, but barge-carrier designs and integrated rail and river distribution might also improve survivability and flexibility.

No; British fighters could oppose it, but a capable Re.2001 produced and deployed in numbers would still be a serious threat.

Largely yes: it was an available nonstandard hull that the Royal Navy had little reason to complete for another purpose.

Retain or reactivate them for convoy support, aircraft ferrying, regional cover, and reinforcement while modern carriers performed the principal combat missions.

Yes in concept, but converting a large 7.5-inch cruiser was judged an impractical way to obtain another anti-aircraft ship.

Because the Royal Navy valued fast ships able to deliver large mine loads, a requirement later embodied by the Abdiel class.

About sixteen, the level that historically allowed a balanced cycle of forward operations, transit, maintenance, and training.

The county offers Warspite and Falmouth connections, Atlantic-cable and smuggling sites, weapons history, and the naval-aviation landscape around RNAS Culdrose.

Yes, especially as replacements and reserves, but the extra ships cost money the Treasury and Navy chose to spend on other priorities.

Probably not very long beyond the historical period unless the US had deliberately preserved them and their support industry decades earlier.

It would free major British coal and rail resources, change fleet fuel choices, strengthen exports, and even alter how merchant cargoes absorbed mine and torpedo damage.

Not economically; the necessary rebuilding would make a new ship the more sensible investment.

It provided useful physical margins, but the decisive difference depended on how the carrier and its air group were organized, trained, and employed.

The class would likely branch into specialized variants, become progressively cheaper, and perhaps replace later Burke construction.

No; the larger guns and every supporting system add too much weight to preserve G3's other characteristics.

The answers favor targeted readiness, logistics, aviation, ammunition-quality, escort, and alliance reforms rather than an entirely new fleet.

So large that it would be closer to a floating airfield than a practical carrier, and the bomber would still need major redesign.

Italy could do little beyond its existing program, while its older rebuilt battleships would lose much of their ability to outrun British pursuit.