Bruships 158: Home for Naval History Questions & Trialing the new Question Bot... so cross fingers!

An existing Tornado airframe could not simply be adapted; a carrier-capable version would need to be designed into the program from the start.

The answer argues that design teams would keep working, with Britain moving beyond Nelson-style compromises toward faster follow-ons while other navies explored similar post-Jutland battleship ideas.

The Japanese branch of the treaty counterfactual turns Kaga-class ideas into a better-protected 35,000-ton ship with fewer turrets and a nine-gun battery.

The disagreement appears to reflect whether a source names the company awarded the contract or the subsidiary yard that physically built the ship.

The German ships would face a very dangerous fight. The British force might take heavy losses, but the exchange could still be worth both German capital ships.

Not exactly: the trials showed the arrangement was awkward, while the smaller Arethusa class also operated aircraft and the Royal Navy settled on larger cruisers as the worthwhile operational platform.

The answer suggests larger Hawkins-style cruisers could push treaty cruiser limits upward and open space for more small carriers below the capital-ship threshold.

It addressed the same broad carrier torpedo-bomber problem, but it should not be treated as a direct Soviet analogue to the Avenger.

A Baltic-style conventional design or AIP solution may not fit Canada's oceanic and under-ice requirements, creating pressure toward an AUKUS-related nuclear path.

Such a ship would become an exceptionally powerful frigate, more likely used against French frigates and Baltic problems than sent to the War of 1812.

The Australian ships would join nearby Royal Navy forces. Cruisers would range across the Pacific, smaller craft would defend critical ports, and the battlecruiser would go wherever the wider fleet needed it.

Probably, because good harbors and crossing points remain useful, so settlements and later infrastructure repeatedly grow over the same strategic sites.

Two linked exchanges distinguish protected cruisers listed on paper from the maintenance, crews, and institutions needed to make Dominion navies effective.

Improved breech and shell-hoist design mattered more than shell similarity; Scharnhorst benefited from later iterations of the same gun lineage.

Britain would likely produce an updated Invincible-like ship with eight or nine 12-inch guns, while the new category could also reopen arguments over much larger battleship guns.

Phantom is the more plausible answer because it was already a carrier aircraft and could simply remain in service longer until a later replacement arrived.

Only Britain or France plausibly had the means, and the ship would more likely become a heavy surface combatant with autoloading 8-inch guns and missiles than retain a traditional 16-inch battleship battery.

They would probably remain gunships and force Washington negotiators to recognize an intermediate super-cruiser or light-battlecruiser category around 20,000 tons.

The follow-on would likely make about 28 knots, while steady construction would produce a much newer battle fleet and preserve the yards and skills needed for rapid wartime expansion.

Royal Navy inquiries and tests with twin-engine aircraft reached back to 1929, while the US Navy explicitly sought the best aircraft it could field for the large Midway-class carriers.

Germany might begin with two and build toward roughly six hulls in simultaneous construction, but expansion into H-class ships and larger guns would expose yard limits and a serious loss of specialist experience.

Hood's greater energy and better-worked-up fleet could make British operations at the Chesapeake more assertive and coordinated, complicating the French effort to secure the bay.

A game discussion separates historical long-range battleship practice from tactics rewarded by a World of Warships map.

Not necessarily; the River Plate ships carried earlier shell production, while German ammunition design and manufacture continued to improve.

Yes. Informal racing was widespread naval behavior, especially among destroyer crews.

The decisive problem was role mismatch rather than simple quality: the Fleet Air Arm did not need the Bermuda once the Barracuda covered its dive- and torpedo-bomber requirement.

It did not need to be enlarged for destroyer displacement, but its existing arrangement was closer in role and character to a British sloop than to a fleet destroyer.

The strategic result would probably remain the same, but American aircrew losses would rise and rebuilding carrier air groups could lengthen intervals between operations.

They would be compact, hard-hitting coastal or regional deterrents; wartime supply constraints make Japanese-built 14-inch guns more plausible than British weapons if construction continued.

Completed Reina Victoria Eugenia-class ships could turn the Spanish Civil War into a contest between capital-ship-centered fleets near Gibraltar.

It was active and significant: Russia fielded the third-largest navy and was important enough to figure in British two-power-standard calculations.

The discussion expects a large general-purpose Type 83 rather than a frigate derivative and argues that modern labels increasingly describe primary roles, not displacement.

About 500 nautical miles is suggested for a theater-limited uncrewed asset rather than an ocean-going submarine.

Older and expensive ships would retire early, concentrating resources on four modernized fleet carriers, four amphibious groups, newer escorts, and a more useful Tiger-class cruiser program.

No major gap stands out. The Royal Navy acquired essentially everything it considered necessary through lend-lease.

There is no single answer until the mission is specified: Vultee Vengeances suit ground attack, Dauntlesses suit scout bombing, and simpler light aircraft suit towing or utility work.

Losing both British carriers likely ends or pauses the campaign; even one loss would trigger relentless retaliation and a postwar drive for larger catapult carriers with airborne early warning.

Wartime commanders may push boilers and turbines beyond safe peacetime limits when the target matters and a major refit is already due, accepting machinery damage that routine operations would avoid.

A Victory is compared with a first- or second-class protected cruiser, while the larger Imperial-class ship is closer to an armoured cruiser.

A shared F/A-18 program would reduce cost and technical risk, improve NATO parts commonality, and could still preserve British industrial work through engines, radar, weapons, or licensed production.

A strategic digression explains why Britain often favors naval and air reach over building a much larger continental army.

Those types appeared across different planning periods; operating all of them together would impose an implausible logistical burden on a carrier of Joffre's size.

Not necessarily: sound tactics already let Wildcats contest Zeros, and even a modest improvement would be backed by much deeper American pilot-training and replacement capacity.

Prince of Wales and Duke of York are the practical choices because they can enter service fastest; immediate availability matters more than selecting a more ambitious but distant design.

Renown would be the nearest heavy reinforcement, allowing King George V to close, a slowed Rodney to fire at short range, and Renown to support from safer long range.

The Fleet Air Arm generally liked the Hellcat; the main wish was for heavier cannon armament comparable to contemporary RAF fighters.

No treaty clause necessarily prevented production, but the politics of selling major naval weapons created a much stronger practical obstacle.

In the Hearts of Iron IV scenario described, Germany can be overwhelmed in 1937-38 because rearmament is incomplete and Italy often stays out.

It would be a very large ship and not clearly superior, but its extraordinary volume of fire could compensate for the smaller shell.

Britain would likely build with margin for the next generation, and the larger infrastructure could enable a different path for postwar carrier design and procurement.

Yes; Dasher and lend-lease experience reinforced caution, especially where British operating procedures met American fuel systems built around different assumptions.

Yes; the Phantom would phase into service while Sea Vixen phased out, probably completing the transition by about 1965 or 1966.

The extra 6,000 pounds would make it a substantially better bomb truck, adding three 2,000-pound or six 1,000-pound weapons beyond the S.2's external load.

Yes: a common fleet of 52 purpose-built tankers would reduce the support burden and likely generate more available aircraft than the same total spread across several variants.

That is unlikely because the principal treaty powers favor an orderly renewal, while Argentina's economic constraints limit the naval buildup needed for such a conflict.

It could operate many more Harriers and Sea Kings, use a longer deck and higher speed to launch heavier aircraft, and might field airborne early-warning Sea Kings before the Falklands War.

The Navy would probably reject the aircraft because its unconventional airframe offered no clear advantage sufficient to justify the structural and handling demands of carrier recovery.

A warship's boats, rescue gear, manpower, and lower freeboard could remove many more people, although pulling directly alongside Titanic would remain dangerous.

No 8-inch cruiser could remain combat-effective after all eight 15-inch shells hit; it might stay afloat briefly, but would be burning and catastrophically damaged.

Britain and the United States could each sustain about four annual starts, while Germany, France, Italy, and Japan remained constrained by yards, resources, or programs already at capacity.

It would still be devastating, but the exchange would count as a British strategic victory; Prince of Wales and nearby cruisers and destroyers would continue until the disabled Bismarck sank.

Yes; it was an aspirational emergency proposal unsupported by the industrial coordination and Luftwaffe-Kriegsmarine cooperation needed to make it work.

Yes; the Skua was a capable dive bomber for 1939 and would have provided more useful combat aircraft than the Roc.

The estimate is a 15,000- to 18,000-ton cruiser armed somewhere between 9.2-inch and 12-inch guns by about 1920.

The fleets would be enormous, but Britain and America would have moved furthest toward 16.5- or 18-inch fast capital ships and early carriers while Germany retained more first-generation dreadnoughts.

Hydrofoil patrol craft, chiefly because their speed and appearance are compelling even though there is no strong operational case for retaining them.