Patreon 46: Nelsons, Dunkerques, Tones and Battles - Good or Bad to Concentrate Main Armament

Older siblings is the preferred analogy for these related designs.

A forward battery rewards tactics that keep a narrow target facing the enemy during visual ranging.

The G3 layout concentrates magazines forward and machinery aft to shorten shafts, simplify protection, and fit existing dockyard limits.

The suggested explanation is a preference for a conventional-looking battleship once the navy committed to a 14-inch quadruple-turret scheme.

A transom stern might have made the ship faster, but no definite gain is claimed and the Royal Navy chose the conventional form.

Yes, although treaty restrictions limited improvements at certain locations.

Washington Treaty displacement and fleet-tonnage limits made every protected ton and every retained hull matter.

Hood's 15-inch battery helped make its retention acceptable, while an uncertain Agincourt hypothesis illustrates how British 18-inch ships might have changed negotiations.

Italy was permitted to replace it.

A little, but not much.

Not without major penalties in insulation, machinery layout, weight distribution, and usable internal space.

Earlier turret ships and destroyers show how weapon placement could preserve internal machinery space.

The N3/G3-style layout puts guns and fire control ahead of the funnel, reducing smoke interference and simplifying a concentrated salvo.

Yes, they still had conning towers.

No. Wing mounts are rejected, and the related N3 layout also has a funnel and high superstructure obstructing stern fire.

The Royal Navy preferred triples, and three mounts limited the firepower lost with one disabled turret to a third instead of half.

The argument favours calling it a battlecruiser in its contemporary setting, while allowing that it could be developed into a fast battleship.

Similar solutions to similar problems are the suggested explanation; access to N3's plans is not established.

G3, for its armour and easier infrastructure support, while acknowledging Iowa's higher speed.

Their capabilities are close enough that the outcome could depend on command, with no firm winner when both have highly capable commanders.

It would be slower but heavily protected and powerfully armed. Building N3s could also have prompted a different Japanese design.

That explanation is rejected in favour of the view that the Royal Navy hoped to obtain four ships of each design.

Possibly, by replacing the third turret with a hangar and using the deck around the funnel for helicopter operations.

A hypothetical O3-style N3 could fire nine guns forward, reducing its exposed aspect in a chase or crossing-the-T encounter.

Nelson's compact protected spaces support a conditional argument that Nelson and Rodney could hold off Yamato at considerable risk.

British battlecruiser studies ran from G back toward A, while battleship studies ran from N forward toward Z.

Rodney's forward battery gave it more freedom to change course against Bismarck than a ship needing to keep aft guns engaged.

Several chase actions are suggested. North Cape would probably have ended the same way, with Scharnhorst sunk sooner.

Quoted gun and shell weights show the physical scale behind British 18-inch capital-ship proposals.

A hypothetical five- or six-ship Nelson programme could favour speed and sustainable fleet availability over exceptional protection for two flagships.

Not inherently; their secondary guns could cover the forward quarters, the ship could manoeuvre, and friendly destroyers should screen it.

Theoretically, but the damage risk makes the arrangement unattractive.

Probably. Moving it forward would be easier than moving it aft, and a 1930s version would likely have adopted that arrangement from the outset.

A larger force of 28-knot Nelsons could have encouraged matching Queen Elizabeth modernisations and produced an eleven-ship fast battle fleet.

No. Chatfield's traditionalism and preference for 14-inch volume of fire were more important.

A twelve-gun French capital ship promised firepower at the cost of consuming more of France's limited fleet allowance.

It was not designed to fight Hood.

France's Dunkerque design concentrates offensive guns forward, defensive weapons centrally, and aircraft aft within tight treaty constraints.

A little more usable space, possible visual-spotting benefits, and better Atlantic-weather suitability are suggested, without a meaningful endurance gain.

Alaska would probably win because its speed advantage lets it choose the engagement, though Dunkerque's forward battery makes it a difficult opponent.

No. This assessment treats 15 inches as the practical Second World War battleship threshold, with 14 inches only at the entry level.

Some, but not enough by itself. Combined with the treaty margin, the saving could support an investigation of a third shaft, turbine, and more boilers.

Dunkerque is assessed against Scharnhorst, Deutschland, and Trento rather than the most heavily armed battleships.

Not directly; the oil acted as a barrier between boilers and magazines, a layout the Royal Navy regarded with some caution.

No, their reload rates were broadly similar.

The ships reached about 31 knots on trials. A second-hand archival account criticises their turbine selection rather than treating boiler power alone as the explanation.

A supplier's explanation for an older-machinery licence request remains an interpretation of the customer's capabilities.

No. The concern was combustible fuel being heated by a boiler failure or shell explosion.

Probably an export design like those built for South American customers, although Canada could in principle have developed its own capacity with major investment.

No. The newer propulsion machinery is defended, despite problems with other systems in the period.

The Tone class turns all-forward gun placement into a reconnaissance-cruiser layout by reserving the stern for aircraft facilities.

It was a concern because cruisers carried much less armour than battleships.

Yes, that is proposed as a way to make the forward battery more compact.

An established Nelson design lineage might have encouraged an all-forward County-type cruiser, but the Royal Navy retained conventional heavy-cruiser layouts.

Exercises rewarded attacks on prestigious capital ships, while wartime attackers had reasons to destroy vulnerable escorts first.

Yes, it had worked on various 9.2-inch proposals.

The Battle class concentrated heavy 4.5-inch mounts forward to make room for torpedoes, anti-submarine weapons, and increasingly important anti-aircraft systems.

Upper-deck 4.5-inch mounts reduced the weight and space penalty of restoring main-battery fire aft.

Limits on archival access shaped the national coverage and scope of a study of the modern destroyer.

Soviet aviation cruisers put missiles forward and aircraft aft, giving surface groups both heavy shipborne weapons and their own fighter or helicopter cover.

Type 42 and Type 23 warships show how forward weapons and aft helicopter facilities continue the same space-management logic.

Many factors mattered, with the absence of airborne early warning identified as the central problem.

Yes. Damage to radars or other mission systems could disable the ship's intended function even if the hull remained afloat.

A builder's proposed Type 23 variant would lengthen the hull, add an aft Sea Wolf launcher, and carry sixteen Harpoons.

Often. It takes less effort than sinking a ship and can be easier to disguise or deny.

Public discussions suggest stronger continuing attention to electronic warfare in Western navies than in other services, though the comparison remains tentative.

Type 45 and Kirov concentrate major missile systems forward while propulsion and aviation occupy the centre and stern, without inheriting a gun battery's blind arc.

They could on some ships, but adequate bow height and protection around the mounts should keep well-designed Royal Navy examples operable.

Richelieu's quadruple-turret difficulties weaken its comparison with Littorio and motivate a proposed three-triple forward battery.

That depends partly on oil and gas revenue, which could remain substantial while buyers continued purchasing at higher prices.

Designers feared losing all three turrets to one magazine hit, though a true magazine penetration would probably doom the ship in any layout.

Yes. Its nuclear endurance and concentrated firepower suit an independent global-presence cruiser more than a battleship role.

It housed the ship's aircraft hangar and storage; a lift to below-deck stowage would have been a possible alternative arrangement.

No; unexploded hits could still cause major kinetic damage, while many shells caused no damage simply because they missed.

A game engagement illustrates how propulsion damage and disabled aft guns can let an attacker approach through a restricted firing arc.

An 18-inch Washington Treaty ceiling could require larger hulls and produce different design responses from the major naval powers.

Real British gun development underlies hypothetical 18-inch Agincourt and Hood designs with different structural demands.

An established 18-inch fleet would strengthen Britain's negotiating position while still requiring enough hulls and suitable dockyards.

The counterfactual links larger guns to industrial costs and judges 20-inch weapons too slow to justify their greater calibre.

An accelerated hypothetical 18-inch Agincourt could have served as Jellicoe's flagship and threatened older German dreadnoughts at Jutland.