Operation Tan No.2 (77yrs ago today)

Operation Tan No. 2 grew from Japan's continuing search for a decisive fleet blow even as its strategic position collapsed.

Tan No. 2 illustrates why a long-range strike depends on finding the enemy before launching the attack.

The earlier plans show a striking contraction from a carrier-and-land-air offensive to a proposed 54-aircraft raid on Majuro.

One estimate gives a fully successful strike enough effect to delay Okinawa for months, while leaving Japan unable to win the war.

Britain's escort-building capacity helped it sustain defenses against submarines that Japan's smaller industrial effort could not match.

Some probably noticed the shrinking defensive perimeter, but information control and limited geographical knowledge complicated that judgment. Believing the war was going badly did not necessarily mean believing it was lost or acting accordingly.

Not fully, and German and Italian claims to have sunk several British carriers further confused the picture.

The failure to establish a clean chain of command left too many senior admirals competing for authority and credit.

American carriers had effective damage control, while their balance of protection, air-group size, speed, and ease of construction reflected a fleet built in much larger numbers.

Not to a significant degree. Singapore could have supported some construction and Korea could have hosted expanded yards, but money, policy, and a preference for employing Japanese workers limited that approach.

They understood radar. Japan had its own equipment, and some supporting submarines were held up while radar was fitted.

Public belief differed from the navy's professional assessment. Hood was a battlecruiser, and most unsinkability publicity did not originate with the Royal Navy.

Majuro offered stationary targets, but aerial torpedoes still needed room to run and a controlled water entry; Taranto worked because the Royal Navy had engineered for those constraints.

The Enterprise attacker displayed exceptional skill, and a maneuver possible for one aircraft could not simply be assumed for a force of 54.

No. A hypothetical Swordfish strike might have complicated American radar-directed defenses, but its prospects would need modelling and it was not the Japanese plan.

The fast C6N reconnaissance aircraft depended on maintenance support that was harder to provide away from its intended carrier environment.

British carriers helped coordinate night air defense around Okinawa because the Fleet Air Arm maintained a broader pool of crews practiced in night operations.

Protective features were intended, but inconsistent production quality and the loss of Japanese design records make their real effectiveness difficult to establish.

The American move to Ulithi changed the target and required Japanese planners to confirm the carriers' location before a distant attack.

Enterprise's physical condition is considered adequate for preservation, while insufficient support is identified as the obstacle.

Japan had radar and ideas for developing it. Limited industrial capacity made widespread production and deployment the larger problem.

No timing forecast is offered. The emphasis is on Ulithi's location in Micronesia and the value of securing access.

Not in the same form; it could use Ulithi when needed and instead relied on forward support from Australia and the Indian Ocean.

Kamikaze attacks were treated as a potential war-winning weapon when Ugaki approved Tan No. 2 in early February 1945.

Breakdowns and landing losses reduced seven reconnaissance aircraft to one flyable C6N, which found no carriers at Ulithi.

Yes. Floating docks and other support facilities could be brought to the anchorage, as they were during the Second World War.

There are competing reports about tests, but Japan did not properly implement an operational twin-engine carrier aircraft before the end of the war.

Tan No. 2 paired 24 P1Y attack aircraft with flying-boat pathfinders and submarines assigned to navigation, supply, and rescue.

Frank criticism within a naval command can restrain overconfident planning, though anecdotes about personal relationships require care.

Attacking Ulithi's floating repair docks could have constrained carrier availability more effectively than chasing individual hulls.

A 24-aircraft raid could not decisively affect a navy building dozens of Essex- and Midway-class carriers.

The choice depended on which submarines could supply enough electrical power for the radio equipment.

The criticism of Tan No. 2 is ethical as well as operational: planners committed 72 aircrew without assembling a force capable of earning the promised result.

Japanese officers considered logistics targets but struggled to implement that strategy, while doctrine and exercises kept pulling attention back to the climactic fleet battle.

The H8K Emily's armament and long range suited the pathfinder role; the range figures suggest, without establishing, which variant was used.

It could have been considerably more dangerous and might have inflicted much heavier losses on Allied shipping.

Antenna failure, severe weather, and enemy air activity delayed I-366's delivery to the vulnerable reconnaissance detachment at Truk.

Yes. Weather reporting was part of their role, and the spares and fuel they carried were essential to keeping the reconnaissance aircraft flying.

March reconnaissance finally found carriers at Ulithi, but losing the surviving C6N would have ended the reconnaissance effort.

Supporting Tan No. 2 pulled I-58 away from a kaiten attack only ninety minutes before its planned launch.

Yes, together with special fuel and ordinary aviation fuel.

Engine failures, crashes, weather, and navigation losses reduced the 24-aircraft force to only two arrivals at Ulithi.

One P1Y struck USS Randolph; the other crashed beside a lighted baseball diamond on Mogmog Island, possibly after mistaking the diamond or its access road for a carrier.

Ulithi's repair capacity returned USS Randolph to service for Okinawa within weeks, limiting the strike's strategic effect.

Possibly, but the identification is uncertain because some photograph captions disagree.

A counterfactual Dardanelles assault contrasts a concentrated attack with an operation too weak to achieve its objective.

Calling the result inconclusive obscures the operational balance: Randolph returned quickly, while Japan lost scarce aircraft and crews largely to weather and mechanical failure.

About eleven hours, from a 09:00 takeoff to an arrival around 20:00.

A substantial carrier force remained. Sinking all fifteen carriers cited in the response would have delayed American operations, although the delay was judged unlikely to last very long.

The reconnaissance aircraft for this operation were operating from Truk, not Tokyo.

Engine failures and excessive distance undermined the raid, while successive abandoned plans left Tan No. 2 as the attack actually carried out.

Putting Enterprise out of action had a morale effect, but her survival also strengthened her reputation.

Other, improved grades of cordite rather than a wholly different propellant; SC appeared from 1927 and flashless Cordite NF was used during the Second World War.

Potentially in the First World War or for early anti-aircraft work. For the Second World War, it would be more useful as an anti-aircraft cruiser with larger general-purpose guns around 4.5 to 5 inches.

Theoretically yes, probably with rocket-assisted takeoff and significant modifications to the aircraft and carrier.

No. Flashless cordite was thought likely in the real battle, but not in the filming.

A modest reduction in energy per unit could be accepted to avoid revealing a ship at night, with a larger charge compensating where gun dimensions allowed it.

Probably little damage, though an impact aft could still have had an effect.

No reliable figure is given. The cordite first has to be converted into TNT equivalent, and the calculation needs further research.

An offhand estimate suggests low thousands of tons for a battleship when charges for all its guns are included. The figures are recalled from memory, with a correction during the answer.