Naval History Questions: Live From The Brushack

They can work close inshore and blend among the fishing-type vessels that smugglers are likely to use.

Probably more than 88 unless they were exceptionally large, fast, and coordinated from several directions, because long-range fleet fighters would attack the launch force first.

The navy received priority and often a majority of defence expenditure, but within a peacetime defence budget of roughly three to four percent of overall annual spending.

No, although they would fight hard; three destroyers are also an implausibly thin screen for two fleet carriers.

Possibly part of an experimental arrangement involving airflow or air purification, although the identification is tentative.

Flooding geometry and the movement of gravity-seated heavy turrets can drive a battleship through a capsize, while wreck depth and damage pattern also matter.

Possibly, although as a new design rather than a revived Tomcat, because future long-range missiles and laser systems may demand a large payload carrier.

Yes; small dogs, including possible corgis, went to sea, and kangaroos have also been carried aboard Royal Australian Navy ships.

They could sharply reduce their utility by improving defensive exchange ratios, but only if practical laser and railgun systems can be made to work.

In July 2022, the most visible naval links were Penny Mordaunt's reserve service and the prospect of Ben Wallace remaining defence secretary.

An exchange over Roman weapons shows how journal scholarship and hands-on reenactment can produce different historical interpretations.

Yes; federation members would be expected to help, as Commonwealth and NATO partners did in different ways during the Falklands War.

Probably not; Tempest is the Typhoon-side replacement in Britain's two-fighter policy, while navalisation would add major cost and different design demands.

Breaking a food blockade would require a visibly multinational escort so an attack confronted the alliance collectively rather than one navy alone.

Antarctic waters are the clearest example; unlike the Arctic convoy theatre, they have no known major naval battle in the discussion.

Only to a limited extent; meaningful growth requires long-term investment in shipyard processes and a workforce that can be retained after training.

Britain might fight harder for Canada's resources during the Revolution, while the War of 1812 would become chiefly naval because the United States would lack a Canadian land frontier to invade.

Probably not by itself, because Abe was a former rather than serving prime minister, although his death still carried diplomatic and symbolic weight.

Not without a much larger population able to sustain that system; India's demographic and political setting gave the East India Company opportunities Canada did not match.

Not necessarily if it were defending an internationally sanctioned convoy, but multiple missiles and uncertain targeting would create a dangerous escalation zone.

All of them, ideally with each site marked, recorded, and three-dimensionally scanned.

The opening would rely on ships already present or quickly moved into the lakes, with American monitors potentially useful until new construction expanded the forces.

A carrier would be too provocative; NATO could instead move land-based fighters closer through Black Sea allies.

Yes, occasionally, although these were visits rather than a constant ironclad deployment.

Probably, because strong anti-British assumptions in early United States foreign policy could still drive a confrontation.

More carriers; Japanese planners were already trying to expand the force.

It could become a worldwide free-trade, economic, and defence bloc resembling a global European Union and predating the United Nations.

The idea was considered, but the redesign and launch-system requirements were substantial; it also made most sense alongside a larger LHD-based aviation fleet.

An admiral active around South Carolina and the Caribbean who raised troops and planned a gradual reconquest, although his name could not be recalled live.

Foreign-relations histories are useful because British patrols depended on diplomacy, territorial authority, and the deterrent threat of the Royal Navy.

Atlanta brought cruiser-level seakeeping, ammunition capacity, logistics, turret depth, and battle-damage resilience that a destroyer could not match.

Yes; Eagle was part of the original two-carrier plan, and the navy would have used additional suitable carriers if they had been available.

War would be bad for both sides, but refusing to defend Taiwan could also weaken the alliances built on American security promises.

A massive, heavily protected and highly automated arsenal ship with a command bunker, many missiles and guns, layered defenses, and possibly nuclear power.

Not efficiently enough for sustained catapult operations; the required steam pressure, volume, and ship alterations make the idea impractical.

Taiwan's advanced fabrication capacity gives its partners a reason to preserve production, while Beijing's strategic objective extends beyond the factories to Taiwan itself.

It would likely grow from France's existing large-destroyer tradition, with planners deciding whether to pursue another heavily gunned destroyer design.

Yes, although the exchange gives no detailed configuration for the proposed conversions.

Shared language, mobile sailors, and weak proof of nationality made British impressment collide directly with American sovereignty.

For the Royal Marines, a medium-light force with its own protected wheeled vehicles may be more useful than an exclusively ultra-light formation.

Type 45 is the more practical British choice because of crew and support demands, though Burke offers greater proven missile capacity if constraints are ignored.

They could form a useful early-war surface group, especially if France had moved major ships to Far Eastern bases before German interference became possible.

Likely missiles, especially hypersonic weapons, in open ocean; a South China Sea conflict could produce a different littoral answer.

Improving and mass-producing a maintainable Panzer IV could yield far more usable combat power than a technically superior but scarce and unreliable Panther force.

Hopefully not, but the concept may be simple enough that eventual deployment cannot be dismissed.

Australia would probably assemble the boats, while Britain could be a plausible source for reactor modules because it had more available production capacity than the United States.

Probably a mine, because mines account for many submarine losses that otherwise remain unexplained.

Naval ammunition was not given away wholesale, but Britain still needs larger purchases to rebuild stockpiles reduced by long-term policy choices.

Possible, but no more securely established than several other occupational theories, and the evidence does not justify a confident identification.

The belief that light machine guns and similar weapons could stop aircraft remained influential even as aircraft became much larger and tougher.

Both, with a stronger British presence at Gibraltar and possibly conventional submarines to contain French movements.

Much longer if senior command remained active and the air groups stayed alert, because the historical collapse was not caused by the Japanese strike alone.

Treaty gun caliber can conceal how six-inch cruisers delivered similar practical range with broader utility.

Only under restrictive coastal conditions; in an open-sea fight Warrior's speed, maneuver, and power made her overwhelmingly favored.

Britain becomes much less willing to accept naval construction limits after German ships strengthen other Allied fleets.

More active, consistent command could preserve readiness and concentrate American armor against Japanese landings, making the campaign longer and harder.

A faster ship on a related hull with eight-inch guns, more ammunition, and machinery capable of reaching about 30 knots.

The scenario requires a different First World War, and Germany would seek a major-power ratio that Britain probably would not accept.

Probably not all of it, but a heavily fortified Brittany would have a strong chance of remaining in British hands.

A few foreign battleships add disproportionate training, engineering, and supply burdens to a large standardized fleet.

Probably not; a Renown-sized hull better fits existing infrastructure and can still carry the machinery and support spaces the mission requires.

Possibly, but Britain would likely demand additional 16-inch capital ships in response, changing the resulting Nelson-class program.

A worked-up pair would add major effective firepower to the Italian fleet and pose a serious new problem for Britain.

Some boarding actions, including one in which a midshipman entered through a gunport and fought his way to the main deck, are stranger than fiction.

They could be useful to the United States, while Britain had less reason to want ships already surpassed by Hood.

No convincing Jutland lesson supports such thin armor; Lexington was a speed-and-range Pacific design vulnerable even to upgraded Kongos and Japanese cruisers.

Yes; the result could be a fast nine-gun capital ship and support a standardized improved 15-inch weapon across much of the fleet.

Something around the scale and combat level of the Alaska class, rather than a conventional treaty eight-inch cruiser.

Overwhelmingly well: its endurance, air wing, and airborne early warning would overturn the regional air and sea balance.

Yes; they would be useful against Deutschland-class raiders and the varied large-cruiser threats fielded by other navies.

Operation C with the Eastern Fleet, where her aircraft could add a potentially decisive night strike against the Japanese.

Probably only her armored-carrier sisters, whose protected hangars were designed around surviving heavy attack.

The latest photographs examined during the research showed it in apparently reasonable condition.

Radar and fighters could disrupt Japanese strikes enough for Force Z to survive, while the carrier's strike group and later reinforcements could create an early Eastern Fleet.

It would help, especially if the destroyers were modern enough to add effective anti-aircraft defence rather than merely more hulls.

Potentially, and the risk of comparable complexity helps explain why the six-inch arrangement was never fitted.

Yes; its ability to fly slowly enough to engage propeller aircraft makes it unusually suitable among modern jet fighters.

Yes; it built six-inch cruisers under the treaties but planned 9.2-inch cruisers once the limits expired.

A hit could matter, but obtaining one was difficult enough that success depended heavily on luck.

They were large cruisers built to hunt surface commerce raiders, with 7.5-inch guns chosen as adequate for the task.

Yes; they would likely join the Eastern Fleet because they were the major ships available for reassignment.

Probably, depending on the matchup; it may be particularly suitable for engaging a very slow aircraft such as the Swordfish.

The Kriegsmarine, in the brief comparison.