Bruships 202: Naval History Questions Answered Live...

Yes. Kevlar, steel, compartments, and local machinery shielding provide protection, although no universal splinter-resistance rating is given.

Michael Clapp's reported criticism of a Falklands loss estimate centers on ship movement, self-defense, and the added protection available within a task group.

Moskva's isolated deployment illustrates the risks of operating without another ship to provide mutual support.

Naval games model the combat value of grouped ships while also exposing the budget decisions that can prevent navies from fielding those groups.

The ships were old, intended replacements changed, and missile-equipped ships and aircraft offered more useful ways to defeat surface threats.

Yes, disputes are recalled, including an uncertain account of crews using squashy loads to prove that their delivery angle could hit a ship.

Vulcan exercise accounts combine low-altitude flying, high-altitude interception problems, and specialist jamming support; a missile-armed escort version remained a proposal.

Britain still sought peace and hoped a controlled display of capability would deter Japan, while normal diplomacy made outright refusal difficult.

No; the conflict was framed as a United Nations action rather than a formally declared American war.

It was technically possible, but the available British missiles made the conversion less worthwhile than the Tiger class's historical ASW flagship role.

A Tiger-derived design with eight 15-inch guns is plausible, but the clarified scenario requires Hood's later form before Jutland and reverses the historical design sequence.

No; Britain prepared an invasion, but Japan surrendered before it was launched, allowing the assembled forces to reoccupy Singapore quickly.

Tiger's protection, subdivision, and dense construction support an argument that her design line offered a clearer route toward fast battleships than Hood's larger hull.

Two possibilities are considered: abandoning fixed-wing carrier aviation or building smaller replacements, with industrial constraints and flagship prestige pulling the decision in different directions.

A MiG-29K air group could support a smaller replacement carrier, while a competing forecast expects prestige to push the hull toward 55,000 to 60,000 tons.

A report that only part of the F-35 fleet is immediately available must be read against normal maintenance and readiness cycles rather than treated as proof that the force is unusable.

British newspapers once maintained dedicated naval and defense staffs, while smaller modern newsrooms push generalists to rewrite wire copy under severe time pressure.

A personal recollection of conflicting Lockheed Martin briefings shows the difficulty of separating F-35 national variants and development proposals from operational configurations.

A Resolution-derived boat or a stretched attack submarine could support continuous conventional deterrence, with different costs, missile capacities and secondary roles.

They can launch a large conventional strike from an unexpected undersea position, offering carrier-scale opening firepower without revealing the launch platform in advance.

Missile mass mattered alongside coordination: Soviet submarines and aircraft needed attacks from several directions, while the necessary communications exposed boats before launch.

Oscar-class missile submarines are dangerous in firing position, but reactor noise and the decline of Russian attack-boat numbers make it difficult to escort them there.

Disappointment with Lada and its planned successor leaves improved Kilos as the practical way to replace Russia's lost diesel-submarine capacity.

Potentially very effective, because Japanese invasion routes would have crossed several planned T-class patrol areas around Singapore.

The expected trend is toward larger multirole naval drones as additional capabilities raise costs and create pressure to justify each aircraft through more missions.

Small single-purpose categories have appeared, but the argument here is that each tends to grow as users ask for more sensors and capabilities.

Working control systems let older drones teach transferable skills while absorbing the collisions common in early operator training.

It is a practical repurposing that turns the ships into survivable strategic strike platforms able to service distant targets quickly.

Zumwalt largely delivered the unusual hull that was ordered before the class was cut, while LCS carried speed and drivetrain choices that undermined its intended missions.

The specific Tokaji practice is not confirmed here. The broader answer concerns spirits carried on Arctic expeditions and the hypothermia risk despite feeling less cold.

Yes in an emergency, though adapting fire-control and weapon interfaces would require local engineering and discreet command cooperation.

If a replacement is built, the two estimates are 40,000 to 50,000 tons and 55,000 to 60,000 tons, with STOBAR favored for existing infrastructure and air defence.

There are many, but strategic-level failures are often worst; the defense of the defective Mark 14 torpedo system is a particularly strong example.

Beatty is suggested, but the analogy is contested because both careers include administrative achievements alongside disputed command decisions.

No; CVA-01 was too small for the F-14, and Britain would more likely upgrade the Phantom and pursue a Buccaneer-derived replacement.

Submarine layouts and commando operations would change, but engines, batteries, cold, currents, and waterproof equipment would still prevent effortless underwater warfare.

The basic gun would change relatively little, but its mounting would use extensive automation; single versus twin turrets remains disputed.

Higher gun fire volume could support fragment barrages and several shore targets while reducing expenditure from finite missile magazines.

Independent mounts can engage different targets, while the opposing preference for twin guns emphasizes redundancy within each mount.

Many could receive a fairly quick engine overhaul because their hulls were regularly maintained, though some accompanying hull work would be necessary.

They could be rebuilt extensively, but cost, age, treaty politics, and the superiority of new cruisers make the investment hard to justify.

A 15,000-ton cruiser limit might preserve the Tennessees, but it would also permit stronger new rivals and leave Versailles-limited German ships behind.

CV90 is judged a good but aging platform that does not fit the American troop and weapon requirements described in this exchange.

Japan probably would not attack Pearl Harbor and would more likely concentrate on the Philippines, since a major strike on San Diego was logistically unrealistic.

An English expedition in the Low Countries becomes an example of how inadequate finance could delay campaigning and entangle the royal family in borrowing.

The main risks lie in joints and complex pipe runs, so compact modular boiler-turbine-generator units could make the plant more reliable and maintainable.

Diesels would help range and steady power supply, but 1930s machinery would not provide the desired high-speed power density; a mixed electric-drive system remains a possible alternative.

Yes; British troops were intended to participate, and the Allied transport system could move them east given several months.

A surviving Singapore could have supported a much more joint campaign. Its loss separated the Pacific theater from Britain's major commitments in the Indian Ocean and Southeast Asia.

Fleet nominates Admiral Aube for implementing the Jeune École and pausing capital-ship construction. Clarke nominates Richmond Kelly Turner over the handling of warnings before Pearl Harbor.

They could fill a useful amphibious role, but the participants disagree about offensive employment. Escort availability, slow construction, machinery supply, and the allocation of only two ships limit their potential.

Its capabilities and organization should remain intelligible, its tactics should adapt to the situation, and its ships and weapons should fit the setting's established rules.

A fictional Byzantine campaign illustrates the error of transferring the same army organization and cavalry tactics into different terrain.

No. Fleet destroyers and larger fleet units could justify the change, while many older ships and slower escorts would not need the extra power.

It was technically possible but operationally unattractive because the speed gain was small and the American machinery complicated support.

A nuclear-powered, 50,000-60,000-ton STOBAR carrier is one forecast for Russia, based on domestic propulsion capability and the attraction of a prestige asset.

A small bomber force could fit a proposed emphasis on British naval and air power within NATO, but B-21 export access and the RAF budget remain major doubts.

The proposed maritime emphasis depends on suitable weapons while preserving a heavy bomber's wider role.

The B-21 comparison centers on affordability, production in quantity, and applying lessons from the difficult-to-sustain B-2.

A limited British work share could benefit domestic industry, but the participants disagree about what France would demand in return.

No current French requirement is established here. Fleet's proposal assumes that France first decides it wants the capability.

B-52 is expected to outlast B-1 and B-2, while a long B-21 transition feeds the argument for buying an established aircraft later.

That remains uncertain in the exchange. Clarke argues that Britain and Australia could be considered because of AUKUS, without identifying an approved sale.

That analogy is disputed. Clarke favors a Los Angeles-to-Virginia comparison and emphasizes the shift from a Soviet Cold War threat to Pacific and global conflict.

Roughly three centuries.

The claim that the War of 1812 was a draw is challenged by comparing American commitment with Britain's more limited willingness to fight in North America.

Clarke criticizes it as a discredited account but regards it as worth reading for the perspective it preserves.

No individual is selected. The difficulty is separating an ambassador's mistakes from a government that gives poor direction or ignores accurate warnings, as in the example of Argentina and Port Stanley.

New Orleans is treated as a defeated opening attempt, with further British troops expected for an advance toward St. Louis.

The delays are considered a problem without establishing that the industry is finished. One participant also raises a conditional concern about a proposed copper tariff.

America's infrastructure and central authority are examined alongside expectations that Napoleon would occupy Britain and that an invasion of Canada would be welcomed.

The modern Dido proposal is rejected. If navies increase caliber beyond five inches, the prediction is a move to six inches because of its greater shell capacity and comparable modern rate of fire.

Barrel length has practical movement and transport limits, which helps explain why tank-gun development can favor a larger caliber.

A four-person Haida crossing is proposed as a joke, with little sleep expected. Another participant suggests roughly ten as an absolute minimum, but no settled manning requirement is established.

Her different damage and continuing role as a fast unit would require modifications unlike West Virginia's survivability-focused reconstruction.

There is no clear overall advantage; the preferred arrangement combines a Burke and Type 45 with effective data sharing.

The initial reactions are favorable toward the turret and secondary-battery layout, while Clarke reserves his detailed assessment.

The estimated result is an F3-style ship capable of about 28 knots.

A Mississippi approach toward St. Louis would give the Royal Navy a river route for troops and supplies, with 64-gun ships suggested as possible participants.

Little advantage in the existing aircraft; having that engine in 1934 would probably produce a very different design.

The objection is whether the heavy torpedo would survive entering the water, a problem investigated through years of testing.

Mainly to the National Archives at Kew, with some in company and personal archives, although many detailed results have not survived.

Wave-related incidents are described, but the cause of an actual loss is disputed, and an aircraft assessed as lost during an exercise returned safely.

When its role expands from the local ship-to-shore movement to strategic transport and support of the landing operation.

The timing and early problems of American high-power engines complicate the proposed shortcut of buying them, while the Royal Navy funded several British engine programmes.

Clarke rejects the proposed connection, arguing that the controlled ration was too small to create dependence by itself.

The one actually available to fly the scouting mission.

It depends on the carrier, but strengthening the F-104 for deck landings would add substantial weight and leave serious questions about operating it again.

It was a major battle, but that ranking is rejected, particularly given Persia's continued influence and the imbalance in surviving perspectives.

The government would need to make a different decision at the end of the war; building the carrier is judged beneficial to the Royal Navy.

Under that counterfactual they would use rails and carry rockets instead of bombs, but there is little reason for the obsolete aircraft still to be serving.

The premise is insufficient: Germany would need a durable definition of RAF defeat and still had no convincing answer to Royal Navy intervention, especially at night.

The attraction is greater performance, but balance, wing-root condition, and late timing make it an extensive rebuilding project with little remaining service opportunity.

Yes, torpedoes appeared in early concepts, but the idea was rejected.

Prinz Eugen is likely overwhelmed by the remaining British ships, and Germany loses both Bismarck and the propaganda benefit of Hood's destruction.

Greece would probably buy more destroyers and submarines and strengthen coastal artillery for a defensive Aegean strategy.

Foreign construction is a familiar solution when domestic yards lack suitable capability or capacity; even Britain's fleet tankers were built in South Korea.

The Royal Navy would probably find uses for them, add missiles such as CAMM, and employ them for fire support and presence.

Its assumed equipment could support self-sufficient off-world colonies, alongside the overwhelming military power granted by the scenario.

The High Seas Fleet would be comprehensively outclassed by faster, heavier-gunned, radar-equipped ships, making any major fleet action overwhelmingly favorable to Britain.

Upgrade the carriers' arresting gear and obtain dedicated fighters, then use the Gannets' radar and strike capability to inflict much heavier damage on U-boats and surface forces.

Restarting would take too long, so the proposed fallback is an existing anti-submarine design such as Type 26, copied without modification.

Try to land on the American carrier, just as an aircraft could defect by landing at an opposing airfield.

The proposed craft lacks a convincing role and enough engine power; concerns about variable loads add another unresolved objection.

Earlier British airframes and engines would be needed, and the prospective reduction in American losses is disputed: aircraft performance would improve some operations while daylight doctrine would remain a danger.

Yes, but gas turbines quickly became another major propulsion path.

The ships would force canal expansion or separate ocean fleets and provoke larger foreign designs, with a concern that Congress might withhold funding for America's next response.

Masts could be shattered by rapidly expanding moisture, while a conductor to submerged metal offered a possible protective route; the timing of its adoption remains uncertain here.

It could be useful on carriers, with missiles engaging first and guns firing at close range, but the weight and complexity are substantial.

Neither Lancaster nor B-17 could make unescorted daylight raids safe by itself; formation tactics, escort, and doctrine mattered more than swapping airframes.

It would dominate every contemporary capital ship and provoke a much more extreme arms race in speed, fire control, displacement, and gun caliber.

Choices include Bayern, Moltke, and Goeben, with appearance and Goeben's transfer to Turkey among the reasons.

Use a small fiberglass fast-boat hull as a long-range uncrewed sensor and torpedo platform.

Sending the carrier group is supported, but the Royal Fleet Auxiliary still uses ports and earlier shipbuilding choices remain a concern.

It is an attractive vessel worth visiting, although keeping it ashore might make maintenance easier in Nova Scotia's weather.

Probably not; additional air-defense escorts would have improved their prospects more than cancelling the Tulagi strike.

Yes, but it should not: Naval Strike Missile or newer weapons would be more appropriate.

The proposed explanation is inadequate funding and institutional support, which prevented further turbine work and a possible development toward 700 psi.

Chicago Pile-1 achieved the first self-sustaining chain reaction in 1942; the much earlier date proposed for a different kind of device remains unsupported here.

The American candidate appears to be the Sumners, with Batch III Hunts as the alternative and disagreement over the escort-destroyer category.

Use an F3-like form and aim for about 28 knots within 35,000 tons, while retaining the broad battleship concept.

The remembered objections are complexity, large space demands, and disappointing practical power density.