Bruships 187: Naval History Questions Answered Live...

Wooden ships could be made slightly longer than the best-known ships of the line, but structural reinforcement and rapid deterioration imposed a firm practical limit.

The choices are Warspite in 1942 camouflage, Rurik, Iron Duke, and the Independence-class Littoral Combat Ship.

A brief aside connects the historical success of disruptive paint schemes with a future period in which image-recognition systems may still be deceived.

The panel gives no total, but identifies Victory as a wartime school ship and Implacable as probably the last ship of the line in active training use.

Its greatest effect would come from the prewar amphibious doctrine and planning required to create it; the hull alone would offer much less.

Radar-related ranging, fibre-optic and electromagnetic research, gas-turbine applications, and some practical shipboard equipment all have naval development links, although the cookware example is unverified.

No; support disruption would degrade sustainment over time, but Britain could keep the aircraft operating while diversifying future supply chains, and its nearer problem is having too few Poseidons.

A March 2025 discussion of US pressure over Greenland separates immediate military feasibility from the longer problem of European dependence on American power.

Only about fourteen or fifteen in the proposed set, because engine production would prevent Japan from converting all the saved heavy-ship effort into cruiser numbers.

It can be a useful regional force multiplier, but without strong fleet air defense it is likely to absorb missiles rather than survive high-end combat.

No single rule held throughout the period because stronger masts and rigging allowed later ships to carry progressively larger sail plans.

The powered dual-purpose machinery needed more room than the partly manual and hydraulically assisted earlier 4.7-inch mounts.

Yes, but the panel says the later carrier ideas were not improving.

Yes; the Guadalcanal campaign offered a way to threaten ports and normal sea lanes with land-based aircraft, forcing Allied shipping onto longer routes.

They remain useful for focused missions in low-threat environments, but they cannot replace high-end fighters whose combat value includes integrated sensors, planning, and sustainment.

A long panel debate separates the A-10's vulnerability in peer air-defense environments from its usefulness at rough fields and in low-intensity wars.

Their rapid construction and the materials used in the emergency building program made brittle failure more likely.

They would mainly improve accuracy, not range, and might even lose some muzzle velocity while human fire control and ship motion continued to limit effective distance.

No; it was an experimental answer to wartime steel scarcity, comparable to other unconventional concrete-warship ideas considered by major powers.

Probably yes; the navy would scale a familiar off-the-shelf carrier system rather than add another unnecessary technical experiment.

Their heavy dual-purpose batteries and proximity-fuzed fire would make them formidable targets, although saturation and individual hits would remain possible.

A survival counterfactual links stronger naval-aviation leadership with continued carrier development and a 1939 Royal Navy order for American fighters.

Radar proximity fuzes replaced the need to predict and set a precise burst time, making a visible shell burst much more likely to mean an aircraft had been damaged.

Probably not; command stress and ubiquitous environmental lead are stronger explanations, and the expected wider service pattern is missing.

Congress saw no need to double the force, and the United States was competing for ship quality and prestige rather than building the balanced numbers required for war with Britain or Germany.

They generally became happier with oil, but experienced coal-era engineers initially disliked relying on gauges instead of directly inspecting their fuel.

The later batch needed a little more length and volume, particularly to support SH-60 helicopter operations.

It is possible but unlikely, because the Air Force will probably insist on controlling a design tailored to its own requirements.

Their larger hulls offered useful modernization space, while the immediate personnel problem was demobilization and assignment rather than a simple absence of sailors.

Earlier ships separated some internal spaces, but viable watertight subdivision began around the 1840s and evolved gradually into a systematic bulkhead arrangement.

Yes; escort carriers replaced its intended role, and the steel shortage that favored pykrete became less decisive.

A condenser turns exhaust steam back into water for pumping to the boiler, but leakage and system-specific exhaust paths prevent perfect recovery.

No navy does it perfectly; proportionality depends on political limits, intelligence, unintended effects, and the standards of the period.

Yes, but the chain of command normally intervenes earlier, replacing or reassigning the officer and appointing an acting commander.

An acting appointment could fill an urgent command, but a long delay before gazetting showed that the Admiralty was unwilling to make the officer a permanent post captain.

A captain's public recognition of sailors can improve morale and recruiting without eroding authority when the treatment is fair and bounded.

A first rate carried enough for months of extended operation, but fleet supply ships replenished those stores regularly because food was a fundamental endurance limit.

The carriers combine large food capacity, fast passenger-transfer boats, and a highly mechanized magazine to sustain a large embarked force with a comparatively small handling crew.

Not credibly with present yard capacity; the US has greater industrial scale, while Britain may have somewhat easier state coordination in some cases.

No major naval problem resulted because bulk ship fuel was handled by weight, although aircraft and national measurement standards could still complicate logistics.

Regularly; sinking blockships in narrow approaches has long been a standard method of denying maritime access.

Yes; the old 8.3-inch production tooling was gone by 1934, so Germany would need to recreate the industrial capability and develop a new weapon.

Probably not; the navy needs the ships, while low bids and requirement growth are more likely to drive renegotiation than cancellation.

Guilliman is the leading choice because practical automation, logistics, and better historical institutions could materially improve the Imperium, while Vulkan offers the best conversation.

Germany might standardize on nine-gun heavy cruisers, while losing the 11-inch development work that fed into Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.

It lets several kinds of engine generate electricity for propulsion motors, offering flexibility and efficiency across different operating conditions.

Not soon without a major political shock and large, sustained investment in industrial capacity.

They could be more efficient and easier to modernize for high-power systems, but operational effectiveness would depend on the ships' missions and use.

It can fight until its magazines empty, but missile stocks can vanish quickly and higher gun rates shorten continuous firing endurance.

Because twenty years of doctrine, operating experience, structural work, and modernization decisions separate the original conversion from its wartime armament.

Most will likely include low-observable features, but mission, cost, and production needs will decide how central full stealth becomes.

Perhaps, but its twelve-year career was already normal for a rapidly maturing generation of naval jet aircraft.

Yes; the ships were fitted for their contemporary requirements and had the ability to accept more later.

There is no single winner, but condoms, coat hangers, and pencils all had practical sealing, waterproofing, and repair uses aboard ships.

The panel cannot give a reliable fathom total from memory, but a full rig reportedly required about six weeks of continuous production at Chatham's ropewalk.

The details differed, but none could underfeed crews severely without losing the labor, morale, and loyalty needed to fight the ship.

They are often judged against US Navy requirements instead of the different carriers and missions for which the Royal Navy selected them.

Low-level flight, speed, stand-off range, and rapid attack can each remove a layer of the enemy's engagement process, depending on the mission.

Probably, but naval use will mature first in certified parts and short production runs because material performance is harder to scale than the printer.

Not necessarily in a formal one-for-one sense; the U5 tested the capability, while the D10 delivered an operational target-drone system.

Automation could substantially reduce crews, but fleet growth depends on whether operating doctrine and safety practices also change.

It depends entirely on why the war does not happen and which later developments are caused by that change.

A higher count is structurally possible in four-tube increments, but it would require more common missile compartments and a larger boat.

Their airframes had already endured severe operational loads and low-level wear, making conversion unattractive.

A Tornado variant is a plausible guess for the period and flight profile, but the panel does not claim a documented choice.

Loyal wingmen are the more likely early generations; independent fighters may emerge later as software and control mature.

Undeclared trial altitudes and a participant's recollection show how British strike crews treated a sixty- or seventy-metre ceiling as an invitation to fly even lower.

Her survival was difficult but credible because skilled command, good engines, and a useful harbor position combined in her favor.

Probably; the present change is driven largely by ammunition logistics and interoperability, tempered by industrial-sovereignty concerns.

The 15-inch battery is plausible, but the 9.2-inch secondary arrangement is inefficient and operationally troublesome.

Very often; the panel treats it as a routine stopgap for securing things that should not move.

Possibly, if rail-wear materials improve and the need for a reloadable alternative to finite VLS magazines becomes urgent.

The gear was retracted first, and the standing joke was that the aircraft then descended to its normal very-low-level cruising altitude.

It showed an underwater attack could work, but Hunley's loss obscured the lesson and revealed how hazardous her weapon and operating arrangement were.

No; an uninterrupted Alsace program should complete before the Model 1948 weapon exists, though a later refit could add newer guns.

The panel distinguishes rail acceleration from electromagnetic coils and explains why each system creates different problems for barrel wear, accuracy, and projectile electronics.

Often enough to matter; the Swordfish could fly below a fighter's comfortable attack speed, forcing risky slow approaches or brief high-speed passes.

Probably not, because armed Lynx and Wildcat helicopters already offer a flexible specialist capability against small surface craft.

The Littoral Combat Ship is the leading answer for weak design rationale, while ekranoplans and several experimental aircraft compete on appearance and engineering excess.

Possibly, but the more useful option would be to remove after turrets for helicopters or missiles while retaining nine guns forward.

The shift began with late-war and postwar underwater-optimized designs, but nuclear propulsion made submerged performance fully decisive.

Generally yes, because a larger hull offers more space and removable weight, but the value of each conversion still depends on cost and mission.

The conversion could be useful, but Soviet logistics and infrastructure would still sharply limit how effectively the cruiser could operate.

It can handle limited attacks, but its magazine lacks the depth required for sustained defense against a peer threat.

A hybrid of lasers and advanced 35 mm or 40 mm projectile weapons is more likely than an immediate all-or-nothing replacement.

Their choices include Midway for family history, Lion to influence Jutland-era practice, Nubian for an exceptional combat career, and Hermes to witness early carrier development.

Its small bursting charge limits general use, but Nelson and Rodney could gain a specialised armour-piercing option by firing a 15-inch sub-calibre projectile from their 16-inch guns.

Shipboard handling, environment, rate of fire, and mounting requirements make true ammunition and system commonality much harder than matching caliber alone.

No; the panel rejects a direct proportional relationship.

A repeated answer adds Tribal-class destroyers to Nelson and Rodney as ships that might find a narrow armor-piercing use for sub-caliber ammunition.

Possibly; a modern six-inch gun could combine automated rate of fire with larger guided payloads and take shorter-range missions away from finite VLS magazines.

Yes, it offers a weight-conscious, rapid-fire layer between missiles and close-in weapons, especially against drones and saturation threats.

There is no universal figure; the panel says under-keel attack method matters as much as charge weight when the aim is to break the hull.

Yes; shallow conventional magazines can make nuclear escalation more likely by leaving no viable way to continue fighting after the first days.

Roman naval infantry tactics drew on a much older Mediterranean tradition visible among Carthaginians, Phoenicians, Greeks, and even Egyptian records.