Bruships 185: Naval History Questions Answered Live...

The Field of the Cloth of Gold illustrates how public ceremony and sharp disagreement between leaders have long coexisted.

Powder monkeys were boys selected to carry gunpowder from a warship's magazines to its gun decks during action.

Traditional prize payments had faded by the First World War in this account, but extra pay and other rewards for captures continued, so no firm final date is offered.

Either extensively redesign the carrier conversion with all-turbine power and standardized lifts, or complete the ship as a Normandie-class battleship and build a separate carrier later.

Victorious was the best reconstruction candidate among worn Illustrious-class carriers, but delayed construction had already imposed fleet-wide costs.

The diagrams suggest roughly twelve people in either gunhouse, but the available figures do not establish comparable totals including magazine crews.

It was plausible only with enough CATOBAR demand, and would have required a substantially redesigned airframe despite sharing systems with Typhoon.

A prewar gull-wing carrier fighter and the later Spitfire conversion represented fundamentally different approaches to the Seafire requirement.

Their old, heavily used hulls made the conversion cost unjustifiable when Britain was already reconsidering the cruiser role.

Yes. Nuclear-powered surface ships were a recurring idea during the Cold War.

Norway needs a general-purpose principal combatant, but its infrastructure-defense mission gives anti-submarine warfare a slight priority.

Launcher compatibility and inshore operating conditions help determine whether Sea Ceptor suits a Norwegian frigate.

Probably CAMM-ER, although a claimed range advantage over Evolved Sea Sparrow is withdrawn after a units error.

Tradition suggests it should, but sponsors are normally coached and historical mistakes have sometimes been adapted afterward.

Two people could keep an already rigged ship moving while conditions held, but sail handling required a much larger crew, roughly estimated from the total length of its yards.

Italian ships are not lightly armed, and French fits are adequate for their designed missions even when other navies choose more visible weapons.

Phalanx remains useful, and most of the alternatives are also mature designs whose integration and defensive roles differ.

Two competing preferences in US alliance policy favor dependent partners and greater allied defence spending.

Post-Napoleonic Britain faced potential coalitions of peers; the early post-Cold War United States is judged to have faced no comparable constraint.

Funding source, ceremonial requirements, and public visibility can make horses politically harder to cut than armoured vehicles.

New hulls could be built if Britain paid to establish the necessary factory.

A substantial expansion would require new production, and a newer tank would make more sense than reproducing Challenger 3 when starting that investment.

The understanding offered is that Britain retains production capacity while buying ammunition made elsewhere, but the factory's exact operating status is uncertain.

Even a fighter-heavy carrier would have made Swordfish strikes more difficult and given the Italian fleet its own air defence and scouting.

The examples include improvised fuse waterproofing, the Channel Dash, and naval ramming, with uncertainty over whether the waterproofing example came from SOE work or early contact mines.

It would be welcome if it happens, but its completion should not yet be assumed.

A modified Visby is considered a plausible approach, but a participant also notes that the proposed successor is supposed to be a clean-sheet design.

Performance against an older generation does not establish parity with contemporary warships.

Better procurement planning could have produced a sister, but a second ship was not expected to improve Dreadnought's own preservation prospects.

Fully funding and expanding existing programs, while improving pay and accommodation, would deliver capability faster than launching many new projects.

Possibly over decades, but rebuilding the technology base would be costly and current American systems cannot simply be removed before replacements exist.

No better system is proposed; forward presence needs proper resources and a review of the paperwork that consumes officers' time.

No general superiority is claimed over Essex: it was larger, while Centaur benefited from Royal Marines leadership of the conversion. The Iwo Jima comparison remains uncertain.

Many plausible American examples remain in foreign service, while large established museum ships compete for the space and attention needed to preserve a frigate.

Programs may use 'large surface combatant,' but ships entering service would probably return to familiar labels such as cruiser.

The Imperial I carries the weapons and deployable garrison for heavy policing. Proposed improvements include more survivable fighters, specialist support craft and stronger point defence, although the choices are disputed.

They were imperfect but useful experimental carriers whose age also allowed Britain to replace them when newer designs became available.

Mine-layers produced greater aggregate disruption and losses, while torpedo attacks more often delivered spectacular individual successes.

The best choice depends on period and requirement: direct drive favors simplicity, turbo-electric drive offers flexibility, and diesel-electric drive favors range.

One drone may be manageable by a pilot, but larger teams likely require a second operator or substantial computing power distributed with the penetrating force.

A proposed drone-command conversion trades the B-21's bomb load for computing space, with electronic emissions still an objection.

Logistics and interoperability with allies explain the change. Whether the 4.5-inch gun had exhausted its development potential remains unanswered.

The Soviet Navy could have developed its own response from destroyer designs already under consideration, with additional demand for escorts from its projected carrier fleet.

It is an Americanized FREMM suited to US requirements and belongs nearer Type 26's high-end tier than the cheaper general-purpose Type 31.

Five Type 31s. A proposed sequence adds drone-support Type 32s and later batches, then sells older ships unless a crisis creates a need to retain them.

Both involve greater power density, but fuel efficiency, cost, transmission choices, and safe operating limits make the comparison imperfect.

About 2,500 tons is suggested as the lower threshold. Affordability remains relative, and the carrier examples challenge any simple upper size limit.

Carrier size permits several propulsion arrangements, and the expected future fleet can influence which machinery a navy retains.

Global economy, port access, resale, and nuclear certification all favored conventional propulsion for Britain's carriers.

The recollection links it to repairs on Charles de Gaulle and says France paid for the required certification.

Very unlikely without a large built cruiser to justify 15,500 tons. The 8-inch gun limit itself came from rounding up the Hawkins class's existing 7.5-inch armament.

Japan would exceed it, treating the treaty ceiling as a challenge.

The saved turret and ammunition weight could plausibly support an F3-like 28-knot design, perhaps without adding a third shaft.

Type 212 better suits shallow and constrained waters, while KSS-III is favored for open-ocean and long-range patrols.

Unicorn, Pioneer, Perseus, and selected escort carriers are proposed, with the exact lineup and tiers left unsettled.

Ship damage used points based on benchmark shell hits, and bomb effects were compared with those shells. The method for assessing damage to aircraft is uncertain.

No major-warship example is identified with confidence. Pods offer maneuverability, while long-range cruising efficiency is suggested as a reason for limited adoption.

The Iowas last fired in anger during Desert Storm. Possible French combat use around Suez remains unresolved in this comparison.

Probably only about two-thirds, with Ticonderogas serving more as escorts to the larger nuclear cruisers and later Burke numbers also affected.

I-200s were the better general fleet investment, while I-400s were specialized strategic strike boats whose value depended on being available early.

It would be an optionally crewed ASW asset acting like a semi-independent helicopter, with Type 26 coordinating a wider picket line.

UB III is proposed for technical quality, while UC III is favored when effectiveness and the additional mine-laying role carry more weight.

A transfer was considered unlikely because Belfast was already well advanced and Britain needed the first batch to replace ageing Type 23s, while extra Norwegian hulls could use later yard capacity.

They were plausible conversion candidates, although their tapered hulls limited cargo efficiency. The comparison with converted Flower-class sloops produces disagreement over which ships best suited ocean trading.

The preferences differ: one retains Washington as a manageable baseline, while another favors continued building without Washington. Design studies do not establish what would actually have been built.

A bomb can destroy ships that do not justify an expensive missile, especially when stealth aircraft can approach targets with limited air defense.

Georgios Averof, Russia's Aurora, and the United States' Olympia are the other examples named.

The proposed set is 40 mm, 4.5-inch, 6-inch, 9.2-inch, and 16-inch weapons for light AA through battleship armament.

The Courbets would go first, followed by the Bretagnes as the Dunkerque, Richelieu, and subsequent programmes supplied replacements.

Before radar, volume improved hit chances and helped disable opponents; radar fire control increased the value of larger calibres' greater range.

Possibly, but Ford's present factories and production methods would require its engineers to find a different way to achieve it.

USS Truxtun is the tentative choice at roughly 8,600 tons. A later comparison puts Mutsu about 150 tons heavier, while treating the figures as approximate.

Subdivision and local splinter protection keep blast and fragments away from vital spaces, but modern heavyweight torpedoes remain extraordinarily difficult to survive.

Preferences include Caterpillar, Wärtsilä for marine power, and Volvo for road vehicles. The technical emphasis is on injectors, intake, and configuration around a mature rotating assembly.

Coastal defences rule out a conventional fleet advance. Small motor boats offer a hypothetical inland option, with serious doubts about their arrival time and condition.

Preferences differ by role. Historical reasons include the 75 mm and 76 mm association with quick-firing field artillery and enthusiasm for 11-inch German naval and railway guns.

British turbo-electric technology lagged while British geared turbines led, so investment followed the option offering better performance and value.

The Orks are the entertainment choice. Replicators and rapid communications prompt the more consequential debate about access to technology and the competing benefits of coordination and propaganda.

Suggested examples include HMS Warrior, HMS Dreadnought, Napoléon, and the M1 Garand; the Dreadnought suggestion is explicitly tentative.

No single frigate was fixed in advance because the chosen ship and port depended on which escape route remained open.

Arrowhead 140 is near the practical lower bound, with Type 26 and Constellation defining the upper part of the modern frigate bracket.

Early aircraft-derived gas turbines made motor torpedo boats extremely fast at severe fuel cost, while windmill-driven paddle craft worked as models but did not scale efficiently.

A steady naval construction baseline and government pressure to modernize yards could have preserved skills and improved merchant competitiveness.

They mattered most when ships relied on visual navigation aids. Other navigation systems reduce their effect, although shore lights can still provide useful confirmation.

No. Lighthouses could be switched off completely, regardless of friendly shipping nearby.

Yes. The loss of lighthouse guidance increased the demands on lookouts and dead reckoning, with such groundings more common in the age of sail.

The preferred choice is the Scharnhorst class for its effectiveness in its assigned role. Type XXI arrived too late and was difficult to build, while Type VII developed older submarine designs.

They were essential because they created operational infrastructure from scratch, complementing British units that more often improved existing bases.

A River-class offshore patrol vessel is one example. Dreadnought could probably defeat many modern ships placed within her gun range, but weapons able to attack beyond line of sight change the comparison.

Dazzle patterns are worth reconsidering where visual identification matters, while distinctive paint can also serve a presence mission.

Two squadrons of twelve aircraft, with the remaining six allocated to training and maintenance flights.

Småland's guns and internal subdivision underpin a favorable assessment of her ability to keep fighting after damage.