Bruships 157: Books so good they've blown the budget on the #ScandiShip24 tour already!

They look capable, with a larger Type 26-based design and useful VLS capacity, though the missile fit trades some flexibility for point-defense value.

They could be useful, but they belong behind more urgent critical and essential requirements in the procurement queue.

The Royal Navy might still trade down to more 2,000-ton destroyers, while the U.S. answer depends on whether designers use the extra tonnage for stability or simply max out the new limit.

Anti-submarine mortars deserve another look for littoral threats, though the proposal remains open to disagreement.

No immediate revival is recommended. More P-8s and continued Type 31 and Type 32 production would take priority over another submarine line.

Potentially a substantial amount, but only if the systems are designed in from the start; retrofitting them would demand a very large refit.

A likely approach would combine mines, conventional submarines, and air strikes, with the required duration of closure shaping the plan.

The direct cost might be manageable, but old diesels impose space, power-to-weight, and duplicated-development penalties; a serious diesel Scharnhorst needs new engines and gearing.

Command might pass to Evan-Thomas, changing the rest of Jutland and the later choice of First Sea Lord.

The book discussion shows why museum finds and foreign-language sources can add new perspectives on the 1931-32 Sino-Japanese crisis and Swedish-Ottoman connections.

They could create 28-knot-plus capital ships and give the Royal Navy a faster, more cohesive heavy wing during the Battle of Jutland.

Vigilant is better in a somewhat higher-threat environment, while the Batch 2 River is better for long-range peacetime patrol and presence work.

He may have kept the King George V and Illustrious classes moving and protected HMS Unicorn even if other programs were paused.

Possibly by about half a round per minute, but only with a substantial redesign of the turret and its ammunition-handling systems.

An off-the-shelf Arctic patrol hull, preferably ice-strengthened, would be a sensible basis for the specialized ship.

Dogger Bank would be more dangerous for the Germans, and the larger ships would be much harder to give up after the war.

Excessive loading damaged the turbine internally; crews could rebuild much of it in place, but access for major components would probably require opening parts of the ship.

They would be faster, Tiger would likely follow, and their postwar retention case would become much stronger.

A Swedish essay collection links sea routes, naval archaeology, prize papers, flags, wrecks, national identity, and Baltic memory.

A Norwegian museum guide provides a compact reference to arms, ammunition, guns, and captured flags in the Armed Forces collection.

A Norwegian Navy Road walking guide maps a military transport route and supplies geographic context that larger histories may assume.

Some record must underlie the known details, so trace those references and search nearby dates, transferred files, and unexpected archival headings.

It could change history if it sank many capital ships, but the scenario runs into torpedo, range, training, AA, fleet-growth, and operating-space constraints.

The Navy would enter the Cold War with more adaptable large carriers, while some Essex-class ships would probably retire sooner.

The loss would be more traumatic and mysterious, while regulation might move faster toward more lifeboats and stronger hull-protection measures.

It depends on whether observers and escort carriers count; for a pilot commanding a fleet carrier, Caspar John is a likely answer, with qualifications.

Perhaps to roughly 420-425 mm, but only with important penalties in barrel strength, rifling, life, range, and accuracy.

Battenberg might remain in office while Fisher supplied powerful strategic and political support without taking over daily management.

The formation followed operating doctrine: it concentrated defensive fire while sheltering less capable ships.

Probably, but its greater size and handling burden would likely reduce the number of aircraft carried.

Britain would gain ships, refit capacity, readiness, and operational flexibility, producing stronger and more sustainable task groups in battles such as the hunt for Bismarck.

The Battlecruiser Fleet would gain major depth, and an early Canadian Tiger at Coronel could change the battle and remove the need for the historical Falklands response.

It would gain useful wartime cruisers, a possible basis for later treaty limits, and a stronger squadron for confronting Goeben and Breslau.

It was technically possible, but industrial displacement, treaty reactions, and Japan's need for heavy fighting power make the proposed small fast ships a poor simple substitute.

The United States would take greater interest in battleship speed, while one or two completed Canadian ships could strengthen Jellicoe's fast wing at Jutland.

The weight might be slightly lighter, but the more important issue is different performance because German metallurgy and industrial memory had been weakened by the interwar construction gap.

Britain would rely more heavily on Canadian supplies and logistics, but the loss would be smaller than later Lend-Lease totals imply.

Japanese shell quality control for Italy, Italian aerial torpedoes for Germany, and German synthetic-fuel or radar technology for Japan.

He was capable enough to do so, but the Navy already had an effective rotation with Spruance and Halsey.

A group of Norwegian museum books adds an admiral's postwar career, local war monuments, maps, photographs, and Norwegian perspectives on Narvik.

Early U-boats would be more dangerous, but low numbers would give the Allies time to develop a counter before mass deployment.

No responsible speed estimate is possible without a full redesign study because the proposed conversion changes the hull, structure, shafting, machinery, and power-to-weight ratio.

Not immediately; too few submarines were available, and British intelligence and ASW development would likely produce countermeasures before the fleet grew.

Portland could fight, but an attack order was politically very unlikely because the United States was not ready to enter the war in 1939.

They would provide a dangerous early advantage, but limited German numbers and British intelligence and countermeasure development would erode it.

Four Counties should sink the raider, and the loss of Deutschland to Canadians could trigger an early retreat from politically sensitive ship names.

They used carrier turbines that were closer in scale to cruiser machinery than battleship machinery, rather than simply copying a cruiser plant.

Yes; an exposed armoured attack near the coast would give Allied battleships an opportunity to destroy large numbers of German tanks.

It would likely start with a contemporary early system and then receive the same kind of repeated upgrades that transformed British carrier fuel arrangements through the interwar years.

The Mk V was no longer considered worthwhile, but without the engine dispute a delayed-war Barracuda could have avoided major redesign and entered service closer to the original vision.

Two Swedish-language books supply photographs, drawings, and technical context for future studies of patrol boats and icebreakers.

Some naval problems would ease, but the Air Ministry was also trying to correct costly interwar bomber-first choices by investing urgently in fighters and radar.

Britain already preferred purpose-built carriers, but treaty tonnage made small Hermes-sized ships inefficient compared with larger carriers.

It would substantially improve warning and fighter direction by detecting low-level attacks beyond the shipboard radar horizon.

Italy would face an unfavorable and isolated war because Germany was not yet ready to intervene.

The conversion tested whether the arrangement could be built and what value it offered.

They would help to a degree, though disagreement over the results could prevent the lessons from being applied.

The Royal Navy would gain useful light carriers and probably fight for separate treaty tonnage categories for fleet and cruiser-sized carriers.

The final Swedish reference offers a broad illustrated overview of the country's naval forces and coastal-defence history around the twentieth century.

The ship is feasible, but operating much more than about 96 aircraft creates deck and organizational congestion that can erase the benefit of the larger air group.

It might launch one after modification, but effective use would require a major fire-control upgrade to provide the modern torpedo's information needs.

Yes; folding or reduced-span wings would be required to meet British carrier-aircraft stowage rules.

The spacing followed from the position of the turbines and gearing and from the need to balance the hull.

Britain might adopt it instead of the Wildcat and then have little reason to move through the Hellcat as an intermediate fighter.

Larger guns would be more dangerous locally, but fixed defenses still face an attacker who chooses the landing site and can concentrate greater force there.

A joint Air Force-Navy F-15 fleet might have stayed in naval service and displaced the requirement that led to the F/A-18.