Bruships 149: Naval History Questions Answered, Boxes Packed & June Patreon Vote Ends

More than a smaller battleship, but not without limit: date, crew size, usable superstructure space, and firing arcs still govern the battery.

Their main influence ran through the research inherited by Nelson and Rodney, while Japan expected its own designs to provoke counterbuilding rather than overturn the naval balance by themselves.

It was essential; without that space she could not perform both roles at once.

Possible, but not automatic: extra weight might be better spent on armour and a balanced F3-like cruiser layout than on triple turrets.

Because people often repeat remembered narratives without checking the chronology and technical details against sources.

Because planning followed inflated official claims produced by a system in which subordinates had strong incentives to hide missed targets.

Ajax combined luck with six-inch firepower, radar, and superior night-fighting range, but she took meaningful damage and casualties.

Immediate responsibility is easier to see, but the crisis also reflected lost food regions, scarce merchant shipping, and infrastructure decisions made decades earlier.

Removing the exhaust stacks would weaken the case for twin islands and could move a consolidated island into the forward-lift position.

It would add infrastructure for moving goods and could reduce some sea movement, especially if African and imperial rail links carried cargo closer to key theaters.

Common navy abbreviations are useful historical shorthand, but their origins and official status need careful handling.

Yes; much of it was built, and completion after the First World War was plausible before economics and decolonization changed the project.

The US Navy would likely gain powerful, long-lived nuclear cruisers with upgrade room and lasting presence value, potentially encouraging allies to consider equivalents.

It would be a formidable aircraft and a direct competitor to the F-35, with allies pressing the United States to sell it.

The Royal Navy would gain four capable carriers likely to serve into the 1980s, with a more sustainable force even if none matched the largest US ships.

The opening can be designed for easier access, but refueling still requires opening the ship's structure to reach the reactor.

It could normalize eighteen-inch construction, replace older battle fleets before the Second World War, and produce treaty navies built around much larger fast battleships.

About 36 P.1154s plus 18 helicopters in routine service, with roughly 72 total aircraft at maximum load.

Likely a revived R-name group such as Royal Sovereign, Renown, Repulse, and Resolution or Revenge.

Furious is the standout experimental carrier; Langley would likely carry a modest wartime air group rather than match purpose-built fleet carriers.

More likely she stood alone because Battenberg stopped the sister ship and favored the fast-battleship path.

A research-method aside explains why official records, biography, and personal writing answer different historical questions.

Only while it suited the aircraft in service; later aircraft requirements would drive any change in angle.

Without another shaft, an engine and boiler refit might raise practical standard speed to about 26 knots, but not remove the ships' underlying machinery limits.

Yes; a separate category near 15,000 tons could keep Japan in the treaty while accommodating small carriers already held by Britain and the United States.

Only with an active industrial base; retained practice and current process knowledge matter as much as newer metallurgy.

National narratives emphasize the famous American ships while often leaving out earlier foreign designs that weaken the claim of uniqueness.

They would control more First World War engagements and could modernize into 28-knot ships useful in fast Second World War operations.

Perhaps 33-36 knots, but only with a four-shaft layout and a hull form able to use the power safely.

Shared fire control and Repulse's experienced crew would probably turn the chase into a damaging British victory, though Repulse would remain vulnerable.

Yes; British thinking emphasized reliable early hits at practicable ranges, while US and Japanese doctrine placed more value on extreme Pacific engagement distances.

Not really: naval protection faces salt water, large weapon effects, and compartment survival problems that make bulkheads and splinter protection central.

The RAF likely leaves it to the Navy, while the Fleet Air Arm gains a faster Fulmar replacement and might use carriers to ferry aircraft from Canada.

No; Soviet logistics were exhausted at Berlin, while strong Allied formations and potential local rearmament remained in Europe.

It did not have suitable ships it was willing to expend; with disposable hulls available, it probably would have attempted the raids.

An enlarged Surrey or Norfolk path could reach about 30,000 tons, but the game's combat statistics are not a historical performance model.

Probably; radar and rapid long-range fire would disable command and fire-control systems even when belt penetration was uncertain.

About early 1943 on a peacetime schedule, or potentially spring 1942 with sustained wartime construction effort.

About 12,000 tons, because negotiators would round around the displacement of the existing reference cruiser.

To an extent; it adds another protected surface, so judging the ship only by its vertical belt is incomplete.

Possibly, but a defensive strategy would hand operational initiative to the Allies and leave Germany in a poor position.

European amphibious campaigns would be delayed, but North Africa might change less than expected and Japan could face invasion before atomic weapons were ready.

Because light cruisers were procured for numbers and worldwide trade-protection tasks, not to consume the maximum allowed tonnage.

The third Alsace design, because its 32-knot speed and twelve fifteen-inch guns combine mobility with a 50 percent larger battery than Bismarck's.

Harvey Hayes's Electric Eel demonstrated the basic two-cable hydrophone idea, but the work was dropped after 1918 and not revived seriously until the 1960s.

The harder problem was wartime resources; accurate knowledge of Yamato's eighteen-inch guns could have justified completing several Lions despite that cost.

Officially around 1937, with shipboard installation and experimental work already beginning in 1936.

Yes; she was not a fast battleship, but in the pre-missile gap her gun power could still destroy lighter surface forces.

Roughly nine to ten years with four ships ordered annually, or twelve to fourteen years under a more measured program.

It would provide a capable carrier interceptor, improve the case for smaller carriers, and strengthen Britain in the military-aircraft market.

Alsace has a paper firepower edge, but armor, turret reliability, and operational support probably favor the Lions.

Probably a roughly 30-knot enlarged Lion with four triple sixteen-inch turrets.

No; continued battleship construction would bring matching investment in yards and industry, allowing a larger class if policy and funding demanded it.

No; mechanization work dated to the 1880s, and the long-running efficient-ship effort predated G3 by decades.

Not very well; the German First World War examples show that purpose-built cargo submarines still make poor transports.

Because negotiators believed sweeping disarmament would preserve peace, although it could also create fear and opportunity for aggressors.

It would change more than the turret: skilled maintainers, better crew spaces, and a new balance between gun calibres would all follow.

Possibly, but acceptance would depend on US security concerns and French and Italian resistance to their reduced shares.

They make worn liners cheaper and easier to replace without removing the complete gun, at the cost of a less rigid fit.

About 96 inches by a simple length ratio, although the result is only a scale analogy.

Britain can concentrate its fleet in northern waters, France gains southern support, and Germany faces pressure through Austria without an Axis Mediterranean threat.

Yes for the First World War, but probably not from the Second World War onward.

Britain would likely modernize a larger fast fleet more aggressively, although the best design would retain the R class's armor distribution.

After months of integration, Germany could send them out in hunter groups, but their appearance would provoke a massive British construction, air, submarine, carrier, and fleet response.

The shorter gun traded some range for longer liner life and easier support far from Britain's heavy industrial base.

Probably for another navy, but Russia has few realistic ways to obtain a comparable prestige and combat asset quickly.

They would try, but reliably duplicating and deploying a battleship-scale system would take time and sharply raise naval costs.

Three armed Canadians boarded a German U-boat in extraordinary circumstances and captured its crew before anyone organized resistance.

Yes, but parallel British developments diluted effort; the 4.5-inch between-decks mount matured before a suitable upper-deck turret.

Britain wins an early engine-horsepower advantage, with major effects on bombers, fighters, and possible US interest.

It would likely become a carrier battle followed by a British surface pursuit, with the delay allowing Britain to assemble overwhelming reinforcements.

Not necessarily; frigates emerged from corvette escort requirements and lower construction standards, not from destroyer size alone.

Possibly: US combat requirements and industrial capacity favor growth, while Japanese numerical needs and limited infrastructure constrain it.

Early reliable vehicles could affect battles and start an armour race, but weight and terrain would force them toward practical tank designs.

The Soviet Union could emerge diplomatically isolated and face a stronger coalition in China, though the outcome depends on wartime alliances and postwar leadership.

Probably not in large numbers; a Mach 3 P.1121 could specialize as an interceptor, but the programs overlap enough that one would likely displace the other.

A properly designed multi-shaft version might reach about 27.5 to 28 knots, but only with the hull form and power plant developed together.

Britain would combine more battleships and carriers into one overwhelming hunting force, using air reconnaissance and night strikes to pin the German ships before a surface action.

A breakaway parachute is more practical: it controls water entry without the dangerous drag of a tension wire behind a fast aircraft.

In a fleet of 70,000- to 80,000-ton battleships, it may be the economical size for heavy cruiser roles.

They would become different ships for different missions, and their larger aircraft or air groups would push later carriers toward larger lifts, catapults, and landing systems.

A methodological aside shows how shipbuilding responses and treaty changes compound uncertainty in long alternate histories.

Dry docks ease launching loads but impose harder dimensional and access limits; slipways offer more flexible side access and are usually easier to extend.

There is no convincing documentary evidence, and the proposal does not align well with American strategic interests.

Yes, although the larger ship would probably carry more defensive firepower as well.

No; its dimensions reflected engineering and financial limits, even though they later constrained ship design.

Its similar machinery layout was refined to deliver about 20,000 more horsepower and two additional knots.

Partly: Canada could build many destroyers and later cruisers after British-supported yard development, while the United States would see the force mainly as defensive and politically useful for its own naval budgets.

Because it combines canals with navigable channels instead of forming one continuous canal, and the distinct name helped present the system as something new.

Neither alone explains the loss; vulnerable hit locations, repeated attack, isolation, and failed communication over fighter cover were decisive.

Ark Royal's loss illustrates why carrier counterflooding doctrine must account for a carrier's distinct stability limits.

Enough steady work to stop plants and skills disappearing; maintaining that core could cut ship delays and enable rapid wartime expansion.

Some would, but a treatyless fleet would probably keep a mixed hierarchy of very large, light, and scout cruisers rather than make every cruiser enormous.

To eliminate the 7.5-inch logistics chain while fitting perhaps eight or ten standardized six-inch guns.

The carrier could be lost, and an early Japanese withdrawal in response might prevent the historical carrier battle from unfolding at all.

No; Narvik's strategic value came chiefly from denying Swedish high-grade ore to Germany, not from British dependence on it.

Very little; the Americans answered with ships for their own scouting doctrine rather than treating the County class as an immediate threat.

Extensively in design, training, weapons, and personnel exchange, with Canada integrated into the wider Royal Navy system much like Australia.

No; battleship-grade protection and subdivision would make her the first generation of fast battleship.

It might not; the decision would turn on strategic threats, replacement weapons, and the gap between wartime and peacetime crew strength.

They should move to a tertiary role behind lasers, missiles, and larger guns, ideally combined in an automated layered mount.