Bru Ships Episode 9: Super Power Contest (as in the nations) Themed Books to Review & a general Q/A

Dmitri Volkogonov's access to Soviet archives makes his Stalin biography unusually valuable, but its late-Soviet origins still require careful reading.

A book-led look at Stalin's intended blue-water fleet, including the immense Project 24 battleship and a proposed Soviet battlecarrier.

Stalin wanted global influence and naval diplomacy; a fleet can maintain presence and reach in ways land forces and land-based aircraft cannot.

No. The captured carrier was too incomplete and damaged to become a practical Soviet operational asset.

Only with a compelling strategic need, major reprioritisation, and likely greater imperial support for the Royal Navy.

Two contrasting books frame naval diplomacy as both a hopeful account of incidents at sea and a harder-edged account of coercive presence.

The Sverdlov class is read as a Soviet post-war development of the long-range cruiser-raider role associated with Germany's Panzerschiffe.

They received sea time and staff training, and should not be dismissed through an exaggerated post-war image of German superiority.

Rear-Admiral J. R. Hill's Air Defense at Sea is recommended as a serious guide to the practical realities behind Cold War naval air defence.

Their missiles were much larger, so planners assumed naval weapons were better and did not treat the fighter-combat warning as directly applicable.

A multi-author study of Soviet naval diplomacy is recommended for its detailed account of Soviet activity and maritime signalling.

They were ambitious enlarged Bismarcks, but a ship that large was poorly matched to a surface-raider role and difficult for Germany to employ in a task force.

Use Warships International Fleet Review, Ian Ballantyne's books, and contrasting analysis from The Thin Pinstriped Line and Save the Royal Navy.

Yes in wartime; peaceful expansion might have created the capacity, but Germany could not realistically scale yards and armour production after war began.

Norman Polmar's guide documents Soviet ships, aircraft, marines, and command structures while also revealing how Western analysts understood the fleet.

Probably limited against warships, but more useful for shore bombardment, especially in a theatre such as Norway.

Names should follow the ship's role, and force planners must balance hull numbers against the duplicated equipment and reduced capability of very small vessels.

Warships after Washington is the leading recommendation, but read it alongside the argument that Britain helped write treaty terms to its own advantage.

India is doing well, but its navy must balance a vast maritime frontier and Indian Ocean responsibilities against very large land-security pressures.

The possible Soviet naval threat was genuinely large, but the force that could be realised and employed was somewhat less formidable than its maximum potential suggested.

Yes, but NATO would still need to find Soviet forces already deployed from forward bases rather than merely seal Soviet waters.

The shells would likely inflict devastating kinetic damage, potentially passing through and shredding the ship rather than simply exploding inside it.

A recommended collection restores the Pacific, Indian Ocean, Africa, and South America to a Cold War story too often narrowed to Europe.

A 15-inch triple-turret design would have simplified logistics and development; late in the war, more large destroyers could have offered greater utility than one more battleship.

It makes sense as a global-presence ship, but the refit needs to be comprehensive and timely if the cruiser is to retain meaningful operational life.

It built global political influence and created the possibility that Western states would have to face Soviet maritime pressure in several theatres at once.

It was not the direct cause; Britain paused major surface construction because new carriers seemed too slow to arrive and escorts were urgently needed.

Not automatically. It would chiefly create more naval battles across more theatres rather than dictate one new carrier design.

Britain's trade-dependent economy gives the Royal Navy a direct interest in preserving a stable maritime status quo.

They hoped common calibre and tonnage limits would preserve the battleship, with Britain expecting its designers to gain an advantage within equal rules.

France retains aviation-capable LHDs alongside its carrier, whereas Russia's lone Kuznetsov has no partner and must absorb every refit problem alone.

Alaska is favoured because its radar-directed gunnery could land the first damaging salvos, though Scharnhorst's armour could matter in a longer engagement.

They would likely produce more Soviet task-force operations around the world, but a British carrier transfer was politically very unlikely.

Trade an additional King George V for more fleet carriers, quicker cruiser anti-aircraft refits, and continued Town-class production.

Potentially, but by the time the approach was efficient enough, better competing systems were available.

It might launch the operation, but realistic success would require broader Five Eyes support and could trigger major or nuclear escalation with China.

Often yes: an early heavy hit can disable exposed fire-control equipment and make it much harder for the opponent to recover accurate fire.

The Soviet Union lacked the facilities to maintain the battleship properly, while it did have the support needed to keep the cruiser in better condition.

About 25, with scope toward 30, rather than the roughly 19 discussed in the question.

A counterfactual carrier design keeps the armoured deck but uses deck-edge lifts to recover hangar volume and aircraft capacity.

Possibly: using established 15-inch triple turrets could have reduced development costs and helped bring Vanguard into service earlier.

Yes for British needs, but not because six-inch guns were inherently better; the useful calibre depends on the cruiser role a navy requires.

More could have been maintained if required, but demobilisation and the transition back to a volunteer force created a severe manpower and skills crunch.

No: Macau is too integrated with mainland China and too hard to defend, making any attempt a likely strategic and economic disaster.

United Nations operations in Korea drew on artillery stocks, ships, carriers, pilots, and experienced personnel left available by World War II.

In this 2020 discussion, stronger support for Taiwan is presented as desirable but politically difficult because nearby China can impose immediate diplomatic and strategic costs.

They can be politically valuable because local and parliamentary attachment makes named ships harder to cut.

It was mainly a green- to light-blue-water force, with China's major naval rise occurring after the Cold War.

A Five Eyes framework would be more plausible because its existing intelligence relationships could support combined command and control.

Treat early claims cautiously and avoid inter-service cuts; the services need a shared plan for the threats they all say must be met.

They could complement nuclear carriers in several theatres, but their lower price creates a political risk that they would replace rather than reinforce the larger ships.

Economic interdependence can raise the cost of conflict, but history does not support treating a state's largest trading partner as automatically safe from war.

There is no simple comprehensive recommendation; the unexecuted operation is unusually complex, though Australian studies and war-gaming work may help.

Britain and the United States likely had the greatest industrial potential, but practical design favoured balancing plate thickness, slope, weight, and ship performance.

Use artillery capable of plunging fire, though the weapons actually available at Westerplatte would decide whether that was feasible.

The US can fund specialised carrier and amphibious fleets, while Britain sought a smaller interoperable force whose flight decks could shift between strike and lift roles.

Much more joint development, political agreement, and shared command arrangements would be needed; existing task forces are not yet an integrated navy.

They could have paired with US carriers, allowing one to focus on defence and the other on strike, likely making the result more decisive.

Probably a River-class patrol vessel, although the estimate is tentative because canal condition and draught may impose tighter limits.

States and businesses do not share the same financial purpose, so government spending should be judged against national needs and repayment capacity rather than a personal credit-card analogy.

Polling should be read through its sponsor, purpose, and exact wording because mirrored questions can produce opposite-looking results from the same public.

Use both: protect the vital spaces with armour and divide the ship effectively so damage does not spread unchecked.

Possibly, especially with both layers angled, but the arrangement would require extensive design work to make practical.

India is the stronger choice once auxiliaries and reach are included, though a fight with China would depend heavily on location and support.

Battleships would likely last longer, while carriers still improve and the fleet shifts toward larger destroyers and cruisers through slower evolutionary change.

If the air groups survived, the United States could fast-track light and escort carriers to restore naval aviation more quickly.

In the 2020 market, the E-7 Wedgetail was the clearest off-the-shelf option, especially after British and Australian adoption.

Naming a Ford-class carrier for Doris Miller both honours an enlisted hero and gives the ship unusually strong political protection against cancellation.

It has useful ships but too few of them, because visible land threats give the army a much stronger claim on procurement funding.

English-language contracts and broadly legible legal systems can reduce transaction costs, helping firms expand across Anglophone markets before entering less familiar ones.

No clear gap justified it; a 9.2-inch weapon would mostly add logistics and maintenance complexity between two established capability tiers.

No. Sloped armour usually increases the effective path through the plate unless the shell arrives at a closely matching angle.

Brazil and Chile remain possibilities, while Singapore's wealth and technological base could let it exploit unmanned systems to extend naval influence.

Internal sloped protection and reinforced bulkheads can limit how far blast and damage travel after the outer structure is hit.

Yes: with investment, their docks, space, and accommodation could make them control and support ships for uncrewed surface vessels.

Submarines and land-based cruise missiles are the leading immediate threats, more than the heavily publicised ballistic missiles.

The main purpose is dispersal, keeping a first strike from destroying too much of Singapore's air power at its home bases.

It has riverine and littoral potential, but it risks being employed in situations for which it was not designed.

Yes: it suited a US Navy preparing for Pacific fleet warfare, where its destroyers were expected to support massed operations.

Start with B. B. Schofield's Convoys and Russian Convoy, both written by an admiral with relevant destroyer-command experience.

Capable amphibious ships are a stronger modern indicator than battleships because they turn sea power into supported action ashore.

Historical figures should be read in context and as complicated human beings, without using that understanding to declare harmful actions right.

Submarines plus adaptable corvette or sloop-sized ships, with minelaying and minesweeping capacity, best fit the Baltic problem.

Funding will become harder, but maintaining programmes is usually cheaper than cutting them and rebuilding capability later.

Use some stealth, but pair it with substantial electronic countermeasures rather than relying on low observability alone.

They would face a severe shock: just-in-time supply chains and present practices are poorly prepared for large-scale convoy control.

Yes. Ships can seal themselves and use washdown systems to clear chemical or biological contamination from exposed surfaces.

Not as a crewed helicopter carrier, though launching a compact rotary uncrewed aircraft could be worth exploring.

They try to find and disrupt the kill chain or destroy the launcher before it can fire.