Related time notes
- Who was to blame for Norway falling in 1940?1:03:29Fleischer's northern command offered a readiness templateChapter
- Who was to blame for Norway falling in 1940?1:04:35How partial mobilization could put formations at the landing pointsNotable Point
- Who was to blame for Norway falling in 1940?1:08:14Regional commanders would have tested Norway's paper readinessNotable Point
- Who was to blame for Norway falling in 1940?1:10:23Laake's political loyalty and the limits of army commandChapter
- Who was to blame for Norway falling in 1940?1:16:29Norway still had a final chance to mobilize in April 1940Chapter
- HMS Gorgon(HNoMS Nidaros) takes part in the First Battle of Narvik7:54Why Carl Gustav Fleischer was sidelinedNotable Point
- HMS Gorgon(HNoMS Nidaros) takes part in the First Battle of Narvik21:52The blocked withdrawal toward BjørnfjellNotable Point
- HMS Gorgon(HNoMS Nidaros) takes part in the First Battle of Narvik56:22Surviving warships change Sundlo's surrender calculusNotable Point
- Leadership of the Russo-Swedish Wars of the 18th Century(1700-1790)3:49:47How army museums present military experienceNotable Point
- Bruships 179: Future Projects & Naval History Questions...1:26:39How mobilisation communications could change the Narvik landingNotable Point
- WWII if Norway Wins & Operation Weserübung Fails...30:23Norwegian command turns naval victory into victory ashoreNotable Point
- Patreon 87: Norway Stands! WWII if Norway repels the German invasion...57:01How an Allied Norway drives the landing backChapter
- Patreon 87: Norway Stands! WWII if Norway repels the German invasion...1:01:08Why use a major general to coordinate Allied forces?Q&A
- 1940 Norway Campaign Part 5 of 5: What ifs, Ships & Patreon Votes3:43Denmark as a warning for Norwegian mobilizationChapter
- 1940 Norway Campaign Part 5 of 5: What ifs, Ships & Patreon Votes6:38Command resolve and Norway's half-hearted mobilizationNotable Point
- 1940 Norway Campaign Part 3 of 5: Namsos, De Wiart & Fleischer18:38The case for concentrating at Namsos and TrondheimNotable Point
- 1940 Norway Campaign Part 3 of 5: Namsos, De Wiart & Fleischer27:15Fleischer's aggressive use of terrain and troopsChapter
- 1940 Norway Campaign Part 2 of 5: Planning, Invasion & Narvik,23:53Denmark's fall and Norway's slow mobilisationChapter
- 1940 Norway Campaign Part 2 of 5: Planning, Invasion & Narvik,26:08How stopping the Narvik group might have reshaped NorwayNotable Point
- 1940 Norway Campaign Part 2 of 5: Planning, Invasion & Narvik,36:30Narvik's unready garrison and Fleischer's responseChapter
- 1940 Norway Campaign Part 1 of 5: Introduction18:23Cabinet turnover weakened Norwegian defence policyChapter
- 1940 Norway Campaign Part 1 of 5: Introduction28:09Why Birger Ljungberg was chosen over Otto RugeChapter
- 1940 Norway Campaign Part 1 of 5: Introduction31:27Mobilization politics and Norwegian readinessChapter
- 1940 Norway Campaign Part 1 of 5: Introduction35:01Why force totals conceal the importance of timingNotable Point
- 1940 Norway Campaign Part 1 of 5: Introduction37:20Operation Weserübung attacks several ports at onceChapter
- 1940 Norway Campaign Part 1 of 5: Introduction40:39General Laake and the cost of peacetime defence cutsNotable Point
- 1940 Norway Campaign Part 1 of 5: Introduction44:17Denmark's invasion and the Norway campaign timetableNotable Point