A Norwegian division had an assigned strength of 11,250 men in three regiments of 3,750. The approximate calculation here starts with about 19,000 troops mobilized and settles on about 41,500 with two further divisions activated; the force totals are recalled from memory and explicitly qualified. Divisions near Oslo and Trondheim would have forced German planners to consider whether they could put enough troops ashore quickly enough to overcome them. Full-strength divisions were not the only option. A divisional command could remain in place with one regiment, or one-third of each regiment, under arms. That would leave more troops available and staffs ready to direct them. Visible preparation to inflict losses could strengthen deterrence even when Norway could not expect to defeat a major power alone.
Notable Point · 1:04:35-1:08:14
How partial mobilization could put formations at the landing points
Additional divisions or smaller regimental call-ups could have given Norway organized forces and command staffs near likely German landing points.