Norway chose a partial mobilization that was not publicly announced, and reservists were not required to report until 11 April. Postwar accounts tried to place responsibility on passive Defence Minister Birger Ljungberg, but Prime Minister Johan Nygaardsvold and the cabinet had approved the order. Claims that cabinet members did not understand its terms deserve caution, especially because Labour remained in power when the reports were written. Ministers feared provoking either Britain or Germany and believed they still had time to prepare quietly. Otto Ruge's concept depended on an enemy appearing in one place, allowing Norway to concentrate and request help from the opposing belligerent. Simultaneous attacks on several ports removed both the time and geographic focus the plan required.
Chapter · 31:27-34:59
Mobilization politics and Norwegian readiness
Norway's cabinet chose a gradual, unannounced reserve mobilization that assumed time, one landing area, and the chance to seek aid from the invader's enemy.