Video

1940 Norway Campaign Part 3 of 5: Namsos, De Wiart & Fleischer

Study 1940 Norway Campaign Part 3 of 5: Namsos, De Wiart & Fleischer, a Dr. Alex Clarke video from 17 Nov 2020, with 15 time notes. Topics include Adrian Carton De Wiart, Amphibious Warfare, Carl Gustav Fleischer.

Date
Runtime47:02
Guide points15 time notes

Time notes

  1. 1:03
    Dombås and Harstad reveal the transport battle

    German paratroopers cut a southern railway at Dombås while British troops landing at Harstad struggled to move their supplies inland.

    Chapter
  2. 2:44
    A divided command at the Norwegian landings

    The Namsos and Harstad landings expose how an unclear British command arrangement made an already difficult amphibious operation harder to direct.

    Chapter
  3. 6:02
    Why speed mattered more than a delayed landing force

    Norway gave Germany time to reinforce by sea and dig in, while the Allies lacked a ready, joined-up landing force.

    Notable Point
  4. 8:32
    Warspite and the missed chance to land at Narvik

    After the Second Battle of Narvik, Admiral Whitworth regretted not putting sailors ashore quickly enough to exploit the naval victory.

    Notable Point
  5. 9:54
    HMS Cossack and Narvik's unofficial trophies

    Scattered accounts report German flags, machine guns, and other objects brought home from Narvik even though official records say little about them.

    Notable Point
  6. 10:34
    Destroyers as Namsos headquarters, artillery, and defence

    At Namsos, Mauriceforce relied on destroyers for command support, firepower, supplies, and air defence when its land organisation was thin.

    Chapter
  7. 13:11
    Mauriceforce improvised a staff beneath a confused high command

    Carton de Wiart assembled a headquarters from whoever was available while distant seniority and inter-service rivalry complicated decisions above him.

    Notable Point
  8. 18:38
    The case for concentrating at Namsos and Trondheim

    An Allied main effort at Namsos could have supported a drive on Trondheim while Fleischer dealt with Narvik.

    Notable Point
  9. 23:34
    Evacuating Namsos under air attack and gunfire

    The Royal Navy removed Mauriceforce from Namsos, while destroyers supplied the artillery and perimeter fire the force otherwise lacked.

    Chapter
  10. 24:32
    Why Allied numbers did not produce operational advantage

    Allied and Norwegian troop totals exceeded Germany's initial invasion force, yet command and supply failures let the smaller force keep the initiative.

    Notable Point
  11. 27:15
    Fleischer's aggressive use of terrain and troops

    Major General Carl Gustav Fleischer kept his troops together and used Norwegian terrain to maintain pressure on the invader.

    Chapter
  12. 31:46
    Northern Norway as a base for maritime operations

    A more active Norwegian war effort might have used northern bases to support convoy protection and anti-submarine operations.

    Notable Point
  13. 36:06
    Narvik retaken, then Norway abandoned

    Fleischer's forces retook Narvik, but air attack and the crisis in France made the wider Norwegian campaign unsustainable.

    Chapter
  14. 39:00
    Norway's long-term defence problem before 1940

    The campaign's surprises grew from long-running weaknesses in Norwegian readiness, coastal defence, and senior leadership rather than one decision in April 1940.

    Notable Point
  15. 43:37
    A three-port strategy for defending Norway

    The closing assessment proposes supporting Narvik while concentrating Allied power through Namsos and Trondheim, then moving on Oslo.

    Chapter