Video
1940 Norway Campaign Part 3 of 5: Namsos, De Wiart & Fleischer
Study 1940 Norway Campaign Part 3 of 5: Namsos, De Wiart & Fleischer, a Dr. Alex Clarke video from 17 Nov 2020, with 15 time notes. Topics include Adrian Carton De Wiart, Amphibious Warfare, Carl Gustav Fleischer.
Time notes
- 1:03Dombås and Harstad reveal the transport battleChapter
German paratroopers cut a southern railway at Dombås while British troops landing at Harstad struggled to move their supplies inland.
- 2:44A divided command at the Norwegian landingsChapter
The Namsos and Harstad landings expose how an unclear British command arrangement made an already difficult amphibious operation harder to direct.
- 6:02Why speed mattered more than a delayed landing forceNotable Point
Norway gave Germany time to reinforce by sea and dig in, while the Allies lacked a ready, joined-up landing force.
- 8:32Warspite and the missed chance to land at NarvikNotable Point
After the Second Battle of Narvik, Admiral Whitworth regretted not putting sailors ashore quickly enough to exploit the naval victory.
- 9:54HMS Cossack and Narvik's unofficial trophiesNotable Point
Scattered accounts report German flags, machine guns, and other objects brought home from Narvik even though official records say little about them.
- 10:34Destroyers as Namsos headquarters, artillery, and defenceChapter
At Namsos, Mauriceforce relied on destroyers for command support, firepower, supplies, and air defence when its land organisation was thin.
- 13:11Mauriceforce improvised a staff beneath a confused high commandNotable Point
Carton de Wiart assembled a headquarters from whoever was available while distant seniority and inter-service rivalry complicated decisions above him.
- 18:38The case for concentrating at Namsos and TrondheimNotable Point
An Allied main effort at Namsos could have supported a drive on Trondheim while Fleischer dealt with Narvik.
- 23:34Evacuating Namsos under air attack and gunfireChapter
The Royal Navy removed Mauriceforce from Namsos, while destroyers supplied the artillery and perimeter fire the force otherwise lacked.
- 24:32Why Allied numbers did not produce operational advantageNotable Point
Allied and Norwegian troop totals exceeded Germany's initial invasion force, yet command and supply failures let the smaller force keep the initiative.
- 27:15Fleischer's aggressive use of terrain and troopsChapter
Major General Carl Gustav Fleischer kept his troops together and used Norwegian terrain to maintain pressure on the invader.
- 31:46Northern Norway as a base for maritime operationsNotable Point
A more active Norwegian war effort might have used northern bases to support convoy protection and anti-submarine operations.
- 36:06Narvik retaken, then Norway abandonedChapter
Fleischer's forces retook Narvik, but air attack and the crisis in France made the wider Norwegian campaign unsustainable.
- 39:00Norway's long-term defence problem before 1940Notable Point
The campaign's surprises grew from long-running weaknesses in Norwegian readiness, coastal defence, and senior leadership rather than one decision in April 1940.
- 43:37A three-port strategy for defending NorwayChapter
The closing assessment proposes supporting Narvik while concentrating Allied power through Namsos and Trondheim, then moving on Oslo.