Questions of the Equitable Washington Treaty Answered: A UAD Infused Discussion (Long Patrol)

This opening counterfactual asks how G3 conversions could have given the Royal Navy large strike carriers before Ark Royal.

The first design pass tests whether extra beam and draught plus 25 knots can support an exceptionally heavy 14-inch battery.

The simulation stacks machinery and protection choices until displacement forces compromises in range, subdivision, and defensive armament.

A second counterfactual design gives the German ship period-inspired crew, fuel, and fire-control assumptions before comparing it with the British vessel.

A counterfactual 1914 design uses four triple 14-inch turrets to show when an all-forward battery can be an efficient choice.

Moving the funnel aft frees displacement and improves longitudinal balance, allowing protection to be redistributed before the battle begins.

The simulated battle shows torpedo damage and fire overwhelming the simple expectation that twelve heavy guns should beat ten.

Their battlecruiser-conversion compromises created weight problems, while the heavy guns made sense for fast reconnaissance carriers expected to operate with or ahead of the fleet.

The discussion shifts from nominal carrier capacity to sustained air operations, with HMS Eagle as the revealing case.

Not necessarily. Because carrier utility was still uncertain, naval leaders might have spent the combined allowance on battleships instead.

Because submarine restrictions enter the discussion with the later London treaties, not this Washington carrier proposal.

Treaty bargaining is framed by Britain's near-term yards, America's long-run capacity, Japan's resource limits, and the willingness of legislatures to pay.

The treaty debate links naval requirements to coastlines, overseas possessions, army priorities, and each state's idea of where its security began.

The treaty debate is tied to American concern about the Anglo-Japanese Alliance and warnings that isolating Japan could deepen future hostility.

Treaty support is explained as a domestic budget choice that let British politicians reduce defence spending while American mobilization remained politically uncertain.

Carrier value includes protecting oceanic trade and extending reconnaissance alongside battle-fleet operations.

The response rejects a one-sided reading. Total carrier-tonnage ceilings and experimental-ship rules constrained every signatory, while the claim about American pressure remains unresolved.

The claim that regional navies did not need carriers is tested against Mediterranean warfare, French overseas commitments, and competitive pressure from other fleets.

A comparison with heavy-bomber units shows why a carrier air group cannot be shifted between theatres without a formidable support system.

Cost and obsolescence matter, but the deeper restraint is reciprocal security: a navy that keeps extra ships invites competitors to do the same and can undermine the ratios it relies on.

The comparative counterfactual asks whether longer Lexington hulls or less-complete G3s gave the better carrier-conversion opportunity.

Yes. Dedicated drone carriers are likely to appear soon, alongside motherships that deploy and support uncrewed systems.

The proposal receives amused approval, but the response does not assess its force numbers or likely effects in detail.

A simulated battle supplies the closing lesson: before radar and mature rangefinding, torpedoes remained tactically relevant to dreadnoughts.

Convert all seven Admiral and G3 hulls into carriers before the treaty, so they could enter service and be treated as experimental ships.