Patreon 67: RN use of water Based Armour, and why it annoyed Admiral King so much?

Admiral King's complaint becomes a dispute over information sharing: Britain followed the treaty rules but withheld knowledge that could have changed how other powers understood displacement and protection.

Only if the system had matured in time for Hood's design and construction. The technology was still developing and may instead have been relevant to later Admiral-class ships.

The exact weight depended on tube thickness and packing density but ran to hundreds of tons, with the tubes absorbing explosive energy by deforming like a car's crumple zone.

The case against battlecruiser obsolescence connects Britain's postwar capital-ship choices to worldwide commitments, likely rivals, and an industrial preference for technological competition.

Hood's size, speed, armament, and public image made the ship a traveling demonstration of British power whose purpose extended beyond winning a fleet engagement.

It would certainly have continued building battlecruisers for a time, with Renown, the Admiral class, and G3 forming three successive fast-capital-ship classes.

Stephen Piggott's career at John Brown illustrates how people, turbine technology, and informal industrial knowledge crossed the Atlantic around Hood's construction.

Hood and G3-style display cruises fit a longer British practice of sending a powerful but visibly non-premier warship abroad so observers would infer the strength held in reserve.

Building very large battlecruisers was only the first step; using them globally required graving docks, forward bases, and a deliberate distribution between the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Singapore.

The unconventional G3 battlecruisers and N3 battleships were intended to force rival navies to question their own designs, estimates, and building programs.

The treaty cancelled the oversized G3 and N3 programs, while a total building holiday also froze design experience and encouraged later powers to stretch old ships and treaty definitions.

The G3's higher speed demanded an extra machinery group, while both designs used subdivision to limit the effect of damage.

The historical Yamato would have been only an entry-level response; Japan would probably have pursued something larger, especially if a later treaty normalized roughly 45,000-ton ships and 18-inch guns.

Japanese leaders might have attempted it politically, but the cost could have broken the Japanese economy.

An unusually experienced British team explored F2 and F3 as 35,000-ton fast capital ships, establishing the all-forward arrangement and testing what could be retained from G3 and N3 thinking.

Probably not: prestige and gun-size politics would still encourage an attempted response, while faster British treaty designs could have made early German surface losses more likely.

To an extent: it was designed to resist gas by contemporary standards, and the broad idea of pressure-protected warship spaces was not new.

More than likely; adopting the new weapon would have created a strong operational and logistical case for extending it to older 15-inch ships and later battleship designs.

A new 15-inch/50 offered logistical and ballistic advantages, but 16-inch guns better preserved the intended contrast between fast ships shown abroad and a visibly heavier battle fleet held at home.

The Nelson class's all-forward armament reduced the armoured length, separated magazines from the hottest machinery spaces, and accepted lower speed because other ships covered the fast role.

Not completely; speed and range demand hull volume and machinery, so the cruiser role historically tended to produce a larger ship rather than a battleship with every advantage added.

Designers can add buffers and subdivision, while turbo-electric drive can separate functions, but survivability still depends on redundant generation and power distribution that remains usable after damage.

Compressing Nelson's main battery and citadel saved treaty weight, but the chosen superfiring arrangement crowded the bridge and pushed the secondary battery aft.

Probably not, because the proposed 15-inch/50 would have been too close to a 16-inch weapon in practical power for other treaty powers to treat it as a meaningful concession.

A specification tour shows how Nelson combined nine 16-inch guns, concentrated armour, and a compact 23-knot machinery plant while remaining below the treaty limit.

Nelson and Rodney used layered air and buoyancy spaces that could be flooded in wartime, with a full-scale trial indicating protection against a thousand-pound underwater charge.

Designers compared machinery layouts, shafts, revolutions, materials, and even equipment stored ashore in an effort to hold Nelson's propulsion plant near two thousand tons.

The deck covers a much larger area and its weight sits high in the hull, so each added inch creates a greater displacement and stability penalty than the same local increase along the belt.

Nelson and Rodney could not chase every faster opponent, but their guns and concentrated protection made them valuable finishers against a slowed German capital ship and dangerous opponents in the Mediterranean.

They used compact machinery, low speed, and an all-or-nothing layout to concentrate an unusually large share of displacement into thick protection around a short vital core.

Admiral King learned of the British system after American wartime ship designs were largely fixed, leaving little opportunity to copy a protection scheme demonstrated against heavy torpedo charges.

Britain's treaty-era innovations drew on continuous battleship construction, experienced design teams, operational knowledge, and years of underwater-protection testing.

Directors need a high, unobstructed view, which leaves them exposed above the main armour; designers can protect the transmitting paths and plotting spaces below, but not turn the upper director into a fully armoured citadel.

It was on the heavy side of competitive and unusually concentrated, whereas other ships tended to distribute a similar armour weight over more of the hull.

Nelson's large enclosed bridge gave commanders protected working space in northern waters and enough accommodation for a substantial admiral's staff.

It becomes a problem when the commander makes a decision because of ego rather than evidence, which is different from ego merely influencing an otherwise evidence-based choice.

Speed determines which operational roles a capital ship can perform: roughly 32 knots supports independent pursuit, 28 knots can suit a carrier group, and about 23 knots confines a ship more closely to the battle line.

Probably yes; adequate oilers would make the ships deployable, add operational options, and provide heavily armed, well-protected units near the carrier force.

At less than roughly 8,000 yards in World War II conditions, a battleship is not going to dodge correctly aimed heavy shells before impact.

Nelson served as a flagship with the Eastern Fleet in the Indian Ocean, while Rodney remained nearer home as insurance against Tirpitz or another German sortie.

The clear benefit would be greater range, but fuel would not necessarily absorb an explosion as effectively as water and a hit could contaminate the fuel system with seawater.

The answer points chiefly to Admiral Chatfield's preference for 14-inch guns and to design conclusions drawn from contemporary gun testing, rather than describing the Nelson weapon as simply unusable.