Patreon 45: Comparing Sisters(Not Kardashians) - HMS Renown & Repulse / HMS Nelson & Rodney

A two-ship class makes design choices and operational differences easier to see than a large, evolving class.

It is debatable: Blackbeard is a strong candidate, but the answer depends on how Ottoman-connected fleets are classified.

Early ships absorb facilities and development costs, while a sustained production run can make later hulls cheaper.

More could have been built during the original programme, but later yard commitments made a restart impractical even though extra ships would have been useful.

A two-ship class can test a design, but maintenance or damage quickly leaves only one hull available.

Because they are a modified continuation within the larger Town-class cruiser programme, not an independent pair.

Yes, but three ski-ramp-equipped LHDs would provide a more resilient and useful force if capacity and funding allowed.

It may not be absolutely illegal, but peacetime overseas construction would be politically unacceptable and contrary to the domestic industrial purpose of warship procurement.

Dreadnought was a one-ship demonstration because the Royal Navy had already tested its component ideas in earlier designs.

Removing a turret, lengthening the hull, and redistributing protection turned the R-class basis into the Renown design.

The cancelled third R-class hull becomes a case study in wartime dockyard policy and the cost of stopping useful capital-ship construction too early.

Probably HMS Anson, with Howe, Collingwood, or St Vincent as less likely admiral-name alternatives.

Yes. Rowing, football, cricket, and other contests could produce intense rivalries between otherwise similar ships.

British volume and yard capacity probably reduced costs substantially, but a precise fifty-percent advantage is not established.

George VI chose to honour his father when the later class was built, after the royal name had been held back from the two treaty battleships.

Probably: surviving in reserve to around 1960, alongside Vanguard, could have made Renown a compelling preservation candidate.

Renown served with the Grand Fleet, then became a fast and prestigious platform for post-war royal tours.

Internal framing and armour support matter when deciding whether a fast capital ship is a battlecruiser or a fast battleship.

Because they exposed a valuable capital ship to extreme danger, even though its heavy guns could cause enormous damage once in range.

A new belt, raised protection, deck reinforcement, bulges, and anti-aircraft guns made Renown a more resilient battlecruiser.

They were intended to collapse under blast pressure, absorbing and spreading the torpedo's energy before it reached the magazine bulkheads.

Sending a royal party in a fast battlecruiser displayed prestige while quietly demonstrating Britain's ability to reach and threaten maritime trade.

Renown and Repulse could exceed nominal speeds on good trials, but designers had to guarantee useful performance when machinery and conditions were imperfect.

The 1935 collision led the Admiralty to look beyond the ship captain and examine the squadron commander's ambiguous manoeuvring signals.

New machinery, fire control, dual-purpose guns, armour, and aircraft facilities transformed Renown before the Second World War.

By the 1930s, fast battlecruisers and carriers increasingly formed mutually useful task-group pairings.

The deleted turret freed magazine, protection, and machinery space; restoring it while keeping the speed would have required a substantially larger Hood-like ship.

About eighteen months, and a second ship with Renown's capabilities would have been extremely useful, but taking Repulse out of service competed with urgent fleet requirements.

They were dual-purpose: designed to engage aircraft while also defending against destroyers, torpedo boats, and other small surface attackers.

Hood fused both ideas, but her design lineage was more an evolution of Renown with Queen Elizabeth armament and protection ambitions.

Repulse received armour improvements and imperial duties, but never gained Renown's final comprehensive reconstruction.

Operational demand during the Abyssinian Crisis and Spanish Civil War helped close the long dockyard window needed to rebuild Repulse like Renown.

Before Force Z, Repulse repeatedly escorted fast convoys and searched for German surface raiders across the Atlantic and Norwegian theatres.

Repulse's loss is considered through the absence of carrier air cover and her remarkable attempts to evade attack.

Renown's reconstruction helped keep her useful across Force H, convoy, Mediterranean, Atlantic, and Eastern Fleet operations.

The Revenge-class basis used newer framing and protection ideas, while the conversion produced a longer, faster three-turret ship rather than an enlarged Tiger.

Her guns would matter, but the larger change might be a senior British admiral and staff reshaping ABDA command and operations.

Treaty tonnage and replacement rules left Britain with two new 16-inch battleships when it wanted a larger class.

No. More efficient high-pressure machinery eventually made it possible to combine battlecruiser speed with battleship protection in the fast battleship.

They could not be ignored, but the German ships were shaped more immediately by French and Russian opponents; Bismarck and Tirpitz were the clearer one-for-one British challengers.

Replacement age, accidental loss, and defensive-reconstruction clauses shaped what treaty navies could build or modernize.

Treaty standard displacement counted a fully equipped ship and its stores while excluding fuel and reserve boiler feed water.

The unusual all-forward layout concentrated magazines and armour to fit 16-inch firepower within treaty and dockyard constraints.

Probably. A Nelson-type ship would still be damaged, but its more extensive built-in torpedo protection should have improved survival.

No. C turret could not clear B within its 30-degree elevation limit; a different turret order might have allowed it.

Nelson's flagship role, mine damage, and wartime deployments show how the Royal Navy managed one of only two 16-inch battleships.

The crews of Nelson and Rodney joined the Invergordon refusal to sail after proposed pay cuts exposed a breakdown between sailors, fleet officers, and the Admiralty.

Possibly enough for a third shaft, but probably not four; the Royal Navy retained a battleship secondary battery because the ships were treaty replacements for battleships.

Nelson carried more staff personnel, which made the junior officers' quarters especially crowded.

They were intended to enter the Channel with Hood and use their heavy guns to destroy the invasion force and its supporting targets.

Rodney's troublesome machinery and succession of notable commanders show how leadership affected the usefulness of a scarce two-ship class.

Rodney pushed beyond her expected speed to join the Bismarck hunt, then used nine 16-inch guns to cripple the German battleship.

After Bismarck, Rodney continued through Mediterranean operations and the Normandy landings until wartime strain made a major repair uneconomic.

Because 16 inches was the treaty maximum, and the Royal Navy would not accept a visibly smaller main armament while rivals built to that limit.

Nelson's repair periods shifted more work to Rodney, and Rodney's intense Bismarck action added substantial self-inflicted blast and machinery strain.

Usually by commander rank the appointment pattern makes the likely path visible, although strong performance as a captain can still change it.

Not much. The force needed another carrier and more fighters far more than it needed an additional battleship.

A heavier shell would have required new handling machinery, while the adopted 16-inch performance rested on trials that did not translate cleanly into practice.

No. Platform quality, global logistics, transport, infrastructure, and nuclear attack submarines make simple equipment-count rankings misleading.

Renown, Repulse, Nelson, and Rodney show why losing one member of a two-ship class can reshape every later deployment.

The closing interpretation links Nelson's heavy protection to Beatty's survivability-first reading of Jutland and the institutional habits it encouraged.

Not directly, but similar medium-power constraints lead to some of the same conventional-carrier design principles.

Two exhaust stacks already divide the available space, and separate islands improve lift, hangar, ship-control, and flight-deck arrangements while operational command remains centred in the CIC.