Chiefs of Staff of the Axis Navies: (Long Patrol) - P12/14: Henning von Holtzendorff

The opening frames Holtzendorff as evidence that Tirpitz’s anti-British building policy was contested inside the Imperial German Navy rather than universally accepted.

Holtzendorff's service from 1869 through Danzig shipbuilding and squadron command explains the practical experience he brought to the High Seas Fleet.

Holtzendorff opposed matching the Royal Navy ship for ship because British industry and dockyards could expand faster than Germany's.

Recalled after the naval staff changed hands in 1915, Holtzendorff intensified submarine activity and coastal minelaying around Britain.

Holtzendorff treated submarine warfare as the remaining way to pressure Britain after rejecting a conventional contest in capital ships.

Holtzendorff fought the German army for scarce wartime resources, funded submarines, and ruthlessly triaged which surface ships could still be finished or repaired.

Holtzendorff's December 1916 memorandum allocated Britain's merchant fleet among military, coastal, repair, and allied uses to estimate the tonnage left for British supply.

The Admiralty may have known the shipping figures yet resisted convoying because adopting it could look like an admission that existing methods had failed.

The memorandum argued that poor harvests would shift British grain imports from North America toward India and Australia, tying up more ships on longer routes.

The campaign sought to force Britain into favourable negotiations rather than produce an outright German military victory.

The memorandum projected that unrestricted attacks would cut British food, industrial inputs, neutral trade, and public confidence within five months.

The critique of Holtzendorff's calculation is that it forecast losses precisely without making adequate allowance for how Britain would change its behaviour.

Holtzendorff accepted that the United States might enter the war, but judged that shipping limits would prevent it from changing the outcome in time.

The video weighs Holtzendorff's clear presentation of a desperate strategy against the uncertain judgments about people and enemy reactions on which it depended.

Deutschland's cargo voyages, U-53's attacks near the American coast, and the Lusitania notes showed both the value and diplomatic danger of long-range submarine operations.

Holtzendorff’s reading of American anti-war politics and British consumer habits encouraged a fragile belief that neither society would accept prolonged sacrifice.

The episode pauses to compare the approximate Allied merchant, naval, and personnel losses with the German U-boats and crews lost in the campaign.

To secure the Kaiser's approval, Holtzendorff reportedly gave his word as an officer that no American soldier would land in Europe.

Early 1917 sinkings brought Britain close to a supply crisis, but they also triggered the American break with Germany and declaration of war.

A report by Commander Henderson helped Jellicoe build political support for convoy experiments before their wider adoption in August 1917.

Losses began to fall as Q-ships improved and German submarines tired under the high rate of operations needed to keep so many boats at sea.

The controversy over a threatened Norwegian convoy showed how political demands could exceed the escorts available after Britain adopted convoying.

The U-boat campaign and the convoy response both depended on leaders winning resources from competing wartime priorities.

Promoted as the Imperial German Navy’s final grand admiral, Holtzendorff soon concluded that Germany could no longer win as American troops arrived and intelligence assumptions collapsed.

The episode contrasts Tirpitz's Risk Fleet theory with Holtzendorff's attempt to use submarines against Britain’s maritime lifelines.

By 1917 Britain had learned, built escorts, and expanded merchant shipping, making the submarine threat harder to exploit than it had been in 1914.

American troops were the cargo most likely to receive convoy protection and travel in fast liners, undermining Holtzendorff's assumption that submarines could stop their passage.

Holtzendorff's sparse direct signalling may indicate a preference for occasional orders, personal meetings, and trusted subordinates rather than constant micromanagement.

The final analysis distinguishes compelling Britain to stop fighting from outright military destruction, a strategic distinction interwar Germany is argued to have missed.

The verdict presents Holtzendorff as a leader who rejected the Risk Fleet premise, then pursued the least-bad option available to Germany in wartime.