Holtzendorff projected monthly destruction of 600,000 tons and expected fear to deter two-fifths of neutral shipping, reducing British seaborne trade by 39 percent within five months. He argued that Britain would struggle to ration food and that lost trade with Denmark and the Netherlands would quickly restrict fats. Threats to Scandinavian routes and Spanish iron ore would then affect timber, coal, pig iron, steel, and munitions as parts of one connected maritime system. A cruiser-rules campaign, by contrast, was expected to cut only about 18 percent and would not generate the same panic. Holtzendorff therefore treated a simultaneous declaration and opening attack as psychological shock as well as economic warfare.
Notable Point · 20:53-24:29
The assumptions behind Britain’s supply crisis
The memorandum projected that unrestricted attacks would cut British food, industrial inputs, neutral trade, and public confidence within five months.