Bruships 94: Some New Books, Some Others Books and a lot of Naval Chat

Using a Mediterranean example, the answer estimates about twenty brigs and places them in the working fleet as convoy escorts, inshore support, and occasional frigate substitutes.

The answer champions smaller ships: First World War sloops and destroyers, treaty-era escorts, and Age of Sail third rates that carried out much of a navy's essential work.

It was a strategically important Mediterranean possession and a major prestige victory because the island had long been contested and associated with French power.

An American-held ship would probably have been examined and used in nuclear testing, while Soviet capture could have triggered a prestige-driven postwar battleship competition.

Probably, but a more isolationist United States could remove the Washington treaty system and produce very different British, American, and Japanese alignments in the Pacific.

Money and manpower mattered, but industrial investment begun around 1933 gave later naval orders a crucial head start; more time before war allowed British and Dominion forces to become steadily better equipped.

The name runs from sixteenth-century and Age of Sail warships through an Imperieuse-class armoured cruiser, the Queen Elizabeth-class battleship, a Valiant-class nuclear submarine, and a planned Dreadnought-class submarine.

Their speed, range, and nine 12.2-inch guns would make them capable ships and likely increase pressure on the United States to build Alaskas and on Britain to consider a comparable design.

Yes. Most faults had already been worked through before 1937, after difficulties caused by introducing the Royal Navy's first triple turrets and then lightening and reworking the design.

Robert Harling's convoy memoir uses an Atlantic passage to explore shipboard routine, reserve officers, and anxiety over life after the war.

Africa's lone 64-gun approach was bold enough to alarm the Franco-Spanish fleet, which briefly had to consider that a third British column might be arriving.

No: if the hull already had its guns and machinery, the Soviet Union would probably complete it with Soviet equipment and display it as proof of victory over Japan.

New construction begins on a slipway and requires every system to be produced and assembled, while refits normally use a dry dock and vary greatly with the depth of work planned.

The answer makes treaty limits the decisive factor: an eight-inch ceiling favors a heavy-cruiser answer, while altered rules or treaty collapse could permit a super-cruiser or emergency 14-inch design.

Paying off removed the ship from commission and dispersed most of the crew; in ordinary she remained afloat in reserve under a minimal caretaker establishment until recommissioning or deeper dockyard work.

The answer would mass-produce the Daring-class twin 4.5-inch mounting for older cruisers, buy more 40 mm Bofors guns, and accelerate radar development.

By the end of the First World War, when capital ships were approaching 40,000 tons and carrying 16-inch or larger guns, that combination would look increasingly cruiser-like.

A 15-inch/50 installation would probably be too large, while a twin 14-inch turret derived from the King George V program is the more plausible maximum.

The answer selects Nelson and Rodney as leading examples, while stressing that no ship is an attractive place to be when a torpedo hits.

The familiar LST belongs to the Second World War, but First World War programs had already produced and developed barges and landing craft capable of carrying armored vehicles.

A technical reading from Hitler's Secret Commandos examines the Molch midget submarine's cramped controls, primitive navigation, poor trim, and limited combat value.

The trade-off becomes doubtful around 18 inches and especially at 20 inches; 14- and 15-inch protection can still make sense, but only over selected areas and ranges.

It might be made to work with a major development effort, but its roughly 70-foot barrel, propellant demands, and manufacturing complexity make a 12-inch 50-caliber weapon the more practical choice.

Their weight and drag reduced ship performance, while damaged nets could become a hazard of their own by fouling propellers; the trade-off worsened as operating speeds rose.

A flight deck does not restrain a wheeled aircraft by itself; brakes and tie-downs must secure it, and an unsecured aircraft can simply keep rolling over the edge.

Japan would probably continue construction, while Britain could enlarge the Lion design to twelve 16-inch guns and the United States would be pushed toward a comparable response outside normal treaty assumptions.

Probably: once the Soviet battleship threat failed to appear, other navies had no peer capital ship against which new battleships were worth building.

Digitisation is expensive, and some records remain restricted under rules that require an archive to verify the identity of the person consulting them.

The answer emphasizes greater speed and fuel efficiency, with the operational consequence that an earlier Jutland action could reduce the German fleet's chance of escape.

The planned Lion-class program extended to six battleships, but only Lion and Temeraire are treated as firm names in the discussion.

A recommendation of Before the Battlecruiser highlights its combination of design detail, plans, and coverage of ships' later careers.

A Pacific 1914 force summary compares British, French, Australian, Japanese, and German cruiser deployments around the opening moves of the war.

Probably. A fixed or limited-traverse mount is the practical option unless the ship is made large enough to carry an enormous rotating turret.

China, Russia, and to a degree the United States all imported foreign concepts or expertise, but Japan gained decades of stability and selectively absorbed technology without fully remaking society.

Their speed and nine 16-inch guns could place one or both in the opening interception, reducing reliance on Hood and the still-working-up Prince of Wales and giving Bismarck a much heavier fast opponent.

The difference was that Japanese factional hostility could become serious planning and attempted action, rather than remaining frustrated mess-table talk between services.

Nelson excels at extracting armor and combat power from treaty displacement, Queen Elizabeth suits First World War survivability, and Iowa best combines speed with Second World War survivability.

A reading from The Battle of Midway inventories the Combined Fleet at Hashirajima and captures the confidence surrounding the May 1942 sortie.

Britain, Japan, and the United States would all have strong incentives to build the new type quickly because the category offers cruiser status with capital-ship firepower.

The hulls reflect different design problems: Nelson had to deliver efficient 16-inch fighting power under a tight weight limit, while the King George V design's 14-inch armament changed the weight distribution available to the hull.

Build 28-knot Queen Elizabeths with triple 15-inch/50 turrets, give the main battery roughly 40 degrees of elevation, and develop high-angle 4.7- or 5-inch guns against airships and aircraft.

It is a valuable and engaging personal account, but its judgments remain filtered through one officer's perspective and biases.

With an expensive early industrial push, the ships might enter service around 1935-36, but armor-plate capacity would be the dominant bottleneck.

Neutrality could keep supplies flowing to Russia and might push the Ottomans toward the Allies if Germany threatened the straits or Caucasus, although the empire could still face civil war or collapse after the war.

The answer prioritizes more oilers, a corrected Mark 14 torpedo, and completing a pair of Lexington-class battlecruisers to give carrier forces faster, heavier support.

It described a cruiser with a continuous flight deck for operating more helicopters than earlier hangar conversions, and the concept evolved into the Invincible-class light carrier.

Replacing twin 4-inch guns could save some cruisers and make the Mediterranean much more dangerous for aircraft, but only if the fast-firing weapon is paired with suitable radar.

It would likely accelerate stronger fast capital ships, keep early battlecruisers out of the line of battle, and impose much stricter ammunition-handling discipline.

Not realistically within the existing design: reaching that speed with 1920s machinery would require changes so extensive that the result would effectively be a different ship.

Probably, but in a much weaker position: Germany might take Moscow and force a deeper retreat, while Soviet industry beyond the Urals and German logistical limits could still prevent a complete defeat.

The answer proposes a roughly 16,000-ton Type 83-style cruiser with extensive missile capacity, helicopters, two forward 5-inch guns, 57 mm mounts, 40 mm guns, and Phalanx defenses.

A reading from Andrew Lambert's Admirals follows Samuel Hood from frigate success and convoy service through patronage, dockyard administration, and late promotion to flag command.

Broadly yes: strategic surveillance systems tend to be larger, more power-hungry, and optimized for wide-area awareness, while tactical radars support target engagement and fire control with different modes and frequencies.

Probably not for long. Moscow's loss would hurt Soviet coordination, but German railway logistics also deteriorated with distance and could leave both armies unable to move beyond a new stalemate.

Not in their normal configuration; a specially carried crane with near carrier-level handling capacity might make it possible, but the ship is not arranged for routine underway reloads.

Better cooperation would remove a recurring Axis handicap, because Allied services were generally more successful at remembering that they were supporting the same war effort.

Tryon could have pushed initiative and reform further, giving Fisher a stronger foundation and making literal obedience to flawed orders a less acceptable excuse.

US nuclear supercarriers define the first rate; British, French, and emerging large Chinese carriers fit the second; most existing Chinese and Indian carriers the third; and smaller Japanese, Italian, or amphibious aviation ships the fourth.

Plan against what can be kept forward: five carriers can sustain roughly two on station and surge three, so a comfortable counter may require about six carriers, submarines against the battleships, and continued construction of large destroyers.

A comment on battlecruiser employment stresses that Fisher's construction program was intended to deter war and avoid a conventional battle line.

A longer missile is theoretically possible if the trainable arm is strengthened for the added weight, while combat evidence for VLS reliability remains limited because Gulf War launches occurred under relatively controlled conditions.

Happy Odyssey, the memoir of Lieutenant General Sir Adrian Carton de Wiart, is the recommended starting point.

Not neatly: protected cruisers develop into light cruisers, and treaty definitions later create the heavy-cruiser label, while the armoured cruiser has no direct successor despite the Alaska class echoing part of its role.

The answer picks turbine blades: they require exact metallurgy and precision engineering, and failure in a geared-turbine system can cripple the ship's propulsion.

The answer favors more 40 mm weapons on Fearless and Intrepid, continued use of the 3-inch gun, and development of twin 4.5-inch mounts rather than a shift to single guns.

The carrier could destroy the High Seas Fleet and strike artillery and ammunition positions across the Western Front with impunity, although sustaining her would depend on adapting contemporary fuel and ordnance production.

The answer chooses a very large 112-gun sailing ironclad: essentially HMS Warrior's armored concept enlarged and adapted to rely entirely on sail.

For the First World War, strike Admiral Scheer's flagship as the fleets meet at Jutland; for the Second, disable Vittorio Veneto at Taranto to weaken Italy and release British strength for the Far East.

One could serve each major Black Sea, Northern, and Pacific fleet while a fourth conducted global deployments; sustained investment would likely replace the need for Slava-class flagships and avoid Moskva's modernization problems.

Because deterrence would require demonstrating the weapons, while a modern carrier could defeat the same forces conventionally without crossing the nuclear threshold.

Six inches would probably remain important because it is near the upper limit for fast manual ammunition handling, although some navies might explore an intermediate gun around 7.5 inches.

The Royal Navy gains enough time to study modern sensors, missiles, close-in defenses, and ship systems before the Second World War, radically improving fleet air defense.

Nuclear propulsion brings additional organizations and inspectors into the maintenance chain, making neglect or diversion of funds harder to conceal than on conventional ships.

A modern 40 mm gun should be sufficient by rapidly opening many holes, while a .50-caliber weapon probably lacks the destructive effect needed against very thick oak and teak structure.

In practice the categories often overlap because most nuclear-armed Russian naval vessels are also nuclear-powered, while a conventional ship such as Kuznetsov does not appear to receive the same scrutiny.