Bruships 229: Naval History Questions Answered Live...

Because work already completed on the hulls constrained the choice; an earlier administrative pause would have been needed to preserve the alternative.

The proposed 3-1-3 battery would have a poor firing pattern; 3-2-3 is considered plausible, and the historical alternative used three triple 15-inch turrets.

No firm recommendation is offered; one Spanish-language work prompts a warning to distinguish independent development from being first.

St Vincent is the likeliest name, with Neptune, Colossus, and Hercules among the plausible remaining choices.

Mulberry harbours, brewery ships and the volume of new warships are suggested, with the atomic bomb added as an especially dramatic example.

Its geography could split the emerging United States, strengthen British North America, and possibly leave New England aligned with Canada.

Kev Darling's books are suggested for digital reading, while Neil McCart offers another useful treatment whose ebook availability is uncertain.

A mismatched book illustration prompts a practical source check: does the pictured vessel match the advertised class?

Not very much compared with a new warship, because the hulls already had the needed range and support spaces and received only limited concealed armament modifications.

A short anecdote links the threat of coastal artillery to the money needed to purchase effective guns.

Vian, Cunningham, Somerville, Jellicoe, Harwood and Beatty are suggested, with reservations about Beatty and discussion of Ramsay and Manley Power.

She would be a useful escort but not a war-changing ship, and would probably be lost to air or submarine attack in the late war.

The Ibuki discussion turns to the small escorts Japan would have needed to build in large numbers before the later wartime shortage.

France would probably invade Germany and the Royal Navy would move to sink the ship because its mere existence would be read as a deliberate treaty violation and strategic threat.

The answer tentatively suggests about 200 under favorable defensive conditions for the Norse fighters, because knife-armed SEALs lose the equipment advantages their training normally assumes.

The tentative leads are Robert Scheina's Latin American naval history and an incompletely identified work associated with Jose Ramon.

The bases would improve Caribbean and canal security, but permanent control would also bind the United States more tightly to Central American political and border disputes.

The changes would be so extensive that Spain would be better served keeping the F110 as a frigate and designing a destroyer for the larger mission.

American carrier strikes would become much heavier and harder to intercept, but crews would need retraining and the aircraft would not supply the later technology required for its nuclear role.

It might, though improved sighting equipment would not supply the bombing practices needed to make the campaign effective.

Frigates are enough for a patrol fleet; an expeditionary LHD-centered navy needs larger destroyers and could benefit industrially from building them.

Sloops and cutters are strong candidates, while cogs, hulks, carracks, caravels, and clippers deserve more credit for trade and exploration.

They were sound, balanced fast battleships with strong guns, adequate protection and good subdivision.

Relatively little: he had managed the trouble in his own force, and the sea lords had handled much of the wider problem before he returned.

Multiple feedback channels and direct observation help commanders detect exhausted crews even when formal readiness figures look healthy.

Probably: finishing the war at sea carries a different public reputation from reassignment to a desk, which can leave a career receiving less attention.

Wider deployment was considered, including Italian participation in the projected invasion of Japan, while actual operations discussed here remained in Italy.

No; they were wartime orders, but not reduced-capability emergency designs, and most were built after the war.

The crisis already exists because the Type 23s are overdue for replacement, and any delay to HMS Glasgow makes it worse.

Mark 41 VLS is the firmest upgrade, but sonar changes and later Type 32, Type 26, and Type 83 work all compete within two escort production lines.

Usually a navy's wartime corvettes, frigates, or destroyer escorts fill that role; the specific class reflects its own production experience.

Yes in a pre-Second World War scenario; a modern version would need many more missiles, though the command-and-prestige role could still work.

The choice depends on the measure of effectiveness. LRASM receives particular support, while Naval Strike Missile is also named as a preference and Chinese YJ-83 variants and BrahMos enter the comparison.

A higher-flying missile can direct a low-flying salvo and be replaced if destroyed, while claims of surprise are challenged by the system's prior publicity.

Warfare, Raiding and Defence in Early Medieval Britain is recommended for its interpretation of defensive earthworks, while Demolisher is praised for its fictional treatment of an officer struggling with company command.

No; the seeker, computing, propulsion, and manufacturing prerequisites are too far beyond 1939, so meaningful effects would arrive much later.

It would add resilience and experience, but only continued funding for the ship and air group could make the improvement durable.

Not greatly; Ballard could approach another partner, though the refusal might expose capability limits and weaken later private interest in deep-ocean searches.

An F3-derived nine-gun capital ship and a roughly 28,000-ton carrier with omitted armor and weapons, supplemented by carriers below 10,000 tons.

The fleet auxiliaries would be more useful because their logistics value is immediate and they are easier to integrate than modern LHDs.

Copenhagen and Alexandria are major candidates, but generations of practice fire most literally reshaped small British target islands.

Probably not; the necessary intelligence leak would look suspicious, and German aerial reconnaissance could expose the disguised battleships before the trap worked.

Possibly, but only with a real reserve personnel structure and shipyard capacity; otherwise the stored hulls do not create usable force.

The categories would yield poor cruiser designs and could collapse the treaty by narrowing the practical separation between cruisers and battleships.

Their repeated technical objections were treated as obstruction by politicians who wanted an agreement, so the naval specialists were removed from the talks.

The explanation given is politicians associated with international peace groups who wanted an agreement and regarded naval objections as obstruction.

Navies and politicians did not want an uncontrolled nuclear weapon able to drift around the world's oceans.

They already possessed much of it after 1945; governments chose not to keep funding the carriers, cruisers, submarines, auxiliaries, and bases at the same level.

They could become a valuable radar and denial position, but only if fortified early and sustained as an isolated military fortress under constant attack.

Gas turbines or combined diesel-and-gas machinery could support a major rebuild, but fitting large VLS blocks depends on internal volume and hull framing.

Fox proposes using Tiger's space for helicopters while retaining a forward six-inch gun for fire support.

Steam expertise was still available in 2000. In 1982 Bristol already had an operating crew; finding additional specialists for reactivated Tigers was a separate problem.

Dragon combines a retained six-inch turret with modern 76 mm guns and a hangar able to support contemporary helicopters.

The most extensive Tiger proposal retains the name and six-inch guns while replacing almost the entire ship.

Yes; a faster, stronger German battle line would have posed a harder concentrated problem, while British battlecruiser construction would continue for global missions.

Global opponents and overseas duties still mattered greatly, although the move from Lion to Tiger is judged more closely related to German construction.

The original Admiral design pursued a much enlarged Invincible concept; post-Jutland changes moved it toward Tiger's approach without making it equally dense in armor and armament.

Britain would deploy larger ships overseas and probably build more, while fast battleships could take over scouting duties with the Grand Fleet.

Japan had useful early ideas, but the construction pause eroded experience; later ships such as Yamato did not meet the 28-knot cruiser-line threshold.

Penguin, Naval Strike Missile, Brimstone and Talos are favored for different reasons; another choice is a failed system whose design is interesting despite its problems.

Nuclear power seems plausible for ships around 15,000 tons and above as electrical demand grows, with a reactor for base load and conventional generators for surge and emergency power.

There is no single minimum dimension: reactor barges and cruiser-sized installations show different possibilities, but cost discourages small combatants unless reactors become much cheaper.

Eskimo is selected with a joke about bow damage, Zubian for her composite construction, and a later answer chooses a rebuilt Soviet cruiser to see how far an old hull could be pushed.

Yes. Shipboard rocket launch is well established, though the answer is tentative about the particular modern laser-guided application.

A Soviet cruiser tangent weighs shipyard experience gained from inherited hulls against the time and resources saved by starting with a fresh design.

Most would be RFA vessels carrying Royal Navy specialist parties; a true command warship would remain Royal Navy.

Retiring the old ship was reasonable; Spain should discuss a modern successor with Italy, whose carrier and LHD program offers a closer match to the desired scale.

The lifts can already take the aircraft. Trieste's LHD role limits her air group because she also needs capacity for amphibious operations.

It would be a strong, even excessive Korean War surface group, but it has no meaningful amphibious lift.

It would add pressure but not become a decisive new threat, because Japan already created a similar problem and geography limited direct access.

The larger problem is the loss of amphibious lift; carriers can provide air cover, but they do not replace landing ships, craft, and heavy-equipment capacity.

No. She was transferred through the destroyers-for-bases agreement.

The proposal spreads work over years, expands worthwhile programs, invests in personnel and support capacity, and addresses procurement failures; the argument is that the full trillion is unnecessary.

A larger Wedgetail order is proposed as a possible remedy for an undersized force and an awkward procurement program.

Combining naval and land-based Aster orders could help justify expanded British missile production.

The spending exercise includes a substantial pay increase and criticism of outsourced recruitment.

Delayed orders encounter busy suppliers, while rebuilding dockyard capacity requires investment beyond the ships themselves.

The hypothetical carrier proposal depends on crew requirements and a suitable naval aircraft, with nuclear power and CATOBAR left as options.

A stable budget and direct consultation with service personnel are proposed as the basis for procurement reform.

Possibly, but Britain might combine some of those functions in cruiser-style command ships rather than copy every American auxiliary type.

Alleged Ajax hull inconsistencies lead to a discussion of repeatable manufacture, interchangeable parts and repairing vehicles overseas.

The discussion calls for scrutiny of repeated delivery promises after missed targets, including the possibility of cancellation.

The criticism fits a conventional battleship comparison, but the class was a transitional step toward fast battleships and should be judged in that design context.

The Lion design offers the best balance, particularly because its protection suits Mediterranean conditions without sacrificing wider service.

A compact 6,000- to 7,000-ton cruiser-like coastal-defence ship, probably sourced from a builder such as Sweden.

They would provide useful extra hulls for northern and secondary missions, though not heavily armed modern destroyers.

It would redirect American Pacific basing - probably toward Guam or the Marianas - and create cascading political changes too large for a simple modern snapshot.

Some panelists have not; Clarke tentatively recalls it as useful for readers unfamiliar with military history and connects the discussion to post-combat decompression.

Not directly; they could evolve toward it over decades by changing hull construction, iron production, rigging, and infrastructure.

Ancient metalworking provides a foundation, but producing the iron components for a fine clipper hull would require sustained development.

Sail handling, mast size and hull strength have to develop together before an ancient ship can approach a clipper's rig.

Regional construction sequences are discussed in relation to local flooding, wind exposure and the vulnerability of unfinished hulls.

No; the label may expose them to more demanding destroyer comparisons without solving the underlying procurement problem.

It would be useful, but its success is uncertain because the 2010 market offered few likely buyers and strong competition.

It would certainly not make D-Day easier for the Allies; no detailed estimate is offered.

An upgraded Type 82-derived design is the closest British comparison, sitting near the boundary between destroyer leader and cruiser.

Not on the evidence discussed; MEKO could be an additional or backup purchase, and the final relationship to F126 was still unsettled.

No; a modern off-the-shelf light frigate would be more useful, though even that risks undermining the common Type 26 fleet plan.

The estimate is about 3,000 tons, taking the ship to roughly 25,000-26,000 tons, with useful additional space in the centre.

Not as the usual classical model; trained free or freed auxiliary rowers were safer and more effective than a chained crew able to revolt during combat.

The choices include HMS Trincomalee, HMS Modeste and Constitution.