Bruships 190: Naval History Questions Answered Live...

Existing castles were often adapted when their locations were useful, but modern coastal defence relied mainly on purpose-built forts, batteries, and beach defences.

They were distant, prolonged campaigns whose effects were felt indirectly and whose gravest dangers governments often concealed to avoid panic.

Not in surviving detail; waterborne fighting likely occurred on lakes and rivers, but written evidence is sparse and much oral memory was lost.

Nelson at Cape St Vincent is the leading example, with Copenhagen and the Oscarsborg command decision as related cases.

An employment campaign through shipbuilding, aerospace, and supply-chain unions offered more leverage than a purely military case.

Few came directly from ships; most were coastal or railway pieces, spare barrels, or guns originally intended for unbuilt vessels.

No; their basic design errors remain inexcusable, and the extreme speed requirement compromised too many other qualities.

Carriers expose airpower's dependence on basing and joint operations while forcing aircraft to accept shipboard constraints.

They were used with some frequency, and Swordfish even torpedoed and damaged an Italian dam.

Yes, docks were damaged by heavy bombs, and precision-guided weapons later made such attacks much more reliable.

The Skyhawk had a low approach speed and the Harrier landed vertically, whereas the Super Étendard's high landing speed exceeded the practical limits of those decks.

Primarily Soviet submarines, but it was meant to work against any threat and was weakened by poor assumptions about British behaviour.

France had different priorities and stronger support for retaining the capability, but paid for it by operating only one carrier.

Yes; much of the Atlantic Wall focused on beach denial, with separate batteries handling ships farther offshore.

They layered more ASW assets around the group to detect and engage submarines as far away as possible.

It would have been a major British success against Argentina's fleet flagship and principal sea-based strike asset.

A wooden ship of the line could theoretically pass through broadside and central-battery ironclad stages to a turret ship, though the last step amounts to new construction.

A follow-up identifies HMS Splendid as the boat sent after Argentina's carrier and uses her rapid deployment and rising cost to illuminate the later Swiftsure class.

It exposes a long-running failure to replace solid-support capacity and the broader hollowing of the RFA.

Selling serviceable RFA tankers for lack of crews sacrifices future capacity when reserve status or commercial charter work could keep hulls warm and useful.

They have operated such weapons, but older systems were retired and successor or dual-use capabilities are not always obvious from public inventories.

Retain and modernize more of the existing fleet instead of following the deep post-Cold War drawdown.

Yes for states that need expeditionary capability, especially because self-reliance pushes programs from pairs toward three or four usable decks.

Building two large LHDs could rebuild Russian experience with aviation ships and make a later STOBAR carrier more plausible, although yard capacity, schedule, and political ambition leave the outcome speculative.

Fort Victoria's combination of fuel, stores, aviation, and self-defence made sense within a larger support fleet but became restrictive when too few specialized auxiliaries remained.

With difficulty, because confinement accelerates transmission and a serious outbreak can take the entire ship out of action.

Broadly yes as an LPH, though she differed in design and survivability.

Not officially, but matching diameter and wartime necessity might permit a difficult improvised conversion.

It is important support, but the wording also appears designed to protect air mobility by tying it to a secure naval priority.

Very important, especially because RNLI people and existing small-boat networks supplied organization as well as vessels.

Yes; Hermes already had a commando-carrier role, and the ski-jump adaptation for Harriers came later.

Substantially better in hangar and fleet value, although larger jet aircraft would still impose an eventual limit.

The Alaska is the likelier candidate because her original role was weak and her hull could carry a very large missile battery.

A taller hangar would not defeat aircraft growth forever, but four broadly compatible modernized carriers could justify sustained investment and postpone retirement.

It has not yet been identified; the plate may be from Warspite, but its location and provenance still need to be established.

It would probably be an uncrewed underwater vehicle rather than a conventional diesel submarine.

A lost Tribal-class destroyer, complete 15-inch gun machinery, useful Bofors barrels, or rare crated naval aircraft would all fill major preservation gaps.

Yes, if properly funded, because it would preserve capability and strengthen the requirement for a larger replacement fleet.

Only in relation to doctrine and availability; concealment and mission fulfilment matter more than a universal specification ranking.

She would be a valuable fast battleship, with Allied maintenance and fire-control work likely improving her reliability and accuracy.

Allies must procure enough platforms to backstop themselves, while both sides account for mutual technological dependence.

Probably not the treaty limits, but it would greatly expand what Britain could build, enlarge, modernize, and repair afterward.

It would want to, but doing so would be difficult and would clearly signal that war was approaching.

More medium-calibre guns, especially overlapping 76 mm and 40 mm mounts, for affordable depth and redundancy.

She would be useful for stabilization and evacuation, but not as a full surgical hospital ship.

Argus carries advanced medical facilities while retaining the legal and operational flexibility of an armed auxiliary rather than accepting protected hospital-ship status.

Yes; replacement is already overdue, although the exchange does not endorse one particular successor design.

It might have served briefly, but 20 mm cannon offered enough additional effect to replace it eventually.

Because fixed-wing carrier AEW had previously filled the role, and the Falklands proved land-based cover could not be assumed.

The Allied transport system and public morale would suffer a massive blow because she was an exceptionally valuable troopship.

Yes, because all foundries faced limits in producing and heat-treating very thick plate consistently.

Newer tiltrotor or UAV AEW is likelier, and a British STOVL fighter was feasible in concept but not funded.

It would enable heavier aircraft but could slow mass launches and require major structural changes, so the wartime benefit is uncertain.

At least about one hundred dedicated support personnel, with more specialists and spare craft needed for sustained operations.

Direct access to HMAS Vampire's boiler room lets historians and museum specialists reconstruct machinery relationships that drawings and labels alone cannot settle.

No; the F-35 was deliberately organized as an international programme, and Britain earned major work through investment and specialized expertise.

Not fundamentally; the launch systems are set, while the selected missiles can change through later partnerships and integration choices.

They are usually treated as background infrastructure and become prominent mainly when something goes badly wrong.

Names with strong service traditions, including Tribal-class and major fighting names, should return on ships suited to their heritage.

Naming a major warship for a living political figure ties the vessel to unfinished controversies that historical distance would normally soften.

Grant's wartime skill at fighting and logistics did not translate automatically into the political management needed to control Reconstruction-era administration and corruption.

Possibly, but no change is confirmed and the British review and procurement decisions still have to settle the fit.

Most accessible engines were probably removed, but remote wrecks buried in sand could conceivably retain machinery.

Little by itself; the enormous gun battery drives size and vulnerability without guaranteeing useful reach or a coherent mission.

Because Britain distributed those functions among the Navy, rescue, customs, and police bodies rather than creating one armed maritime service.

She would almost certainly be preserved as a museum ship rather than sent to the breakers again.

British builders offered numerous customer-specific designs, often adapting domestic practice to foreign requirements and constraints.

Germany might win the naval war unless Britain committed its entire fleet, including expendable mass torpedo and submarine attacks, to destroy them.

It would be an appropriate and welcome choice, although no naming decision is claimed.

Very positively, but only after the still-conceptual programme actually produces a ship to name.

Guidance and modern fuzing could improve accuracy, range, and naval-gunfire-support value if the electronics could survive launch forces.

Yes; abundant fuel and parts would help later, but the unfamiliar machinery would still take months to master.

C-130s, dedicated catapult test vehicles, and even expendable cars have all featured in carrier launch trials or stories.

Probably not soon, though a much larger future fleet might eventually bring the name back.

They would be militarily outclassed almost at once, and the main challenge would become securing the ships and handling their crews.

If both German ships vanished after Hood's loss, wartime memory might credit Hood with destroying them until their modern reappearance overturned the story.

New Zealand and other Commonwealth forces would gain more maritime patrol aircraft, potentially giving Force Z better reconnaissance before its fatal sortie.

Most ships would be obsolete, but select hulls might be adapted and the people arriving with the fleet would transform British politics.

A high-impact stability or armament-development mistake would be the best target because it affects survival and whole generations of ships.

They would overwhelm European capital ships, but their construction would probably trigger rival programmes rather than occur in isolation.

No; the stripped aircraft used its own short-field performance to prove an emergency delivery option that was possible but impractical.

Probably, if the weight and space savings were used for protection rather than an additional turret.

A huge naval-heritage and tourism coalition would form to preserve her as a museum ship.