Bruships 114: Alternate Histories, What Ifs & Questions from Chat

German analysts assumed British claims were inflated and did not credit improvements or additional usable fuel capacity, leaving them below the ships' real endurance.

A full 28-knot battle squadron would be very useful and might be difficult to cancel, even against Fisher's battlecruiser preferences.

It might fare better against France, but dependence on British supplies would leave many Italian ships difficult to sustain once Britain became the enemy.

They could plausibly replace Argus and Eagle, but not Hermes, whose new-build design tested different carrier-construction questions.

She might retreat toward Force Z and cooperate with it, but Japan would be reluctant to detach only one carrier because the hunt would require concentration.

Britain could shift more ships and carriers toward home and Far Eastern waters, but it would lose Mediterranean operational experience that helped develop naval aviation.

It would probably need a speed limit for battleships or a measure of armour density, because gun calibre does not reliably distinguish the types.

Midway's historical result was highly contingent; even with Yorktown, many simulation outcomes involve heavy losses, mutual destruction, or no decisive contact.

It could form two powerful hunting groups and pursue two raider forces at a time while retaining enough strength to meet any German regrouping.

Britain would press to retain a large battlecruiser squadron and organize its capital ships for home, Mediterranean, and Indian Ocean service.

The scale would likely cause alarm and prompt a stricter treaty definition of experimental carriers.

The fleet might adopt oil much earlier, possibly beginning with Dreadnought or the Orion generation rather than the Queen Elizabeth class.

Britain might build more and preserve industrial capacity, while the United States could keep more battleships but develop carrier aviation more slowly without Lexington conversions.

Possibly on the outward crossing, but supplies and the absence of a reliable return route make sustained contact much less likely.

It could give Britain one of the world's most powerful naval guns and prove especially useful for Falklands-era surface and shore fire.

Norway needed to treat the invasion of Denmark as an immediate warning and go to full alert instead of assuming Sweden would be attacked next.

They are generally second-strike assets because remaining hidden makes them difficult to eliminate before they can retaliate.

She should withdraw because she was already damaged and another capital-ship fight would add risk without serving the commerce-raiding mission.

It could make agreement nearly impossible unless Hood received an exemption or every power was permitted a comparable 20-inch ship.

Britain would develop closer links with Malta and likely maintain a larger Mediterranean naval and air presence, while other territories might seek comparable votes.

German forces would face concentrated naval opposition, mines and aircraft, then prepared coastal and Home Guard defences, so a viable scenario needs extensive additional assumptions.

British recovery-vehicle crews mounted a fake 8-inch gun made from pipe, then used the exercise rules to register kills with it.

The war could last roughly eighteen months to two years longer because the United States would need time to replace the lost fleet.

Planning and shipbuilding would need to begin around 1934 or 1935, and Britain would become deeply concerned by the visible amphibious buildup.

Not necessarily: it could reduce junior-command experience, duplicate costs, and still leave situations that require a warship.

Possibly several, alongside other new construction and refits, but available large-yard capacity would prevent every capital-ship modernization from happening.

Germany would face rapid Swiss mobilization, hostile terrain, worsening weather, and likely intervention by France, Britain, and Italy.

Probably; 15-inch guns could discourage battleship bombardment, with smaller calibres covering lesser raiding threats.

They are more likely to be effectively Batch 2 Type 31s, with the second yard's workload making the follow-on programme likely.

The first war would change so much that Canada, Russia, naval treaties, and U.S. party politics would all reshape the path to any second war.

Dreadnought would likely carry 13.5-inch guns, pushing later British classes toward even larger weapons while simplifying early ammunition standardization.

It would likely combine British and American carrier, cruiser, and destroyer ideas, while frigates remained nationally built but more standardized in equipment.

Both motives appeared, while the infrastructure argument still pointed back to damage and neglect that Britain had a duty to repair.

Use the same planning horizon and include overlooked British ships such as Tiger and the King George V class before comparing totals.

The Royal Navy, because its global commitments force many difficult choices; faster Nelson and Rodney ships are one early example of what hindsight might change.

It would strengthen Britain's status, but using it against Germany would create much more immediate geographic and political danger than an isolated Pacific test or strike.

Yes; the G3s could face Japan while Tiger and the other existing battlecruisers protected Atlantic trade routes.

No; escort-carrier priorities and the lack of a sufficiently large, strong construction site were more important constraints.

No; the ship should standardize on one calibre, most likely 5.25-inch, to avoid unnecessary logistical and spatial complexity.

They can be effective and save metal, but their glues and laminates must withstand hot climates without coming apart.

Britain would need a large CVA-01-type carrier, which could then support a powerful F-14 fighter and Buccaneer strike combination.

It would give Britain major economic leverage and might free U.S. battleships from canal dimensions, but oversized ships would lose inter-ocean mobility.

It would likely be a huge cruiser submarine, potentially using protected or retractable gun turrets around the pressure hull.

Not reliably; escorts and torpedoes remain serious threats, and a carrier-on-carrier gun duel requires an implausible isolation of both ships.

The United States could become one of the Royal Navy's two main planning rivals and a useful British counterweight against France.

The United States would probably enter both world wars from their beginning and develop a much earlier pattern of joint action with Britain.

Torpedoes would lose their most effective concealed platform, forcing navies to develop another way to deliver a primary ship-killing weapon.

Both navies made sensible compromises for different operating environments; the Midway class later demonstrates why each wanted both armour and a large air group.

She should have remained with stronger escorts and flown reconnaissance, giving her earlier warning, room to divert, and time to call for support.

A tow might be possible with help, and the ship could reveal German systems, codes, crew knowledge, and the practical weaknesses of her machinery.

Yes; several radar-equipped ships concentrating accurate fire could overwhelm assumptions based on Yamato fighting only one or two opponents.

Not in a classic carrier battle, but convoy operations demonstrated its defensive strengths and some offensive capability.

American systems were better organized, while Britain preferred machinery its crews could maintain reliably during worldwide deployments.

Less than it may seem: wartime submarines relied heavily on surface operation, and both hull changes and homing torpedoes bring significant operational trade-offs or countermeasures.

A tender is a one-stop support base for a flotilla; a repair ship has the narrower task of patching up vessels and equipment.

Strasbourg has the advantage because her layout, redundancy, and ability to maintain speed in likely North Atlantic conditions outweigh Scharnhorst's claimed advantages.

The Barracuda and Seafire would cover strike and fighter roles, with a longer-range reconnaissance or support aircraft still required.

Marschall would probably press the Denmark Strait success briefly and then withdraw Bismarck home before the Royal Navy could trap her.

An Admiralty research office worked with the Farnborough aircraft establishment to develop it in the early to mid-1930s.