An Equitable Washington Treaty: Aircraft Carriers (Long Patrol)

Carrier limits were difficult to design because the ships were still experimental and their military value was unsettled in 1921-22.

The treaty’s carrier allocation could make Japan feel relatively weaker as carrier aviation became more important.

A close reading of the carrier articles shows how total allowances, the 27,000-ton cap, and conversion exceptions constrained fleet design.

Reliable carrier torpedo attack emerged through years of aircraft, weapon, and release-system refinement rather than arriving fully formed.

Article 9 encouraged conversion of existing capital ships but did not legally require the two permitted 33,000-ton carriers to be conversions.

Comparing Furious, Eagle, Hermes, and Hōshō shows why purpose-built carriers could carry more aircraft for the same treaty tonnage.

North Atlantic and North Sea weather made exposed aircraft an unreliable basis for Royal Navy carrier-capacity planning.

As a carrier grows, fixed systems consume a smaller proportion of its hangar footprint and leave more room for aircraft.

Furious's sloped deck and longitudinal wires show how early landing aids first tried to prevent aircraft from sliding over the side.

Personal papers suggest that designers considered external lifts for large British carrier conversions, but no approved plan establishes that the idea would have been built.

Scaling a purpose-built carrier toward 27,000 tons could combine a larger air group with armour, while a 22,000-ton design bought Britain a sixth hull under the historical allowance.

Early carrier value lay in scouting, counter-reconnaissance, spotting, and trade protection as much as in striking enemy ships.

Conversion estimates looked poor because treaty planners had only early-carrier evidence, even though Lexington and Saratoga later performed better.

Eagle's island anticipated flag-officer accommodation and offered a model for commanding a squadron from a larger British carrier conversion.

Retaining the Cochrane name would have linked an early British carrier to Thomas Cochrane's reputation for naval innovation.

The alternate treaty carries a 10:10:7:4:4 capital-ship ratio into carrier limits while avoiding fractional ship allowances.

British carrier islands combined command, aircrew organization, and smoke management while protecting scarce hangar space.

A treaty that sustains shipbuilding capacity could leave every signatory more modern while reducing hopes of an easy challenge.

Staged conversion requirements would preserve existing investment while delaying unrestricted purpose-built carrier construction.

Hōshō gave the Imperial Japanese Navy an unusually efficient early platform for reconnaissance and fleet support.

The proposed totals give Britain and the United States 330,000 tons each, Japan 231,000, and France and Italy 132,000 apiece.

The same treaty allowance could support concentrated Italian air power in the Mediterranean but left France choosing between large ships and enough decks for three regions.

Twelve 27,500-ton carriers offered Britain a compromise between three-fleet distribution, air-group efficiency, and individual fighting power.

Conversion rules probably preserve Lexington and Saratoga, while Japan's larger allowance opens a path to seven individually powerful carriers.

Atlantic and Pacific commitments let the United States choose between ten very large carriers, more medium carriers, or a mixed conversion and new-build programme.

Reconnaissance, air defence, and spotting dominated the 1920 mission set; strike became a larger design consideration only as the decade progressed.

A 27,500-ton British new build offers a compromise between carrier numbers, useful air groups, and the protection of later armoured designs.

A much larger carrier fleet would make Air Ministry control harder to reconcile with the Royal Navy's operational needs.

Converting four lightly started G3 hulls would trade total carrier numbers for a core of powerful strike carriers.

A G3 conversion could combine a large flight deck, substantial hangar space, flagship facilities, and the possibility of operating larger aircraft.

The closing argument is that an arms-control system endures only when it provides security and an incentive for every power to keep it.