Boxer and the cost of repeatedly changing procurement plans
An operating production line and established support can outweigh the attraction of a theoretically better vehicle.
From Britain's Rearmament 1937 vs 2026: What Lessons are we forgetting? ·
Complete directory
Browse all time notes.
Explore every watch point in reverse video-date order, then in timestamp order within each video.
Type 83 and the shipyard timetable behind programme decisions
Type 26 construction commitments supply one suggested explanation for the timing of Type 83 decisions.
From Britain's Rearmament 1937 vs 2026: What Lessons are we forgetting? ·
Drone-led naval plans and the scale of development funding
Proposed uncrewed naval systems are compared with the investment behind prewar fighters, engines, and gun turrets.
From Britain's Rearmament 1937 vs 2026: What Lessons are we forgetting? ·
Drone capability depends on communications and ready replacements
Communications and replacement programmes are tested against the ambition for a more drone-dependent force.
From Britain's Rearmament 1937 vs 2026: What Lessons are we forgetting? ·
Warship endurance starts with ordinary equipment
Refrigeration, fuel tanks, and machinery connect industrial supply with a ship's operational reach.
From Britain's Rearmament 1937 vs 2026: What Lessons are we forgetting? ·
Royal Fleet Auxiliary pay and support-ship availability
Civilian mariners' employment choices make pay and retention part of fleet readiness.
From Britain's Rearmament 1937 vs 2026: What Lessons are we forgetting? ·
Training budgets and responses under pressure
Industrial foundations and regular training are compared as resources that future equipment promises cannot replace.
From Britain's Rearmament 1937 vs 2026: What Lessons are we forgetting? ·
Carrier damage control and the need to retrain instinct
Carrier stability illustrates why specialist retraining can be necessary even for experienced damage-control officers.
From Britain's Rearmament 1937 vs 2026: What Lessons are we forgetting? ·
Infantry training and the preparation behind Roman military effectiveness
Infantry preparation and Roman drill illustrate the work required to make difficult actions dependable in combat.
From Britain's Rearmament 1937 vs 2026: What Lessons are we forgetting? ·
Continuous training, adaptability, and Thursday War
Continuous practice develops adaptability and equipment proficiency, but exercises need fuel, people, and available ships.
From Britain's Rearmament 1937 vs 2026: What Lessons are we forgetting? ·
Swordfish torpedoes and the problem of shallow water
The Swordfish's torpedo load, night-flying role, and controlled torpedo entry explain capabilities obscured by its biplane appearance.
From Britain's Rearmament 1937 vs 2026: What Lessons are we forgetting? ·
Strike aircraft need trained people and reliable sustainment
Swordfish and F-35B capability depends on trained support personnel and dependable supply arrangements.
From Britain's Rearmament 1937 vs 2026: What Lessons are we forgetting? ·
Overseas bases need docks, stores, and training facilities
Historical dockyards and overseas stations show how repair capacity and stores determine what a basing network can support.
From Britain's Rearmament 1937 vs 2026: What Lessons are we forgetting? ·
Diego Garcia and the strategic timing of basing decisions
A political objection to changing territorial arrangements centres on strategic timing and dependable access.
From Britain's Rearmament 1937 vs 2026: What Lessons are we forgetting? ·
Chamberlain, Baldwin, and inherited rearmament decisions
Britain's readiness in 1939 depended on decisions across successive governments and the industrial damage they inherited.
From Britain's Rearmament 1937 vs 2026: What Lessons are we forgetting? ·
Junior leadership losses and the long effects of war
Frontline junior leaders illustrate how wartime losses can remove future experience and skills.
From Britain's Rearmament 1937 vs 2026: What Lessons are we forgetting? ·
Leadership turnover and repeated changes to defence plans
Successive leaders' preferred solutions can repeatedly change requirements and force procurement work to be redone.
From Britain's Rearmament 1937 vs 2026: What Lessons are we forgetting? ·
Comparing military costs requires the supporting system
Basing and maintenance costs complicate comparisons between forces designed for different tasks.
From Britain's Rearmament 1937 vs 2026: What Lessons are we forgetting? ·
Battleships, carriers, and the risk of a capability gap
Parallel interwar investment illustrates retaining present capability while developing a possible successor.
From Britain's Rearmament 1937 vs 2026: What Lessons are we forgetting? ·
Chain Home and the requirements of integrated air defence
Radar and fighter control underpin the readiness comparison, with missiles, fighters, and sensors defining the modern integration requirement.
From Britain's Rearmament 1937 vs 2026: What Lessons are we forgetting? ·
Maritime surveillance needs ships able to intervene
Patrol aircraft can locate activity across shipping routes, but acting on their reports requires naval forces available nearby.
From Britain's Rearmament 1937 vs 2026: What Lessons are we forgetting? ·
Rebuilding industry and explaining the need for defence
Surviving initial losses requires forces already available and industry able to rebuild them, raising questions about docks and public support.
From Britain's Rearmament 1937 vs 2026: What Lessons are we forgetting? ·
Gowind configurations from patrol vessels to light frigates
Gowind configurations range from offshore patrol vessels to light frigates, with a shared design approach that fits different levels of capability into small hulls.
From The Gowind Class: Flexible Warships for Changing Threats ·
Gowind price examples and the currency caveat
The price comparison illustrates how far Gowind variants differ, although the larger figures have an unclear currency basis.
From The Gowind Class: Flexible Warships for Changing Threats ·
Gowind gun, missile and vertical-launch fits
Compare the gun and missile options across Gowind variants, including Oto Melara 76 mm, Bofors 57 mm, Exocet, Naval Strike Missile and differing VLS capacities.
From The Gowind Class: Flexible Warships for Changing Threats ·
Argentina's lightly armed Gowind patrol vessels
Argentina's nearly 1,500-ton patrol vessels illustrate a Gowind configuration equipped for maritime security with a 30 mm gun and a .50-calibre machine gun.
From The Gowind Class: Flexible Warships for Changing Threats ·
Warship status and authority in maritime security
A lightly armed warship can communicate state authority during maritime-security encounters, with unauthorized fishing as the example.
From The Gowind Class: Flexible Warships for Changing Threats ·
Maritime protest, intent and the Greenpeace example
A criticism of Greenpeace's tactics distinguishes deliberate obstruction at sea from damage attributed to accidental mishandling, alongside personal judgments about intent and legality.
From The Gowind Class: Flexible Warships for Changing Threats ·
Matching armament to piracy and disputed waters
The threat changes the weapons requirement when patrol ships face armed pirates or another state's activity in disputed exclusive economic zones.
From The Gowind Class: Flexible Warships for Changing Threats ·
Guns, warning shots and diplomatic signaling
A gun can signal intent through its direction or a warning shot, while keeping it trained away can communicate restraint during talks.
From The Gowind Class: Flexible Warships for Changing Threats ·
Gowind's recognizable silhouette and naval presence
Gowind's distinctive mast and hull shaping make it recognizable, adding a visual element to naval presence and diplomacy.
From The Gowind Class: Flexible Warships for Changing Threats ·
Malaysia's Gowind choice and the FDI alternative
The Malaysian order prompts a comparison with FDI and an assessment that the alternative frigate could have suited Malaysia's requirements better.
From The Gowind Class: Flexible Warships for Changing Threats ·
Available designs, operational needs and Malaysian delivery expectations
An available design can start construction sooner, but naval capability still depends on delivering ships into service. The Malaysian example ends with uncertain commissioning expectations.
From The Gowind Class: Flexible Warships for Changing Threats ·
Allied destroyer production and misleading class names
Compare large American destroyer classes with British wartime batches whose different names can obscure their common design.
From Japanese Destroyers of WWII: Quantity is a Quality of it's own, it can also be a Decisive one ·
Quality had to include the ability to build enough ships
Japanese reliance on superior technology and training is tested against construction time, organisational demands and fleet size.
From Japanese Destroyers of WWII: Quantity is a Quality of it's own, it can also be a Decisive one ·
One Shimakaze could not cover a fleet's missions
Shimakaze introduces the gap between an excellent individual design and enough hulls to perform simultaneous missions.
From Japanese Destroyers of WWII: Quantity is a Quality of it's own, it can also be a Decisive one ·
Crimea, Ukraine and the time needed to expand forces
A comparison with European rearmament after 2022 asks how early warnings should translate into greater numbers and replacement capacity.
From Japanese Destroyers of WWII: Quantity is a Quality of it's own, it can also be a Decisive one ·
A powerful ship still occupies only one place
Consider how dispersed attacks and uncertainty about an enemy's location limit the value of individual-platform superiority.
From Japanese Destroyers of WWII: Quantity is a Quality of it's own, it can also be a Decisive one ·
Shimakaze's fifteen-torpedo broadside
Shimakaze's offensive promise is set against plans for sixteen, possibly thirty-two, ships and the completion of a single hull.
From Japanese Destroyers of WWII: Quantity is a Quality of it's own, it can also be a Decisive one ·
Shimakaze's construction time and replacement value
Follow Shimakaze's August 1941 to May 1943 construction schedule and the problem of delivering replacements during a war.
From Japanese Destroyers of WWII: Quantity is a Quality of it's own, it can also be a Decisive one ·
Shimakaze's speed, range and combat fuel reserve
Separate a quoted 6,000-nautical-mile range from the fuel needed to go out, return and manoeuvre in combat.
From Japanese Destroyers of WWII: Quantity is a Quality of it's own, it can also be a Decisive one ·
Shimakaze's armament and wartime defensive additions
Review Shimakaze's gun and torpedo battery, increased light anti-aircraft armament and larger depth-charge allowance.
From Japanese Destroyers of WWII: Quantity is a Quality of it's own, it can also be a Decisive one ·
Yugumo as an incremental Kagero design
Yugumo's modest changes illustrate why repeating a proven design should preserve shipyard jigs, skills and production speed.
From Japanese Destroyers of WWII: Quantity is a Quality of it's own, it can also be a Decisive one ·
Yugumo construction before the Pearl Harbor operation
The schedules of Yugumo and Makigumo test how much Japan's chosen yards could accelerate before its planned opening offensive.
From Japanese Destroyers of WWII: Quantity is a Quality of it's own, it can also be a Decisive one ·
Shipyard selection and unused Japanese capacity
Examine an unresolved explanation for underused Japanese yards alongside British closures and American yard expansion.
From Japanese Destroyers of WWII: Quantity is a Quality of it's own, it can also be a Decisive one ·
Yugumo losses, repeated demand and Yamato budget cover
The loss of all nineteen Yugumos is interpreted through repeated demand for useful ships, with a related criticism of concealed battleship spending.
From Japanese Destroyers of WWII: Quantity is a Quality of it's own, it can also be a Decisive one ·
Yugumo's second torpedo salvo depended on survival
Two quadruple launchers and a full reload gave Yugumo two salvos in principle, alongside criticism of its depth-charge provision.
From Japanese Destroyers of WWII: Quantity is a Quality of it's own, it can also be a Decisive one ·
Type 98 guns and the cost of an Akizuki redesign
A destroyer built around four twin Type 98 mountings offered useful dual-purpose firepower as Japan approached war.
From Japanese Destroyers of WWII: Quantity is a Quality of it's own, it can also be a Decisive one ·