Complete directory
Explore every watch point in reverse video-date order, then in timestamp order within each video.
Lloyd's List and the London Gazette give different strengths for the same captured ships, limiting how precisely the forces can be reconstructed.
From Action of the 18th of June 1799: How to Lose Frigates & Influence (Long Patrol) ·
France and its allies lost five scarce cruising ships and their crews while Britain's strength in smaller warships remained comparatively steady.
From Action of the 18th of June 1799: How to Lose Frigates & Influence (Long Patrol) ·
British prisoner policy targeted the navigators and junior officers France needed to rebuild an effective seagoing institution.
From Action of the 18th of June 1799: How to Lose Frigates & Influence (Long Patrol) ·
A French court accepted Perrée's reasons for retreat and surrender, while Britain retained, repurposed, or later disposed of the captured vessels.
From Action of the 18th of June 1799: How to Lose Frigates & Influence (Long Patrol) ·
The Trafalgar counterfactual asks whether a damaged victorious fleet could survive further British interception, then explains why Britain wanted to fight far from its blockade stations.
From Action of the 18th of June 1799: How to Lose Frigates & Influence (Long Patrol) ·
Frigates mattered as fleet scouts, messengers, presence ships, and escorts for the supply convoys that kept blockading squadrons at sea.
From Action of the 18th of June 1799: How to Lose Frigates & Influence (Long Patrol) ·
Attacking Gibraltar with Spanish support is considered as an alternative to Napoleon's Egyptian expedition and its uncertain onward route to India.
From Action of the 18th of June 1799: How to Lose Frigates & Influence (Long Patrol) ·
Poor material condition and limited crew experience prevented Perrée's sailing manoeuvres from defeating a prolonged British pursuit.
From Action of the 18th of June 1799: How to Lose Frigates & Influence (Long Patrol) ·
An equitable baseline exposes the domestic politics and strategic assumptions hidden inside naval treaties.
An additional operational carrier could increase the Taranto strike, improve maintenance margins, and release fast battleships for other theaters.
More and larger carriers would create the orders and institutional demand needed to modernize Fleet Air Arm aircraft earlier.
Replacement age and construction-rate rules can restrain fleet turnover more directly than an arbitrary 35,000-ton hull ceiling.
A modest fixed displacement allowance was more negotiable than repeatedly increasing treaty limits by percentage.
A question about giving Japan more ships leads to an explanation of how perceived respect and security could strengthen diplomatic factions.
The 35,000-ton limit is linked to postwar horror and the belief that weaker battleships could make another war less likely.
A proposed capital-ship ratio illustrates why easily understood whole-number allocations are more durable in negotiation.
The effort to halt an arms race could encourage future challengers to believe a frozen fleet was vulnerable to newer ships.
The proposed 8,000-ton cruiser combines Leander-class speed with Amphion-class armour before appearing in the later force calculation.
Newer Admiral-class conversions could displace Courageous and Glorious, while experimental Furious might remain temporarily or release treaty tonnage.
A 20:20:14:8:8 allocation opens a plausible Italian mix of Francesco Caracciolo battleships and carrier conversions.
Larger 1922 dockyard infrastructure could let Britain lengthen the N3 hull, add machinery, and retain its 18-inch armament at higher speed.
The proposed schedule phases replacement by laying-down date and gun caliber instead of imposing a blanket building holiday.
A neutral calendar cutoff is easier to administer than an emotionally charged armistice anniversary.
Removing one or both midships turrets could make room for enough modern machinery and fuel to approach 27 knots, but only through a difficult reconstruction.
The proposed replacement schedule would concentrate modernisation on Queen Elizabeth-class ships while replacing other old capital ships quickly.
Layered armor can be weaker plate-for-plate yet improve hull survival by preventing seams from forming a continuous path.
A more equitable settlement might not prevent war, but it could keep European and Pacific conflicts from merging into one world war.
John Maynard Keynes is identified as a contemporary British critic of the Washington settlement's industrial damage.
Radically rebuilt R-class ships could add speed and nine 15-inch guns, but thinner protection would make them battlecruisers dependent on maneuver.
Aircraft size changes too much over time for a fixed embarked count to define a carrier's rate reliably.
The County-class cruisers illustrate designing below a limit when later armor and armament growth is expected.
Without treaty rebuild limits, British First World War battleships might receive Warspite-scale reconstructions and approach 28 knots.
G3 orders placed nineteen days before the Washington conference left negotiators comparing familiar wartime programmes with less familiar British postwar designs.
More and larger carriers could strengthen the institutional case for naval control of aviation and support an eight-carrier interwar force.
The treaty restricted Japan's defensive depth while Britain and the United States retained distant homelands and established bases.
Replacing the class's extreme 15-inch armament with 9.2-inch guns could turn the lightly protected hulls into useful large cruisers.
The historical settlement is summarized as weakening industrial capacity without resolving the signatories' security fears.
The treaty did not specify that turrets removed from scrapped ships had to be destroyed, leaving room to retain mountings or their components.
France's capital-ship program addressed Italian competition in the Mediterranean rather than an unwinnable race with Britain or Germany.
Treaty rules allowed large numbers of slow, lightly armed sloops, but governments failed to exploit them before the Battle of the Atlantic.
Adding torpedoes would distract sloops from anti-submarine escort work and duplicate missions better left to destroyers.
A 27,500-ton treaty carrier would approach Audacious scale, leaving a Malta-class equivalent as a plausible wartime successor once limits ended.
Continued replacement could redirect unemployment spending into industrial capacity while sustaining a stronger deterrent fleet.
A larger independent naval air service could demand higher-powered engines and a dedicated single-seat fighter, though its exact design remains unknowable.
An early-built sloop would not become useless before 1939 because its slow escort role left room to add ASDIC and radar.
Completed Italian fast battleships could prompt Britain to build a roughly 40,000-ton F3-derived design with nine 16-inch guns.
HMS Unicorn's aviation-support mission and 24-knot design created a plausible argument that she fell outside carrier tonnage.
The counterfactual keeps the Wall Street crash but changes selected electoral outcomes to isolate how different governments might negotiate.