Video

Who killed the Battleship? / Why no more battleships?

Study Who killed the Battleship? / Why no more battleships?, a Dr. Alex Clarke video from 27 Nov 2023, with 16 time notes. Topics include Aircraft Carriers, Anti-Ship Missiles, Battleships.

Date
Runtime31:42
Guide points16 time notes

Time notes

  1. 1:23
    Five culprits behind the battleship's disappearance

    Five culprits share responsibility for the battleship's disappearance rather than one decisive invention.

    Chapter
  2. 3:04
    Jet aircraft outrange battleship guns

    Jet aircraft could attack beyond battleship gun range, eroding the ship-killing role in which big-gun ships were most lethal.

    Chapter
  3. 5:05
    Secondary battleship roles lose value

    Shore bombardment and task-group defence remained useful, but neither role necessarily justified a new battleship.

    Notable Point
  4. 6:44
    Stalin's death ended the battleship rivalry

    The Soviet abandonment of battleship plans removed the rival capital ship that Western navies would have felt compelled to match.

    Chapter
  5. 7:57
    Why militaries relearn doctrine in war

    Peacetime doctrine can be abandoned when forces underestimate an opponent, forcing militaries to relearn rehearsed lessons through wartime losses.

    Notable Point
  6. 10:39
    Cheap missiles threaten expensive armour

    Missile boats shifted the cost exchange by threatening a capital ship with weapons and launch platforms far cheaper than its armour and infrastructure.

    Chapter
  7. 12:14
    A battleship still needs a task group

    The reactivated Iowas needed layered escorts, inviting a direct comparison between a battleship surface action group and a carrier group of similar cost.

    Chapter
  8. 13:23
    Defence's shrinking share constrains battleships

    Rising cash budgets concealed a lower share of national resources available for defence as other public priorities expanded.

    Chapter
  9. 15:22
    Small production runs drive defence inflation

    Low-volume procurement spreads research, overhead, standby capacity, and integration costs across too few units.

    Chapter
  10. 17:23
    Industrial depth enabled British capital ships

    Britain could restart battleship construction in the 1930s because earlier naval building had preserved yards, skills, and supporting infrastructure.

    Notable Point
  11. 18:13
    Specialized yards limit real competition

    Sparse naval orders leave specialized yards as de facto sole suppliers, weakening price competition and raising the cost of preserving capacity.

    Chapter
  12. 22:22
    Cost, capability, and the missing peer threat

    Battleships became unattractive when their rising cost met duplicated capabilities and no opposing battle line strong enough to justify them.

    Chapter
  13. 22:53
    Britain preserved no battleship of its own

    Britain retained battleships in reserve after the war but preserved none, leaving Japan's British-built Mikasa as the surviving heritage link.

    Notable Point
  14. 25:26
    What a battleship could have done in the Falklands

    A battleship could have supplied command facilities and heavy gunfire in 1982, but a proper carrier programme would have offered broader value.

    Notable Point
  15. 27:11
    Invisible deterrence loses budget arguments

    Armed forces prevent distant problems that voters rarely see, making their value harder to demonstrate than everyday public services.

    Chapter
  16. 30:45
    Why no more battleships: justification and cost

    Justification and cost together explain why battleship construction ended.

    Notable Point