Competition lowers prices only when multiple suppliers can realistically deliver comparable products. The Type 26 and Type 31 frigate programmes show how workload, facilities, and specialization can identify the viable yard before a formal competition concludes. BAE's Type 26 workload, Cammell Laird's specialist and RFA work, Harland and Wolff's poor fit, and Appledore's physical limits left Babcock as the practical option for Type 31. The same workload logic makes the likely builders of the prospective Type 83 destroyer, Type 32 frigates, and offshore patrol vessels foreseeable before bids are assessed. Bidding may remain genuine, yet a yard already committed to another programme must charge for the disruption caused by extra work. The problem also appears in American submarine capacity and raises the question of whether state-owned yards could preserve strategic capacity without adding a private profit margin.
Chapter · 18:13-22:21
Specialized yards limit real competition
Sparse naval orders leave specialized yards as de facto sole suppliers, weakening price competition and raising the cost of preserving capacity.