Taranto Zero: Japan joins WWII on side of Britain in June 1940 - Patreon Alternate History

The scenario starts from a narrow counterfactual: no Second Sino-Japanese War, France falls, and Japan chooses Britain in June 1940.

Refit schedules, operating conditions, and home-defence commitments lead to a proposed deployment of Akagi to the Atlantic and Soryu to the Mediterranean.

Speed, readiness, and gun power send one Kongo toward Force H, other fast ships toward the Home Fleet, and the Nagato class toward Atlantic blocking duties.

Reconstructed Kongos could help contain Germany's fast capital ships, while a stronger Mediterranean carrier force releases heavier ships for the Home Fleet.

Japan's detachment would bring an admiral and supporting ships, requiring practical communications and command arrangements with British forces.

The scenario uses Yonai's influence and opposition to war with America to explain a possible return to Britain's side.

The imagined alliance gives Japan time to manage its internal problems and relations with America while offering territorial and diplomatic gains.

Self-contained warships can deploy before troops and aircraft, while secure routes to North Africa and the absence of fighting in Burma increase the available Allied forces.

Safer shipping could ease famine shortages, while the explanation of transport vulnerability places weight on earlier railway investment decisions.

Japan's proposed alliance would leave Churchill coordinating Japanese forces while keeping American representatives involved in the negotiations.

Parliamentary arithmetic and the exchange between Chamberlain, Halifax, and Churchill frame the account of the premiership changing hands.

Japanese forces would arrive too late to change Mers-el-Kebir directly, while fear of occupation could affect French colonies' choices.

Japan's belligerence on Britain's side reduces pressure on Australia, New Zealand, Singapore, Malaya, and Hong Kong, releasing more troops for North Africa and Europe.

Malayan earnings, Japanese demand for raw materials, and a safer ocean route could ease Britain's economic and shipping pressures.

The counterfactual links American pressure for participation to concern about exclusion from a British-Japanese settlement in the Far East.

The counterfactual considers a naval commitment and expanded Atlantic patrols as possible routes to American participation.

The explanation of Pearl Harbor focuses on preparedness and access to information while rejecting a deliberately arranged attack.

Japan's entry makes the Mediterranean and Suez central because the Indian Ocean becomes a safer Allied support area.

Capital ships and floating docks could shift closer to the Mediterranean when Britain no longer needs to prepare for a Pacific naval war.

Even without war in China, the 1939 Soviet-Japanese conflict may still occur and affect Stalin's timing in Poland.

A detailed allocation sends Soryu and Haruna toward the Mediterranean, Akagi and other Kongos toward Atlantic duties, and the Nagatos toward the Home Fleet.

Italy's larger and more balanced fleet is contrasted with the prestige attached to fighting Germany's better-known capital ships.

The scenario considers how pressure from British and Japanese naval power could affect Soviet neutrality and the timing of Germany's eastern campaign.

The interpretation distinguishes political direction from the command staff's responsibility for plans and professional advice.

Adding Soryu lets Illustrious, Eagle, and the Japanese carrier share maintenance, air defense, strike, and supply burdens in the Mediterranean.

A friendly Japan opens a supply route that avoids Atlantic submarine concentrations, although German surface raiders still require escorts and patrol aircraft.

An August arrival gives Japanese ships time to work up before an October or November attack, with larger air groups and optional American reinforcement.

With Soryu and possibly American carriers present, Taranto becomes a larger British night strike followed by a Japanese or Allied dawn attack.

The proposed follow-up targets damaged battleships and ships leaving harbour, while acknowledging limitations in American torpedoes and Japanese harbour attacks.

The counterfactual links a prolonged loss of the battle fleet to Mussolini's ministerial responsibilities and relations with Germany.

With the Italian battle fleet disabled, Allied cruisers, destroyers, submarines, and troops can cut North African supply while heavy ships redeploy north.

Warspite and Valiant could guard likely German routes, allowing faster British and Japanese ships to pursue breakouts or receive overdue maintenance.

Fast Anglo-Japanese squadrons could combine carrier searches, day and night strikes, and heavy surface forces against German raiders.

British night operations supply a model for Japanese aviation, but wartime training limits favour pairing carriers with complementary skills.

The Denmark Strait comparison allows for exceptional damage even when one side appears stronger on paper.

British and Japanese admirals could command separate groups with deputies from the other navy, while an overall commander coordinates their movements.

Losing the battle fleet, North Africa, and Greece could let Italian royalists depose Mussolini and seek neutrality or a new alliance before Allied troops land in Italy.

Italian withdrawal would expose southern France to an Allied landing, while Crete-based air power could threaten Romanian oil and affect Germany's eastern strategy.

Norway remains a difficult Allied landing option, while the interpretation of German success in 1940 focuses on Norwegian preparation.

The enlarged coalition fleet could protect Soviet supply routes with several carriers and capital ships, changing the conditions behind a PQ 17-type disaster.

A proposed January 1942 offensive from Crete attacks Romanian oil as German winter fuel reserves fall, followed by a March landing in southern France.

Service alongside British and American troops could alter Japanese assessments of their fighting qualities, while the risk of later conflict remains unresolved.

The closing problem pits Bismarck, Tirpitz, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau, and Graf Zeppelin against two Anglo-Japanese carrier groups and a deep blocking force.

The closing strategic argument connects British commitments against Japan to Mediterranean sea control and airfields within range of Romanian oil.